saban_road_cover.final 4/12/05 9:28 PM Page 1 T H E R O A D A T R A H HE OAD HEAD E A D : M MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN I D D LE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S E A S T S T THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION P ECOND ERM O 1775 MASSACHUSETTSAVE.,NW LI C Y WASHINGTON,D.C.20036-2188 I N www.brookings.edu T H E B U PLANNING PAPERS FROM THE S H AD SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY M I N IS AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION T R A T I O N ’ S S E C O N D T E R M EDITED BY FLYNT LEVERETT WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY: MARTIN INDYK KENNETH POLLACK JAMES STEINBERG SHIBLEY TELHAMI T TAMARA COFMAN WITTES H E S A B A N C E N T E R AT T H E B R O O K IN G S IN S T IT U T IO N saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page I T R A HE OAD HEAD M E P IDDLE AST OLICY IN B A ’ THE USH DMINISTRATION S S T ECOND ERM PLANNING PAPERS FROM THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION EDITED BY FLYNT LEVERETT WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY: MARTIN INDYK KENNETH POLLACK JAMES STEINBERG SHIBLEY TELHAMI TAMARA COFMAN WITTES saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page II ABOUTBROOKINGS The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofit organization devoted to research,education,and publication on important issues ofdomestic and foreign policy.Its principal purpose is to bring the highest quality research and analysis to bear on current and emerging policy problems.Interpretations or conclusions in Brookings publications should be understood to be solely those ofthe authors. Copyright © 2005 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue,N.W.,Washington,D.C.20036 www.brookings.edu All rights reserved.No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Brookings Institution Press. The Road Ahead: Middle East Policy in the Bush Administration’s Second Term may be ordered from: Brookings Institution Press 1775 Massachusetts Avenue,N.W., Washington,D.C.20036 Tel.1-800/275-1447 or 202/797-6258 Fax:202/797-2960 www.bookstore.brookings.edu Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication data are available ISBN-13:978-0-8157-5205-9 ISBN-10:0-8157-5205-9 The paper used in this publication meets minimum requirements ofthe American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence ofPaper for Printed Library Materials:ANSI Z39.48-1992. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page III T ABLE OF CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FLYNT LEVERETT FIGHTING BINLADENISM 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SHIBLEY TELHAMI AND JAMES STEINBERG PROMOTING REFORM IN THE ARAB WORLD 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAMARA COFMAN WITTES ACHIEVING MIDDLE EAST PEACE 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MARTIN INDYK SAVING IRAQ 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KENNETH M. POLLACK TACKLING TEHRAN 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KENNETH M. POLLACK ENGAGING DAMASCUS 81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FLYNT LEVERETT REENGAGING RIYADH 95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FLYNT LEVERETT THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION III saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page IV A A BOUT THE UTHORS MARTININDYK KENNETHPOLLACK Martin Indyk is director of the Saban Center for Kenneth Pollack is director of research at the Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Saban Center. He previously served as a CIA He has served as special assistant to the president analyst and as the National Security Council’s and senior director for Near East and South Asia director for Persian Gulfaffairs and for Near East in the National Security Council and as assistant and South Asian affairs. His new book, The secretary ofstate for Near East Affairs.As a mem- Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and ber of President Clinton’s peace team, he also America (November 2004), examines the trou- served twice as U.S. ambassador to Israel. He is bled history ofU.S.-Iranian relations and offers a currently completing a book on Clinton’s diplo- new strategy for U.S. policy towards Iran. He is macy in the Middle East. also the author of The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq and Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness,1948–1991(both 2002). FLYNTLEVERETT Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow at the Saban Center. He was senior director for Middle East JAMESSTEINBERG affairs at the National Security Council,advising James Steinberg is vice president and director of the White House on relations with Egypt,Israel, the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Brookings Institution.Prior to joining Brookings Saudi Arabia,and Syria.He previously served as he was a senior advisor at the Markle Foundation. a Middle East and counterterrorism expert on Mr.Steinberg also held several senior positions in the Secretary ofState’s Policy Planning Staffand the Clinton Administration, including deputy as a senior CIA analyst. He is the author of the national security advisor and director ofthe Policy forthcoming bookInheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial Planning Staffat the U.S.Department ofState.His by Fire(April 2005),and is currently at work on previous positions include deputy assistant secre- a book about the future ofSaudi Arabia. tary for regional analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department and senior analyst at RAND.Mr.Steinberg is the author ofand contributor to many books on for- eign policy and national security topics,as well as domestic policy,including Protecting the American Homeland and An Ever Closer Union: European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations. IV THE ROAD AHEAD: MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S SECOND TERM saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page V SHIBLEYTELHAMI Shibley Telhami is a nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center. He is the Anwar Sadat Professor at the University of Maryland and author of The Stakes: America and the Middle East (2002). His many other publications on Middle East politics include Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (1990). His current research focuses on the media’s role in shaping Middle Eastern political identity and the sources ofideas about U.S.policy in the region. TAMARACOFMANWITTES Tamara Cofman Wittes is a senior fellow at the Saban Center. She previously served as Middle East specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace and director ofprograms at the Middle East Institute. Her work has addressed a wide range of topics, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotia- tions, humanitarian intervention, and ethnic conflict. Her current research focuses on U.S. policy toward democratization in the Arab world and the challenge of regional economic and political reform. She is the author of the forth- coming book How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process (2005). THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION V saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page VI saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page 1 I : NTRODUCTION B M E USH AND THE IDDLE AST Flynt Leverett C onfronting a terrorist threat that struck the defined broadly to include important non-Arab American homeland on September 11, states in the Muslim world,such as Afghanistan, 2001, President George W. Bush responded by Iran,and Turkey. laying out a bold foreign policy and national security strategy with few precedents in the mod- ANAMBITIOUSAGENDA ern record of American diplomacy.To deal with the threat ofglobal terror,Bush did not explore a Speaking just nine days after the September 11 reconfiguration of the global balance of power, attacks,the president declared war not simply on as, in very different ways, his father had at the Usama bin Ladin and the jihadists that had end of the Cold War and Richard Nixon had struck the United States, but on all terrorism in the early 1970s. Bush did not propose the “with global reach.”In the process,Bush articu- creation of a new network of alliances,as Harry lated a maximalist vision for victory in that Truman did at the outset of the Cold War. struggle. The United States would not content Likewise,Bush did not call for the development itselfwith destroying terrorist cells and organiza- of new international institutions or a system of tions around the world; those states that, in collective security, as Franklin Roosevelt had Washington’s view, support terrorist activity envisioned rising out of the rubble and ashes of would have to choose whether they stood with World War II. the civilized world or with the terrorists. Rather,facing the defining challenge ofhis presi- In the fall of 2001,the United States launched a dency, Bush developed and pursued a policy military campaign to unseat the Taliban regime approach that can be described as Wilsonian (or, in Afghanistan that had given bin Ladin and his perhaps,Reaganesque) in its ambition to secure followers safe haven, as well as to root out the America by changing the political orientation of al-Qa‘ida leadership from its sanctuaries there. states in far-flung parts of the globe. As this But it was not clear, at the outset of Operation ambitious agenda took shape,it became increas- Enduring Freedom, whether the United States ingly clear that President Bush’s approach to was acting primarily to eliminate a specific securing American interests in the post-9/11 terrorist threat through a “decapitation”strategy world was focused primarily on the Middle East, against al-Qa‘ida or to launch a sustained THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1 saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page 2 campaign to remake the Arab and Muslim recruits were bred.The president proposed to do worlds—in terms ofboth the strategic balance in this by nothing short of remaking the Arab and the broader Middle East and prevailing models Muslim worlds.As the president’s 2002 National ofgovernance across the region. Security Strategy operationalized this idea, the United States would strive to diminish “the In the early stages of the war on terror,the fight underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by against al-Qa‘ida provided the impetus for a dra- enlisting the international community to focus matic upturn in counterterrorism cooperation its efforts and resources on areas most at risk” between the United States and governments and by “supporting moderate and modern gov- around the world.The struggle against al-Qa‘ida ernment, especially in the Muslim world, to and related groups also prompted an unprece- ensure that the conditions and ideologies that dented degree of official U.S. engagement with promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in the problems of public diplomacy toward the any nation.” Muslim world,with the aim of undercutting the appeal ofIslamist extremism. Bush’s transformative agenda for what would come to be called the broader Middle East had at But President Bush’s maximalist aspirations least two foundational aspects.First,with regard became increasingly apparent as the war pro- to regional conflicts, the president embraced a gressed.In particular,the president broadened the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian con- focus ofthe war on terror to encompass an entire flict more fully than any of his predecessors. In category of“rogue”regimes.In his January 2002 contrast to President Clinton, who publicly State of the Union address,Bush underscored his endorsed the notion of Palestinian statehood concern about those state sponsors of terrorism only during his last month in office and as an that were simultaneously pursuing weapons of “idea”that would be taken offthe table at the end mass destruction (WMD)—especially nuclear of his term, Bush made the establishment of a weapons—and oppressing their own peoples. Palestinian state a high-profile element of his Three such states—Iran,Iraq,and North Korea— Administration’s declaratory foreign policy, lay- were enshrined in the address as members of an ing out his position in clear language before the “axis of evil.”A prospective link between ties to United Nations General Assembly in November terrorist groups and pursuit ofWMD capabilities 2001.(Indeed,one of the president’s undeniable was subsequently adduced by the Administration achievements in the Arab-Israeli arena has been to justify military intervention to unseat Saddam to normalize discussion of Palestinian statehood Hussein’s regime in Baghdad—a regime that in the United States and in Israel.) had no demonstrable involvement in the September 11 attacks and,as the U.S.Intelligence Second,Bush articulated a vision of democratic Community argued at the time and the 9/11 and market-oriented reform for the Arab and Commission concluded in retrospect, no mean- Muslim worlds, ascribing a higher priority to ingful operational ties to al-Qa‘ida. promoting positive internal change in Middle Eastern countries than any of his predecessors. In the months that followed the 9/11 attacks, To implement this vision,the president proposed Bush also made clear that he was determined to a number ofimportant policy initiatives,includ- address what he considered the root causes ofthe ing a Middle East Trade Initiative aimed at the terrorist threat confronting the United States and eventual creation of a Middle East Free Trade its democratic allies—as the president sometimes Area and a Greater Middle East Initiative for put it, to “drain the swamp” in which terrorist reform, which, in collaboration with the G-8, 2 THE ROAD AHEAD: MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S SECOND TERM saban_road_reprint.final 4/12/05 9:38 PM Page 3 became the Broader Middle East and North In the essays that follow, the fellows of the Africa initiative. Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy (along with James Steinberg, The president also linked his quest for democra- vice-president and director of Foreign Policy tization in the Arab and Muslim worlds to his Studies at Brookings) offer their recommenda- policy approaches for Iraq and the creation of a tions as to how the Bush Administration might Palestinian state.Bush has repeatedly argued that yet completethe ambitious agenda it has defined the establishment of a democratic Iraq,“in the for itself in the broader Middle East. Some of heart ofthe Middle East,”would have a transfor- the authors might not agree with all of the mative effect across the region.Similarly,he has arguments advanced in pieces composed by their argued that the establishment ofa democratically colleagues. Nevertheless, all of the essays start legitimated Palestinian leadership free from the with some common analytic judgments about taint of corruption and terror is essential to the Bush Administration’s first-term foreign achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli- policy record and some common assumptions Palestinian conflict. about how best to move forward. As the president embarked on his second term in One of the principal assessments animating all office, he reaffirmed his commitment to this the essays is that the Bush Administration’s han- transformative agenda. In his second inaugural dling of the core policy challenges in the Middle address, Bush noted that “as long as whole East has been suboptimal, at best. On multiple regions of the world simmer in resentment and fronts—the fight against terror rooted in Islamist tyranny—prone to ideologies that feed hatred extremism,post-conflict stabilization and recon- and excuse murder—violence will gather, and struction in Iraq, and dealing with the threat multiply in destructive power,and cross the most posed by other regional rogues (such as Iran and defended borders, and raise a mortal threat.” Syria)—current trends are not positive; a There is,Bush argued,“only one force in history straight-line continuation of the status quo on that can break the reign of hatred and resent- these issues could well prove disastrous for U.S. ment,and expose the pretensions oftyrants,and interests in the region. reward the hopes ofthe decent and tolerant,and that is the force ofhuman freedom.”On the basis The Administration’s difficulties in prosecuting ofthis analysis,Bush declared,“It is the policy of the global war on terror illustrate well this basic the United States to seek and support the growth point. The “war on terror” may have been the of democratic movements and institutions in single most important conceptual and rhetorical every nation and culture,with the ultimate goal framework shaping President Bush’s foreign ofending tyranny in our world.” policy during his first term, but, within a few months after the 9/11 attacks, this framework had begun to lose its focus as a framing device A REGIONINTHEBALANCE for policy. From this review,it is clear that Bush’s steward- ship of the war on terror and his foreign policy In particular,the decision to prepare for and,ulti- more generally will be judged primarily by their mately, to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom was efficacy and impact in the Middle East.It is also never accepted as an integral part of the war on clear that, at this writing, the success or failure terror by large parts ofthe international commu- of the Administration’s policies in that essential nity.In the aftermath ofthe September 11 attacks, region hangs very much in the balance. the United States had the support ofvirtually the THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 3