The Problem of POLITICAL OBLIGATION A Critique of Liberal Theory Carole Pateman The Problem of Political Obligation The Problem of Political Obligation A Critique of Liberal Theory Carole Pateman University of California Press BERKELEY LOS ANGELES © John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1979; Carole Pateman, 1985. First published 1979 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This paperback edition published in 1985 by the University of California Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatk>n Data Pateman, Carole. The problem of political obligation. Reprint. Originally published: Chichester; New York: Wiley, cl979. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Allegiance 2. Liberalism 3. Democracy I. Title. JC328.P27 1986 323.6’5’01 85 8719 ISBN 0 520 05650 7 (pbk. : alk. paper) Printed in Great Britain For Roy Acknowledgements I first began work on this study during my periods as Visiting Fellow in the Political Science Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and I am grateful to have had such congenial surroundings in which to gather my thoughts together. I am also grateful to participants in seminars in North America, Australia and England to which I have presented papers on this topic, and to the many people with whom I have discussed my ideas. I owe special thanks to Brian Barry for commenting on the manuscript in its various stages, and also to my namesake, Trevor Pateman, and to Michael Masterson. I should also like to thank Harry Beran, Michael Jackson, Zbigniew Pelczynski, Hanna Pitkin, Raymond Plant, Peter Singer and Michael Walzer for their comments on particular arguments or chapters. The final argument is, of course, my own. My biggest debt is expressed in the dedication: to my husband, who has demonstrated that there is nothing immutable or ‘natural’ about the prevailing sexual division of labour, and who typed successive drafts, made invaluable comments, and who has provided the support over the years which has made my academic work possible. vii Contents Introduction ___ __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __, __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. ____1 Chapter 1; Problems and Questions ........................................................... 11 Obligation and Liberal Individualism ...................................................... 11 Promising and Political Obligation ........................................................... 14 Consent and Self- Assumed Obligation ...................................................... 20 Chapter!; Self-Assumed Obligation and Abstract Individualism ... 24 The 'Problem’ of Promising ...................................................................... 26 The Problem of Arbitrariness . __ ____ __. . . __. . _____30 Chapter 3: Political Obligation and the Sword of Leviathan ...................... 37 The State of Nature __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __.___________38 Obligation in the State of Nature ........................................................... 41 TheJLaws-otNaiuie __ __ __ __. __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __45 The Social Contract and the Authorization of the Sovereign .... 49 Political Obedience and the Right of Refusal ........................................... 55 Chapter 4: ‘No Expressions of it at All* ...................................................... 60 The Lockean State of Nature ___. __. __. ___ ____. _____. ________ _______62 The Lockean Social Contract___ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _____68 Consent in Civil Society ............................................................................ 72 The Limit of Political Obligation and the Right of Resistance .... 76 Chapter 5; Contemporary Consent Theory ................................................ 81 Consent and Liberal Democratic Voting ................................................. 83 Consent and Pluralism___ __ __ __ __ __. __ __ __. __. __.___21 x x x A Postscript on ‘Consent’ in the Pre-Modem Period ........................... 98 Chapter 6: Hypothetical Voluntarism and the Conceptual Argument . . 103 Political Obedience in the Philosophy ofRight ...................................... 105 Rawls on Obligation and Natural Duties ................................................. 113 The Benefits and Participation Arguments ................................................. 121 Voluntarism and the Private Sphere ...................................................... 129 Chapter 7: The Democratic Social Contract ................................................ 134 Philosophical Anarchism and Political Authority ...................................... 135 Rousseau’s True State of Nature ___. __, __. __. __. __, __, ____. __. __, __. __142 ± ix X The Fraudulent Liberal Social Contract ___. __. __, __, __, __, __. __. __. __. __145 Rousseau’s Participatory Social Contract ....................................................... 150 Majorities and Minorities ............................................................................... 159 Chapter 8: Political Obedience or Political Obligation? ........................... 163 Liberal Theory and Political Obedience ....................................................... 164 Democratic Theory and Political Obligation ................................................. 172 Afterword (1985) ........................................................................................... 179 Notes ................................................................................................................. 195 References . __. __. __ __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __. __ __. ___ _209 1972 ............ 209 1985 ......................................................................................................................... 216 Further Reading ........................................................................................... 217 Index __. __. __* __ __ __ __. __ __. __ __. __. __. __. __. __ __. __ ___ ____ __220 Promises are the uniquely human way of ordering the future, making it predictable and reliable to the extent that this is humanly possible. H. Arendt, Civil Disobedience Only political superstition believes at the present time that civil life must be held together by the State, when in reality the State is upheld by civil life. K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family xi Introduction Political obligation, even in Oxford, is now an old-fashioned topic. J. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation. Most recent discussions of the political authority of the liberal democratic state and the political obligation of its citizens are based on one of two assumptions: that general problems about political obligation have now been resolved or are easily resolvable ; or that no such problems exist. One aim of this book is to show that the latter assumption is unfounded and that political obligation is inherently problematic. My larger aim, which is both more substantive and more controversial, is to show that political obligation in the liberal democratic state constitutes an insoluble problem ; insoluble because political obligation cannot be given expression within the context of liberal democratic institutions. The problem of political obligation can be solved only through the development of the theory and practice of participatory or self-managing democracy. There are few contemporary theorists who would dispute that citizens of states ruled by modem tyrants, by repressive and cruel military regimes, or by ruthless authoritarian parties, may legitimately doubt that their governments have a rightful claim to their obedience. But the liberal democratic state is different ; the nature and the basis of its authority are such that, although specific laws or policies of government may sometimes be open to question, the general political obligation of citizens is beyond doubt Some writers have claimed that this is so far beyond doubt that to suggest that a general problem may exist shows only that one is philosophically confused. 1 The majority of theorists do not try to eliminate the problem in this way. They regard political obligation as a genuine problem since they agree that it requires justification, and there is no point in looking for a justification of something unless there is some difficulty about it However, most political theorists also agree that a justification can quite easily be provided; the problem of political obligation is not an intractable one and can be solved with relative ease. That is to say, it is widely assumed that citizens in the liberal democratic state do have a justified political obligation. Political theorists are also widely agreed upon the form of justification that is required. For three hundred years, political theory 'has been characterized, . . . above all by voluntarism, by an emphasis on the assent of individuals as the standard of political legitimacy’. 2 Contemporary writers on political obligation typically appeal to voluntarist arguments. Like their predecessors the social contract theorists, they offer