The Rentier State Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case Ahmet Kuru* After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the theoretical perspectives for Central Asian studies became less capable to explore the region. The new republics of the region cannot be politically considered any more as a part of Soviet studies. They cannot be ideologically examined as socialist countries either. Some scholars have tended to survey Central Asian republics as a part of the Muslim world. However, the radical secularist political and bureaucratic structures of these republics, in addition to the weaknesses of the Islamic institutions (except Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), have complicated an Islam-based theoretical framework. The rising (particularly official) nationalism in these countries is also claimed to be an alternative window to analyze the region. However, nationalism is used very instrumentally by the governments of these countries, and moreover, does not have an institutionalized popular basis. Therefore, nationalism cannot be an independent tool of analysis. So, what might be the new theoretical perspective for Central Asian studies? I argue that the rentier state model based on the natural gas and oil politics is the best analytical tool to analyze the newly independent republics of Central Asia. Natural gas and oil politics essentially affects both socio-economic and political structures of those countries, in a similar way that it has shaped the rentier states of the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, natural gas and oil politics has an eminent impact on Central Asian republics’ foreign policies and their intra-regional relations, similarly to the explanations proposed by the rentier state model. This paper will analyze Turkmenistan, as a representative case of the region, through the lens of the rentier state model. The first part of the paper will examine Turkmen domestic politics. I will begin with the relationship between the rentier economy and the colonial legacy. Then I will compare Turkmenistan and Libya as two rentier states. Next, I will examine Turkmenbashi’s authoritarian rule. The second part will survey Turkmen foreign policy in light of the rentier state model in three issues: (1) Turkmen policy on the Central Asian integration, (2) Turkmenistan’s neutrality status, and (3) Turkmen natural gas and oil policy based on multi-optional pipeline projects. The Rentier State Model and Turkmen Domestic Politics The Rentier Economy and The Colonial Legacy The basic definition of a ‘rentier state’ is ‘a state reliant not on extraction of the domestic population’s surplus production but on externally generated revenues, or rents, such as those derived from oil.’1 In this perspective, a rentier state is based on a rentier economy ‘in which income from rent dominates the distribution of national income, and thus where rentiers wield considerable political influence.’2 Since the rent (i. e., the income Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 52 derived from the gift of nature3) dominates the significant amount of the GDP, a rentier state generally lacks a productive outlook. In the literature some other terms, such as ‘allocation state’4 and ‘distributive state,’5 are used interchangeably with ‘rentier state.’ Those alternative terms emphasize the functions of state (allocation and distribution), instead of its source of revenue (the rent). The rentier states are mainly located in the Middle East and North Africa. Lisa Anderson adds Venezuela to the list of rentier states, which includes Libya, S. Arabia, Iran, and Nigeria, among others.6 In addition to the rentier economy, many of these states share an historical institutional legacy. State structures in these countries began to be consolidated after colonization and the territorial boundaries ‘had been created by outside powers before state-building started.’7 Along the same vein, the borders of today’s Turkmenistan were drawn by Moscow in 1924 by the foundation of Turkmenistan Soviet Socialist Republic. The ‘Turkmen nation’ was designed by meeting Stalin’s four criteria of nationhood: unity of language, territory, economy, and historical culture.8 Turkmen nation-building, however, was not consolidated in the Soviet era. During that period, the Turkmen nation has continued to be ‘a tribal confederation rather than a modern nation’, mainly because of the persistence of endogamy and dialects between tribes.9 Turkmenistan declared sovereignty in 1990 and independence in the following year. Since that time it has been in transition from socialism to a rentier economy. The Turkmen economy depends on the revenues from natural gas, which constitute major portion of the GNP. According to data of January 1999, natural gas constituted 70 Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 53 per cent of Turkmenistan’s total export, cotton fiber - 12,8 per cent, and crude oil and oil products 9 per cent.10 As this data shows, Turkmenistan’s oil production is less important than that of natural gas. The state has a monopoly on the property of natural gas and oil reserves, their revenues, and the distribution of those revenues. The state aims to use natural gas revenues to consolidate its institutional structure. It also seeks to gain popular support by providing free housing, electricity, water, and bread. Similar to other rentier states,11 Turkmenistan’s political legitimacy remains quite low and is bound to the state’s ability to continue these welfare functions. The former socialist system and current rentier state structure in Turkmenistan have some similarities. Both systems generally bring in an unproductive and huge number of government employees.12 Moreover, they both provide social services and subsidies. However, the meanings of those policies differ in socialist and rentier regimes. While the former implements those policies as a result of socialist mode of production and state-based property system, the latter use these policies as welfare programs and distribution of external capital flow while possessing a capitalist economy. In rentier states, the combination of the rentier economy and the colonial legacy results in two general problems. Economically, colonial exploitation is an impediment for industrialization. After independence the new state is supposed to initiate an industrialization policy. However, the rentier economy encourages short-term expenditure rather than long-term investments. In other words, the rentier revenues become a source of shortcoming, instead of an opportunity, for economic development. The second problem is political. The colonial power systematically diminishes sources of resistance, including Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 54 traditional social institutions. Following independence, society needs to rehabilitate the oppressed social institutions and associations. Nevertheless, the state becomes too powerful in comparison to the society due to the rentier revenues. The state, analogous to colonial policies, regards social institutions and associations as sources of political resistance and oppresses them. The result, in many rentier states, is weak society in short-term and weak state in long-term. Turkmenistan has faced the economic and political problems caused by the Soviet colonialism and the rentier economy. Between 1961-1980 more than 500 billion cubic meters natural gas were produced in Turkmenistan SSR.13 Moscow exploited that production and did not invest in the native country. Currently, Turkmenistan lacks an industrial infrastructure at any level. Following independence the state has spent the natural gas revenues to the luxurious consumption rather than to the long-term infrastructure. Similarly, the Soviet Union created an institutional vacuum in the Turkmen society by destroying the social and religious institutions. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is a benefit provided by the Soviet Union to Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan inherited a bureaucratic structure from the Soviet Union like other Central Asian republics, which is hard to find in many Middle Eastern rentier states. Since independence the Turkmen state has established a monopoly on political, economic, and even social life using natural gas revenues. The state does not allow the development of social forces and systematically weakens them to preserve its own hegemony. As a result, the rentier economy consolidates authoritarianism in Turkmenistan. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 55 Comparison between Turkmenistan and Libya The rentier state is financially depends on international capital inflow. The external revenues free the state from the need of taxation. ‘[W]henever the state essentially relies on taxation the question of democracy becomes an unavoidable issue, and a strong current in favor of democracy inevitably arises’.14 On the contrary, the political principle in a rentier state is ‘no representation without taxation’. Moreover, since oil production is a capital- intensive industry, it results in a lack of organized labor through unions and leftist opposition while supporting centralized state structure. For these reasons, the rentier state structure is essentially is incompatible with democracy. It is well-matched with various kinds of authoritarian regimes. In S. Arabia, the rentier state structure co-exits with a monarchy, in Iran with a theocracy, and in Algeria with an oligarchy. Turkmenistan is neither a monarchy nor a theocracy nor an oligarchy. Libya is the rentier state that is most similar to Turkmenistan in terms of political regime. Both countries are ruled by leaders who created personal cults (Turkmenbashi and Kaddafi). Dirk Vandewalle’s analysis of Libya is insightful to compare these two countries through a rentier state perspective. Turkmenistan does not fit Giacomo Luciani’s rentier state model in two issues. Vandewalle’s explanations on Libya are helpful to solve these two problems. First, Luciani claims that in a rentier state individuals seek their interests within the system that is in charge of distribution. Therefore, ‘Loyalty is to the system, not to individuals in power.’15 That contradicts Turkmenbashi’s personal rule. Vandewalle, however, revises this model claiming that ‘as particular in Libya, a careful and deliberate association of the Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 56 two [the distributive system and the leader] can yield a high political payoff, especially if it involves a charismatic leader.’16 Second, Luciani argues that a rentier state ‘does not need to refer a national myth and, as a matter of fact, will usually avoiding so.’ ‘A national myth,’ for Luciani, ‘may be interpreted as a basis to claim a say’17 for the sections of the population that are excluded from the allocation process. Turkmenistan, however, is not a patrimonial state like Gulf monarchies. It has a tribal structure, but the state is by no means captured by a single tribe. The state claims to represent the nation as a whole and promotes several national myths to unify the nation. The media and schools indoctrinate those national myths to the people. Vandewalle’s explanations on Libya are, again, helpful to solve the contradiction between the rentier state model and the Turkmen case. Vandewalle stresses ‘In Libya, particularly, we find its leader employing a powerful combination of ideology, charisma, reliance on moral persuasion and religious symbols, and invented national myths…to instill a sense of community and create political allegiance where formal mechanisms are absent or meaningless.’18 Turkmenistan and Libya have also some other similarities, which are typical features of rentier states. First of all, they both have political structures based on colonial legacy and the luxury of oil and natural gas.19 Second, they have small populations (Turkmenistan 5 millions, Libya 2 millions) and huge hydrocarbon reserves. That encourages migration, especially worker transfer, from neighboring countries. Third, the distinction between public and private goods is often blurred in both countries, like many other rentier states.20 It is hard ‘to distinguish treasury from pocket’ of the leader in Libya.21 Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 57 So does in Turkmenistan. Finally, both states are pursuing nation-building policies to strengthen national identities vis-à-vis supranational ones (Islam, pan-Turkism, and pan- Arabism). In the following section, I will focus on the nation-building and other policies of Turkmenbashi to see the relationship between the rentier state structure and authoritarian regime in Turkmenistan. Turkmenbashi’s Authoritarian Rule Saparmurat Niyazov, elected as the first president in 1990 and the president for life in 1999, has ruled Turkmenistan for a decade with an authoritarian regime.22 He was given the name of ‘Turkmenbashi’ (the head of Turkmens) following the independence. The legislative bodies, The Mejlis (Parliament) and Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council), only rubber-stamp his decisions. The ministers do not have real power and they are frequently humiliated and sometimes fired by the President in live TV broadcasts. Military/civil bureaucrats also cannot limit Turkmenbashi’s charismatic authority. Turkmenbashi’s most significant policy, ‘10 Yyl Abadancylyk’ (10 Years Stability), was declared in December 1992.23 This policy aims to preserve political stability and socio-economic development avoiding opposition and political crisis. Following the declaration of independence, two opposition parties were constituted: Agzybirlik (Solidarity) and the Democratic Party. These parties have been suppressed and are now banned. The Peasant Party was planned as a non- opposition party. Although it was registered, this party became inactive. As a result, Turkmenbashi’s Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (formerly the Communist Party of Turkmenistan) is the only political party. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 58 Under the direction of Turkmenbashi, the Turkmen State initiated the nation- building policy to fill the ideological vacuum, to maintain the source of legitimacy for the new nation-state, and to adapt to the inter-national system. The governmental nation- building policy has two main goals, the unity of Turkmen tribes and gradual socio-cultural de-Russification of Turkmenistan. These goals are pursued through promoting Turkmen as the vernacular language, using history writing and propaganda, controlling education, and channeling the media to transmit symbols and narratives. The development of Turkmen as the vernacular language both helps to maintain national homogeneity as a ‘national glue’ extinguishing differences between tribal dialects and to weaken the influence of the Russian culture. Tribal identities, especially the five biggest ones, Teke, Yomut, Ersary, Salyr, and Saryk, are still influential in social life. The lack of a hierarchical mechanism and leadership within the tribes is a historical legacy,24 which weakens the current political roles and influences of the tribes. Although Turkmenbashi is from the Teke tribe, his tribal loyalty is not strong since he grew up in an orphanage. He does not seek the dominance of the culture of Teke, the biggest tribe which was politically effective during the Soviet period.25 Turkmenbashi’s goal is to create a shared Turkmen culture. The Turkmen society has a very limited role in the political life. The dearth of civil associations, a free media, a bourgeoisie class, and political parties result in the weakness of society vis-à-vis the state. The rentier state policies of Turkmen state (e.g., free electricity, water, and natural gas supplies) based on natural gas income, instead of the tax of the citizens, consolidate this uneven relation between the state and the society. The Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 59 bureaucratic nomenclatura try to preserve the rentier state regime, depending on the profits of natural gas like many Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, the new generation, especially 4000 young Turkmens currently being trained in 24 countries abroad,26 may strengthen Turkmen society in the future. The Rentier State Model and The Turkmen Foreign Policy The Turkmen Policy on the Central Asian Integration In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the leaders of Central Asian countries met in Ashgabat and discussed common problems. However, they could not formulate a shared strategy and each country took its own way. After that, Turkmenistan set up bilateral relations with other Central Asian countries. Turkmenbashi has opposed the Central Asian integration since the early 1990s.27 Several factors, such as the threat of Russian re-intervention to their independence, intra-regional minority and border tensions, and ecological problems, encouraged Central Asian republics to a regional integration. Those countries have strong religious (Sunni Islam), linguistic (Turkic with the exception of Tajikistan), and ethnic ties. The term ‘Turkestan’28 was used to define Central Asia as a unit entity symbolizing these ties. In early 1994, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to create a common economic space. In May 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined this agreement and the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) was founded.29 In 1999, Tajikistan became the fourth member. This organization’s initial objectives were the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor among the members. The CAEU has been partially institutionalized; it has a permanent executive committee, a planning committee, a bank for cooperation and Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002) 60