Central Asian Survey (September 2006) 25(3), 267–286 The logic of Islamic practice: a 1 religious conflict in Central Asia SERGEI ABASHIN In the afterword to the 1995 edition of Orientalism and in the preface to the 2003 edition Edward Said expressed his regret at the continuing dominance of the ideological fictions of the ‘West’, the ‘East’ and ‘Islam’. These terms reduce ‘aheterogeneous,dynamic,andcomplexhumanreality’tosimpleabstractionsfor- mulated ‘from an uncritically essentialist standpoint’.2 Said’s Orientalism greatly contributedtodeconstructingthesefictions,showinghowtheyactedasinstruments of (neo-)colonialdomination.Unfortunately,this hasnotprevented numerous sub- sequent attempts to essentialise ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ Islam in diverse political contexts. Anarmy of ‘combative and woefully ignorant policy experts’,according to Said, continue to persuade themselves and the public about the reality of their abstract schemas, reproducing old and engendering new conflicts. In similar vein, Devin DeWeese critiques what he terms ‘Sovietological Islamology’ in his review of Yaacov Ro’i’s Islam in the Soviet Union.3 DeWeese contends that sovietologists in the West based their description of Islam on inadequate data and problematic sources, and that they merely repro- duced the language of Soviet experts engaged in the project of managing the Muslim territories of the Soviet Union. One of the cliche´s put forward by Sovietexpertsandsovietologistswastheoppositionbetween‘official’and‘unof- ficial’ Islam (which was sometimes characterised as ‘folk’, or ‘everyday’ Islam). Theformerwastreatedas‘pure’Islamwhilethelatterincludedmanynon-Islamic elements. DeWeese argues that this opposition implies ‘an essentially abstract ideal of Islam defined in quite narrow terms that would exclude much of the daily substance of religious life in most traditional Muslim societies’.4 He gives many examples of how the categories of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam contra- dicted the reality of dynamically changing religious institutions and hierarchies, ritualsandrelations,interpretationsandidentities,whichexistedin‘Soviet’Islam. The critique by Said and DeWeese of ‘expert’ knowledge of Islam, both of Islam in general and of ‘Soviet’ Islam, can also be applied to ‘post-Soviet’ Islam. The Soviet Union has disintegrated into different states with their own trajectories of development. However, much analysis of Islam in this vast space Correspondence should be addressed to Sergei Abashin, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Lavochkina Str., 10-74, Moscow, 125499, Russia ((Tel: 495) 938-55-70; Email: s- [email protected]) 0263-4937print=1465-3354online=06=03=0267-20#2006CentralAsianSurvey DOI:10.1080=02634930601022542 SERGEIABASHIN continues to be locked in simplistic schemes which contrast ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims.Onlynowinplaceofthe‘official’and‘unofficial’dualismisanopposi- tion between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘fundamentalism’. The first is described as moderate, liberal, rooted in the local history and national traditions of a specific society.Thesecondischaracterisedbyadjectivessuchasaggressive,radical,dog- matic, alien to the region, and dangerously cosmopolitan. This transformation in the representation of Muslim society in post-Soviet space is generated both by developments in global projects into which the states of the region are drawn, and also by local attempts to control and define Islam. The differentiation between ‘traditional’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Islam is just as dubious and politically charged as the opposition posited between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam in the Soviet Union, which originated out of concerns over regional stability and conflict.5 In fact, the actual situation is much more complexandconfused.Adiversityofgroupsand‘parties’operatewithinthepolit- ical field who appeal to Islam in one way or another.6 Dualistic characterisations are even more problematic at the level of local communities. Here, religious conflicts are often submerged within the dynamics of local political, kinship and economic relations, with each Muslim community containing its own interest groups and means of legitimacy. ThischapterconcernsareligiousconflictwhichbrokeoutinthevillageofO.in Tajikistan at the end of the 1980s and which flared up dramatically in the early 1990s. Research was conducted by the author in 1995 when it had already largely died down. O. is an Uzbek7 village situated in a mountainous region far from any urban centre, near the border with Uzbekistan. It constitutes the centre for a group of settlements which make up a rural jamoat (formerly known as a selskii soviet, a basic rural administrative unit) and a collective farm. With a few exceptions, the other settlements are offshoots of O. and maintain very close con- tactswithit.ThepopulationofO.isabout4,500,whilethatofthejamoatasawhole isalittlemorethan14,000.Theeventsdescribedinthischapteraretypicalofreli- gious conflicts in late Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia, but at the same time contain their own particular dynamics which are the focus of this chapter. My analysis draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s argument that ‘the analysis of the internalstructureofareligiousteachinghastotakeintoaccountthesociallycon- structed functions which it performs, first of all for the groups which produce it, and secondly for the groups which consume it’.8 I argue that an analysis of reli- giousconflictinO.intermsofasimpledichotomybetweentraditionalandfunda- mentalist Islam significantly distorts the real picture of opposition and alliance which exists in the village. The religious conflict centred on the competition between various forms of religious specialist, each drawing upon different sources of knowledge and authority, for control of the religious life of O. It was not only about theological or ideological differences, but was intimately bound up in local politics, with competition over control over symbolic and material resources, and with the re-distribution of financial resources in a period of crisis and state reconstruction. Participants in this conflict legitimated their cause and attackedtheirrivalsthroughavarietyofclaimssuchasthosebasedongenealogy 268 LOGICOFISLAMICPRACTICE:CONFLICTINCENTRALASIA and hereditary titles, through rituals and claims to the control of holy sites and placesofworship.Specificallyreligiousargumentsarelacedwithmoralisingdis- course accusing opponents of greed and hypocrisy, and are filled with personal insult and hostility. All parties insisted upon their own version of ‘correct’ Islam and ‘orthodoxy’, and tried to present themselves as ‘real’ Muslims. It is absurd to reduce this diversity to an opposition between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘fundamentalism’. Descendents of saints: hoja, ishan, tura and shaykh Bourdieuwritesthat‘theformationofthereligioussphereresultsfromthemono- polisationofcontactswiththesupernaturalworldbyagroupofspecialists’.9The religious sphere in O. is divided among three groups, the descendents of Muslim saints, mahsums (those from families acknowledged to possess knowledge of Islam), and hajis (those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca). In one way or another all these groups tried to dominate either the whole religious sphere or partsof it. Togetherthey form ‘the marketof religiousmerit’ where ‘religious goods are produced, reproduced, stored and distributed’ and where ‘consumers with the necessary religious competency satisfy their needs’.10 Competition in the religious sphere is not directed solely at augmenting religious authority, but alsoatobtainingmaterialresourcessuchaspaymentforvariousreligiousservices, the size of which directly depend on the level of symbolic capital that these reli- gious practitioners are able to command. Iwillstartmyanalysiswiththedescendentsofsaints.11Thisgroupdidnotplay a direct part in the conflict. Nevertheless, I mentioned them because the local residents of O. associate Islam with descendents of saints who symbolise it and embodyitssacredpowers.Furthermore,insimilarconflictsinotherMuslimcom- munities in the region descendents of saints were not just impartial observers but activeparticipants.InO.,therefore,theywereseenaspotentialactorseventhough this proved not to be the case in this instance. ThedescendentsofsaintsinO.aremigrantstothevillage.Theymakeupthree separatelineages,namely,hoja,12ishan13andtura14.Hojaswerethefirsttosettle inO.andlocalresidentsrememberRahmatullahon,wholivedthereinthemiddle of thenineteenthcentury, asbeing thefirst.Ishansfirst settled in O.atthebegin- ning of the twentieth century. Unlike the hojas, who trace their genealogy to the chor-yor, the Rightly Guided Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali, ishans claimedtheyweredirectdescendentsofMuhammador,tobeprecise,hisdaughter FatimaandherhusbandAli.15Ishansconsideredthemselvestobemorenoblethan hojas. The tura lineage settled in O. later than other descendents of saints and unlike them they came from further away. Hojas and ishans were from a neigh- bouring village, A., and to maintain their status they appeal to their most recent ancestorswhoarestillrememberedbythelocalpopulation.Theturauseadiffer- entstrategy.TheyclaimtooriginatedirectlyfromBahouddinNaqshband,founder ofthefamousNaqshbandiyyaSufibrotherhood.16AsBahouddinNaqshbandlived in Bukhara, the tura claim their ancestors were Bukharans. 269 SERGEIABASHIN Genealogy(shajara)andtitlesarethemainsymboliccapitalofthedescendents of saints.17 Descent from well-known figures from early Islamic history and members of the local nobility elevate descendents of saints above common people. It bestows upon them certain qualities which generate respect and even awe.18Atthesametime,however,claimstodescentfromMuslimsaintsarecon- tested,andsomeareclearlyfictitious.Peopleoftenaccusetheirrivalsoffabricat- ingtheir lineagesand thereisan unspokendisputebetween thehojas,ishansand turas over who is the most noble and saintly. This dispute, however, has never turned into a serious confrontation. Thepracticeofendogamousmarriagesisoneofthemainstrategiesusedbydes- cendentsofsaintstomaintaintheiridentityandsymboliccapital,19andmarriages are often between different ‘saintly’ families. Here, the competition to be more ‘noble’ gives way to a union of different groups. This marital strategy allows lineage members to build on the sacred assets of other families. It is worth men- tioning that the ethnic origin of the parties involved does not play a significant role. Thus, the hoja and ishan families are closely related. They often intermarry andnowrepresentonelargekinshipgroup.Theturasadoptedadifferentstrategy inthattheycontractedmarriagesbeyondthevillageofO.toKokandinUzbekistan and other places where relations of one of their most important ancestors, Iskanderhon, still reside. Mazars, the burial sites of their ancestors, constitute a major asset for descen- dents of saints. Despite attempts to repress religious practice by the Soviet state and the spread of secular education, a significant number of people continue to visit these holy places for healing, obtaining prophecy and invoking supernatural aid. Pilgrims to mazars give offerings called nazr which may include money, clothing, or food, and this constitutes an income as well as a symbolic asset for theishansandhojas.Descendentsofsaintstrytoattractpilgrimsbyemphasising the importance of their holy lineage. They spread stories about the miraculous powers of their ancestors and about pilgrims to their holy sites who obtained cures, whose wishes were granted, who had dream encounters with saints, and who were given accurate prophesies.20 Onesuchmazar,whichbelongstothehojas,istheburialplaceofRahmatullahon and his son Ishan-hoja and other members of the lineage. It is a place of local pilgrimage and local residents come to visit the shrine on family occasions such as certain celebrations or funerals. The mazar is situated in the courtyard of a hoja house right in the centre of O., separate from the village cemetery, a fact which emphasises its exclusive status. The ishans do not have their own burial places in O. The mazar where their ancestor Kazihon is buried and which is considered to be a holy site is located in the neighbouring village of D. Ishans settled in O. have not created their own family mazar partly out of respect for the memory of Kazihon and partly because of the lack of charismatic leaders. They choose to exploit the popularity and fame of already existing shrines. The burial place of Iskanderhon-tura competes with the shrines of the hojas. Iskanderhon’s mazar is located in the courtyard of a house belonging to a 270 LOGICOFISLAMICPRACTICE:CONFLICTINCENTRALASIA prominentturafamily.Despitethefactthatitismorerecentthanthehojashrines andisaburialplaceforonlyonesaintithasbeenvisitedonamassivescale.Itis popularnotonlywiththelocalvillagers,butalsowithresidentsoftheneighbour- ingvillages,bothUzbekandTajik.Theshrineispopularbecauseofitsconnection to Bahouddin Naqshband, and people mainly make all their offerings to him. Any member of a saintly family is a potential religiousleader. In the past,it is likely that descendents of the saints became mullahs who read prayers during family rituals and ceremonies and acted as leaders and organisers of religious gatherings. This is still the case in some villages, but in O. male members of the saintly families only look after mazars and administer nazr. Although their religiousstatusallowsthemtostriveformore,fiercecompetitionfromnumerous mahsums (members of families renowned for religious learning) diminishes their chances of becoming mullahs. I witnessed how an ishan was asked to perform the duties of a mullah, but it usually happened on exceptional occasions.21 Women from saintly families, however, play a more significant role in the religious life of O. acting, for example, as bu-otins who organise the religious gatherings of women.22 One of the most influential bu-otins is from the tura lineage.23 Thedescendentsofthesaintstrytofindtheirnicheinthesocialstructureofthe village,arolethatmaintainstheirparticularstatusandallowsthemtoconverttheir symbolic and social capital into other perhaps more tangible resources.24 However, neither representatives of the ishan nor hoja families were known to have attained any social positions of significance in other spheres of activity. Perhaps the only exception was a member of the tura lineage who had worked as brigadier in the collective farm for 20 years and then became a businessman. Shaykhs25 are closely linked to the descendents of the saints and perform the samefunctionoflookingaftershrines.ThevillageofO.islocatedonthepilgrim- ageroute(ziyorat)toamajor‘natureshrine’(ashrinewhichconstitutesanatural feature such as a mountain or tree rather than a man-made structure) on top of a mountain.Amythicalsaintisburiedatthisspotand,accordingtolocalresidents, it covers a vast region of a dozen villages including O. In the summer, pilgrims from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan visit the place in their thousands. While at the site, these people require various services such as accommodation and food, per- formingprayersandtellingstoriesaboutthesacredplace.Theseservicesaresup- pliedbyshaykhswhodonotclaimtobedescendentsofthesaints.Thisisunusual, as most Central Asian shaykhs of large mazars have the status of hoja or ishan. Nature shrines are the only resource of shaykhs. Unlike the descendents of the saintswhoinherentlyembodyholinessandcanbemullahsandhealers,shaykhsdo not try to take on any other roles apart from looking after nature mazars. Thus, theydonotposeathreattootherMuslimleadersandarenotsubjecttopersecution eitherfromthegovernmentorotherMuslimgroups.Shaykhsdonothaveasaintly pedigree, aristocratic kinship ties or a hereditary aura of holiness, the attributes that the descendents of the saints so actively exploit. However, the nature mazars that the shaykhs administer are usually more popular and better known outside O. than the ancestral tombs of the turas and hojas. Shaykhs receive 271 SERGEIABASHIN social status and a reasonable income from the mazars in the form of material offerings. Mahsums and Hajis Alongsideshrinevisitationandothermysticalpractices,whicharemonopolisedby thedescendentsofthesaints,thereisavastreligiousfieldofhouseholdlifecycle rituals suchas that markingthe birthof achildand puttinghimor herin a cradle (beshik-tuy), circumcision (hatna-y-tuy), marriage (nikoh-tuy), funerals and commemoration rituals. There are also the Muslim feasts celebrating the end of the fast of Ramadan (ruza-hayit), the feast of sacrifice (qurbon-hayit), the ritual of hudoii26 and others. Key figures in this religious domain are mullahs27 who officiate the day-to-day religious life of Muslims. The mullahs elect imams28 who act as their leaders and who organise the daily and Friday prayers (namoz) in the mosques or, in the absence of the latter, in private homes. The title ‘imam’ is unofficial and is attributed to a person on the basis of the candidate’s knowledge and authority as recognised by the local community. However, this position was formalised by the state in the 1980s as I will discuss below. Within Islam there is no official ‘clergy’. Any Muslim, depending on his religious education and knowledge can theoretically lead collective prayers, be a judge or a teacher, and be called a mullah. However in many communities in Central Asia particular ‘classes’ or ‘clans’ have been popularly recognized as educated and respected Muslims and are given privileges, titles and status. Membership is hereditary and does not depend on an individual’s personal achievements. During the Soviet period the role of mullah was monopolised in the village of O. by a group who bore the title of mahsum, which meant that they were recognized as belonging to families educated in religion and recognised as mullahs. One of the most prominent of these mahsum families trace their origins to Saparmat-domla.29 The most famous mullah from among his sons was Abdudjabbar-mahsum, who studied at madrasas (Muslim higher educational institutions)inKokandandBukharaandworkedasamullahinoneofthemosques in Katta-kurgan, a big settlement between Bukhara and Samarkand. For a long time Abdudjabbar-mahsum acted as an unofficial imam in O. and during the Soviet period secretly led collective prayers on the premises of a local carpet- weaving factory.30 Many of Abdudjabbar-mahsum’s sons also followed in his footsteps and performed the function of a mullah (mullochilik). Abdudjabbar’selderbrotherdidnotpracticemullochilik,andsomeof hischil- drenstoppedpractisingIslamaltogether.Hisdaughterwasoneofthefirstwomen toabandonherveilandworkasasaleswomanatthelocalshop.Thiswasabrave stepinthecontextofthatperiod.HiseldestsonwasamemberoftheCommunist Party, was the chairman of a collective farm for a short time, after which he became the manager of a local shop. However, Abdudjabbar’s two other sons did become mullahs. One of them, Abdumutal-mahsum, was born in 1919 and worked as a carpenter at a local school. In the 1980s he became mullah in one 272 LOGICOFISLAMICPRACTICE:CONFLICTINCENTRALASIA of the outlying districts of O. His second son, Abdukahhar-mahsum, became an unofficial imam after the death of Abdudjabbar-mahsum. Abdukahhar died in 1985 and left seven sons, two of whom became mullahs. After Abdukahhar’s death, a representative of another mahsum family, Abdumumin-mahsum, took over the role of imam in O. The latter’s father had studied in a madrasa in Kokand and at some point had been a mullah in O. before Abdudjabbar-mahsum. Abdumumin was born in 1937 and in the late 1950s left the village of O. He had lived for a long time in Uzbeksitan and Kyrgyzstan where he worked as a driver, plumber and a watchmaker. He studied to be become a mullah in Kokand. In the late 1980s with the support of the local authorities he was elected as the official imam. There are a few other less prominent mahsum families in O. but members of these do not at present act as mullahs. During my fieldwork in 1995 the official imam, Abdumumin-mahsum, served the lower part of the village. The upper part of the village and the cemetery with its neighbouring houses were served by other mullahs from the two prominent mahsum families. Abdumutal- mahsum and one of Abdukahhar-mahsum’s sons were mullahs in neighbouring villages.Eachofthemperformedprayersduringfamilyritualswithin‘theirterri- tory’. These family events provide mahsums with a modest but stable income which includes a small sum of money, food and pieces of fabric. In addition, these events give mahsums a prominent role in public life and a forum through which they might seek to regulate and influence people’s private lives. These events strengthen their social and symbolic capital. Women’s religious practice is separate from men’s, and women members of mahsum families acted as bu-otins. One of the most prominent bu-otins in O. is a daughter of Abdukahhar-mahsum. During family rituals the bu-otin often duplicates the prayers and rituals performed by mullahs in the male section of the house. Bu-otins also officiate at specifically female ritual gatherings such as buseshanba,andmushkul-kushod(heldtoinvokedivineaidinsolvingproblems), and mavlyud-oshi (a commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad).31 Female religious practice is the only area where the interests of mahsums and the descendents of the saints intersect and which creates some competition between them, although this is not open or aggressive.32 In their competition with the descendents of saints mahsums do not claim a hereditary tie to a saint or special divine abilities as the former do. Rather, they draw upon their reputation and status as transmitters of Islamic knowledge, their ability to read Arabic, translate religious texts and their knowledge of prayers. However,thesearenotobtainedthroughtrainingandattendanceathigherreligious institutions.Itisassumedthatthisknowledgeistransferredfromgenerationtogen- erationwithintheirfamilies.TheSovietperiod,whenofficialIslamiceducational institutions were largely inaccessible and the only religious education available waswithinthefamily,wasthegoldeneraforthemahsums. Similar to the descendents of the saints, mahsums attempt to preserve and enhance their status though marriage. For example, the mother of Abdumumin- mahsum, the imam of O., is a sister of a well-known mullah in O. who has 273 SERGEIABASHIN founded his own dynasty of mahsums. However, mahsums are not required to marry exclusively within the group and their authority and position as mullah is not guaranteed by social standing alone. In their competition with rivals over theirpositionsandtherelatedincomeandsymbolicresourcesmahsumsemphasise their personal piety and preach that Islam should be purified from outside influ- ences.Atthesametimetheycallintoquestionthepietyoftheirrealandpotential competitors. This causes frictions between and sometimes within mahsum families. Afurthersourceofconflictbetweenmahsumfamilieswastheformalisationof thepostofimamintoanofficialpositioninthe1980s(aswasthecaseofmullahs, thisfunctionhadpreviouslybeenoutsidestateregulation)andtheappointmentof Abdumumin-mahsumtothispost.Asofficialimamhewasaccountabletothedis- trict(raion)imam,whointurnwasundertheimamfortheprovince(oblast).The republicankazi-kalonwasatthetopofthereligioushierarchyandwastheheadof theTajikdivisionoftheSpiritualDirectorateoftheMuslimsofCentralAsiaand Kazakhstan, which became an independent body controlled by the Tajik auth- orities in the beginning of the 1990s. In effect, official imams became part of the state administrative structure and were answerable to local government. They were appointed by local authorities and the opinion of active believers ceased to play a decisive role in the process. Abdumumin-mahsumattemptedtousehisaccesstoadministrativeauthorityto extend his jurisdiction into the territories of other mahsums. When this failed, he demandedthattheypayhimapartoftheincomefromtheiractivitiesasmullahs, citing legislation on religious activity and instructions from his superiors. His attempts were met by fierce resistance from other mullahs. Mahsums from the family descended from Saparmat-domla (whose members had filled the role of imaminO.beforeAbdumumin)categoricallyrefusedtoacknowledgetheofficial mullah’s authority and pay him part of their income. Inthelate1980smahsumsfacedcompetitionfromanewrivalgroupofmullahs whoIwillprovisionallyrefertoashajis.Membersofthisgroupwerenotdefined in terms of lineage, descent from Muslim saints, or by a family tradition of reli- gious learning. In an interview, one of the mahsums told me that they were not real mullahs, because their ancestors did not practice mullochilik (act as mullahs). However, he also stated that anyone who is able to recite from memory a few basic prayers (particularly those relating to funerals and funeral commemorations—janoza)33 could be considered a mullah. Rather than lineage or inherited status, hajis base their claims to religious authority primarily upon the fact that they have made the pilgrimage to Mecca which gives them the right to the prestigious title of haji.34 The informalleader ofhajisin O.,Ergash-haji,wasbornin 1938intoa family of wealthy cattle farmers. In the second half of the 1930s, at the height of the Soviet confiscation of the property of wealthy peasants, the family moved to a neighbouring Tajik village. They returned to O. only in the 1970s. In the 1980s Ergash-hajibecameinterestedinreligionandmanagedtoobtainreligiouslearning either in the Tajik city of Khodjent or the Uzbek city of Namangan. Two of 274 LOGICOFISLAMICPRACTICE:CONFLICTINCENTRALASIA Ergash-haji’s closest followers are his cousin Djura-haji and a distant relative Mirzokarim-haji.Djura-hajiwasthefirstofthemtovisitMecca,in1993,followed by Ergash-haji in 1994 and Mirzakarim in 1995. Since then people in the village have addressed them as haji. As is the case of the mahsums, nobody in O. knows the exact nature of the kinship ties between the hajis but everyone emphasises the fact that they are related. The reference to kinship has a rhetorical character, since in fact all the inhabitants in O. can trace kinship ties to each other. Therefore, local discourses on kinship ties are not so much concerned with tracking accurate genealogies as a question of the selective actualisation of certain ties to create alliances and coalitions. It is difficult to say whether hajis utilise kinship as a means to widen orsupportthenetworkoftheirfollowers.Iwasunabletobuilduptrustingrelation- shipswithmembersofthisgroup.However,itisclearthatthoseinthevillagewho observe the conflict between mullahs refer to it in terms of kinship. Thus, the struggle between the hajis and mahsums for religious primacy is locally under- stood not just as a clash over religious disagreements, but more importantly as a conflict between two groups, each formed on the basis of kinship loyalties. In fact, Ergash-haji’sfirst wife wasthe daughterof a localmullahandhisown daughter was married to Kushnazar-mahsum, a member of a Saparmat–domla’s family. Thus, he potentially has indirect access to the symbolic resources of the mahsums. This, however, has not resulted in the merging of the two groups. The fact that Ergash-haji is related to mahsums is not spoken of much and Kushnazar-mahsum is not known to be a supporter of the hajis. In rivalry for leadership, Ergash-haji used a more convincing argument than kinship, namely, his material wealth which enabled him to undertake charitable works. For example, he financed the construction of the main official mosque.35 He also paid for the construction of a minaret from which azans are performed (the call to prayers). There were rumours that he paid the salaries of the mosque’s muezzins.36 Such generosity was unusual to local residents and they attributed it to the enormous wealth Ergash-haji accumulated through trading ventures in Russia. Mirzokarim-haji and Djura-haji were also traders. Thestrategiesofhajisandmahsumsareverydifferent.Whilehajisinvesttheir wealth to earn symbolic capital, mahsums exploit the symbolic capital derived from their inherited status to make money.37 This of course does not mean that hajis are absolutely altruistic, but merely that they are not interested in short- term economic gain. They seek social and symbolic gains, the respect of their neighboursandmoralauthority,aswellastoincreasethenumberoftheirsuppor- ters. The demonstration of their charitable sponsorships enables them to contrast themselves with the mahsums who they accused of using people’s religious feelings for their own gain.38 Thus, this altruism served the ‘self-interested purpose’ of ‘a down payment that is required by any prophetic enterprise’.39 As a result of their financial sponsorship, in the mid-1990s the hajis became the dominant force in the official mosque and it became the principal site throughwhichtheyexercisedtheirinfluence.Itreachedapointwheretheofficial imam Abdumumin-mahsum, who had started preaching at the mosque only on 275 SERGEIABASHIN Fridays,stoppedgoingtherealtogetherbecausehisstatuswasusurpedandhefelt he owedsomethingto thehajis. Instead,youngmullahs,thesonsof Mirzakarim- haji and Djura-haji, performed services in the mosques in an unofficial capacity. Gradually, other mahsums stopped going to the mosque and together with their followers gathered on Fridays in a prayer house (dahma) near the cemetery. Thus, the hajis managed to monopolise the mosque, one of the main Islamic symbols of O. which was central to the Muslim (as well as community) identity. The hajis, however, were not able to extend their influence beyond O. to the neighbouring settlements, and were opposed by local state authorities. After the deathoftheleadingmullahinoneoftheseneighbouringsettlementsthehajissup- portedtheelectionofayoungmanof25whowasoneoftheirsupporters.Thiswas discussedbythechairmanofthecollectivefarmandotherlocalofficials,including the head of the district police who claimed that the young man was identified as unreliable by the KGB. As a result, the local government appointed Abulbori- mahsum from another village to be head mullah. This person’s father, a well- known mullah born in O., had received his religious education before the Soviet period and had reportedly been a district religious judge (kazi) in 1920s.40 In the 1930s he had been arrested and deported. As a representative of a mahsum familyandsomeonewhowasnotinvolvedinanyofthelocalconflicts,Abdulbori appealed to the local government as the most suitable candidate. One of the main, but not the only, strategies the hajis employed was to present themselves as conforming to ‘correct’ Islam while asserting that the mahsums did not.AccordingtoBourdieu,towininthereligiousfield,onehasto‘...overthrow the existing symbolic (i.e. clerical) order and symbolically secure its overthrow ...’.41 That is, they have to avoid playing by the old rules and change these rules to their benefit. They questioned the adequacy of the education of the older estab- lished mullahs and accused them of not being able to read prayers correctly, of being ignorant ofmany ofthe tenets ofIslam, and offailing toprotect Islam from syncretic accretions. They presented themselves, by contrast, as the bearers of ‘real’ Islam and therefore worthy of leading the process of cleansing local morals andpracticesfrom‘un-Islamic’influences.Todemonstratetheirdevotionto‘real’ Islam, hajis stopped wearing ‘Western’ clothes and changed their non-Muslim names into Muslim ones (although most villagers could not remember those new names).Toemphasisetheirpietytheystartedtofollowrigorouslythescripturalpre- scriptions of daily prayer, fasting during Ramadan, and abstaining from alcohol. Thesewere religiousdutieswhich mostvillagers,includingmahsums andthe des- cendents of saints, had ignored during the Soviet period.42 Ergash-haji publicly took a second wife, demonstrating his right to live according to Muslim laws.43 As Bourdieu argues ‘the game of increasing values, always somewhat aggressive, theinsistencewithwhichonesupposedlyshouldberemindedofrespectforthefun- damentallawoftheuniverse,andtherejectionofeconomismcanonlysucceedby servingasexemplaryconfirmationsofthesincerityofrejection’.44 Theperformanceofritualsconstitutedtheprimarysiteofconflictbetweenhajis and mahsums.45 Discussions about funeral commemorations, which were one of the main markers of Muslim identity during the Soviet period, were especially 276