UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff MMiiaammii LLaaww RReevviieeww Volume 57 Number 4 Article 2 7-1-2003 RRuummiinnaattiioonnss oonn TTeerrrroorriissmm && AAnnttii--tteerrrroorriissmm LLaaww && LLiitteerraattuurree Christopher L. Blakesley Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr Part of the National Security Law Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-terrorism Law & Literature, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 1041 (2003) Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol57/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. University of Miami Law Review VOLUME 57 JULY 2003 NUMBER 4 ARTICLES Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-Terrorism Law & Literature CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY* They never forgot That even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course Anyhow in a corner, some untidy spot Where the dogs go on with their doggy life and the torturer's horse Scratches its innocent behind on a tree. Only God can tell the saintly from the suburban, Counterfeit values always resemble the true; Neither in Life nor Art is honesty bohemian, The free behave much as the respectable do.' * Christopher L. Blakesley is Professor of Law at the Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas. He previously held the J.Y. Sanders Chair and was Professor of Law at the Louisiana State University Law Center. He received a Doctorate (J.S.D.) and an LL.M. from Columbia University; a J.D. from the University of Utah; an M.A. at the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; and a B.A. from the University of Utah. He teaches International Law, Comparative Law, Comparative Criminal Law, Family Law, and Terrorism. Prior practice was in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State on matters of international criminal law, including terrorism, extradition, and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Professor Blakesley has published several books, over twenty chapters in books, and more than sixty major scholarly articles in American and foreign journals. He has been elected to the American Law Institute. His works include: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES & MATERIALS; THE INDIVIDUAL FACING TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS; COMPARATIVE LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW; Women or Rights: How Should Women's Rights Be Conceived & Implemented, in 2 WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; The Impact of a Mixed Jurisdiction in Legal Education, in LOUISIANA: A MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION: EXPLORING THE NATURE OF THE LOUISIANA LEGAL SYSTEM; Jurisdiction over ExtraterritorialC rime, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. Portions of this article are adapted and updated from parts of chapters one and four of his book TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY. 1. W.H. Auden, NEW YEAR LETTER (1941). 1042 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1041 Violence shall synchronize your movements like a tune, And Terror like a frost shall halt the flood of thinking. Barrack and bivouac shall be your friendly refuge, And racial pride shall tower like a public column And confiscate for safety every private sorrow2. INTRODUCTION General. When an atrocity like that of September 11, 2001, occurs, the rhetoric of those who conspired to cause it or who otherwise prompted it is so venomous that it generates similar rhetoric and possi- bly even similar conduct in reaction. Prior to September 11, we might have refused to believe that human beings could actually commit such acts upon others. How is it possible that leaders of nations or groups are able to inflame hatred and fear in people to the point that some become willing to destroy themselves along with those they see as infidels or enemies? We cannot fathom what can cause individuals to fly planes filled with innocent passengers as missiles into buildings also filled with innocents. This article will attempt to fathom why. I also address the dangers that face us because of our "war" on terrorism. We must be vigilant against an event like September 11 ever happening again, but it is just as important to be vigilant in ensuring that we do not allow ourselves to overreact in a manner to commit terrorism in order to fight terrorism. Finally, we must be vigilant to protect against governmental overreaction on the home front that will erode our constitutional liberty in the name of fighting terrorism or protecting "the homeland." Is it possible that some of the dangers from anti-terrorism measures are similar to the dangers of those who use "terrorism" to fight their "just cause," such as their "war" to lift the yoke of oppression? Thus, this article addresses the following questions, among others: What is terrorism? How does terrorism compare to war crimes or crimes against humanity? What is the proper response when terrorism occurs; when one is attacked with ferocious and indiscriminate3 force causing the slaughter of thousands? What is the proper response when one is part of a group that has been oppressed for ages? Is terrorism a matter of law? Sociology? Anthropology? Pathology? All of these and more? In sum, this article presents my views on what terrorism is: its nature, its character, its characteristics, and its causes. Most importantly for this study, I will try to provide a workable legal definition of terror- 2. W.H. Auden, In Times of War, in W.H. AUDEN & CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD, JOURNEY TO WAR (1939). 3. Perhaps it is more accurate to say "discriminate," in that innocent civilians were targeted in the World Trade Center and in the airliners used as weapons. 20031 RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM 1043 ism and elucidate its constituent elements. To clarify the analysis, I will distinguish terror, war crimes, and crimes against humanity from terrorism. In discussing terrorism, this article also attempts to determine what constitutes an improper (illegal) response to oppression and, similarly, what is an illegal response to terroristic atrocity. What is the legal way to rebel or break the yoke of oppression? What is the legal way to defend oneself against an atrocity such as that committed on September 11, 2001? What is legal rebellion and what is legal self-defense in this context? It must be possible to defend and protect the innocents of the world without purposefully or indiscriminately destroying other innocents. Discussing terrorism in light of the September 11 atrocities is daunting. It requires one to wonder how to maintain an equilibrium in the face of a menace that wishes its own death as long as it flows from the slaughter of "the enemy." How is it possible to combat this menace without falling into a trap of hatred or blind fear that leads to the use of terror to fight terrorism? The overarching issues relating to September 11, terrorism, and counter-terrorism include: whether oppression can provide any justification for that atrocity; similarly, whether that attack calls for or allows self-defense under international law, and, if so, what constitutes a legal response in self-defense. I will elucidate and compare the crimes of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the parameters of self-defense. It is important to define terrorism, a term that is overused today. It is applied over-inclusively to contain almost all acts of violence commit- ted for political purposes by clandestine groups. It is also often used under-inclusively to exclude state terrorism.4 Some commentators see terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of low-inten- sity, unconventional aggression.5 Walter Laquer defines terrorism as: the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.6 4. But see CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY (1992) (2d ed. in process) [hereinafter BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM]; JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS (1989). 5. See, e.g., Scott S. Evans, The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review, and the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 21, 22-23 (1994). 6. Walter Laquer, Reflections on Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 88 (1986); see also CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES & MATERIALS 172 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES]. 1044 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW (Vol. 57:1041 This definition is deficient from a legal point of view. It is both overin- clusive and underinclusive. Its descriptive accuracy is not apt, since we now see terrorists whose purpose is to destroy and only to destroy. This article will address these points. U.S. Response: The War on Terrorism With regard to the current "war" on terrorism, U.S. officials have claimed that they are doing everything possible to avoid civilian casual- ties, and evidence seems to suggest that this generally may be true. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon to hear individuals in the public, even in the press, argue that since al Qaeda intended to slaughter innocents, why shouldn't we? Indeed, it is easy to fall into this evil desire. In the midst of our difficult times, we run a significant risk of participating in or condoning violence that also could include mass slaughter of innocents. Herman Melville, through Captain Ahab, brilliantly allows us to address some of our own least appealing tendencies: All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it.7 Voltaire's "everyman" in Candide cynically assessed international law and the laws of war as consisting of righteous brutality on a grand scale and simple suffering on a human scale.8 Voltaire's assessment of international law, terror, and our own tendency to become barbaric can apply to our similar tendency to confuse justice with vengeance.9 Exploitation of human weakness by the few with power may be the actual culprit.'° Primo Levi drove himself to despair (and suicide) over the issue of why common, everyday, "civilized" people fall into a miasma of evil."1 Sadly, many of us tend to distrust, denigrate, and dis- 7. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1851). 8. Louis Rend Beres, Straightening the "Timber": Toward a New Paradigmo f International Law, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 163 n.7 (1994). 9. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-3 1; Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 77 (1994); Christopher L. Blakesley, The Modem Blood Feud: Thoughts on the Philosophy of Crimes Against Humanity, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, AND PROSPECTS (2002); P.D. JAMES, CERTAIN JUSTICE 7 (1997). 10. See BLAKESLEY TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-89. 11. See PRIMo LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1988); see also BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-31; SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS 2003] RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM criminate against those whom we perceive as being different. This ten- dency is often manipulated by "leaders" for their own nefarious purposes and by propagandists who proliferate the hatred, fear, and rage. We are made to believe that those "who are different" are dangerous and ",evil." 12 Of course, evil does occur, and did occur on September 11, 2001. It is pathetic, but probably true, that terrorism has become virtually banal.13 Certainly, one must defend one's self, family, and nation. On the other hand, the oppressed rightly seek to escape their oppression. How properly, legally, and morally to defend oneself or to escape oppression is not so simple (or, at least not that easy). Lofty rhetoric, religion or other philosophy, or principle are appropriated by those who wish to pervert it for their own uses. A people's deep-seated fears and hatreds are exploited often by those who retain a nefarious desire to prompt the people to commit acts of atrocity in the name of the ideal, but actually serve the prompters' purposes. A perversion of these same values and fears are also used to oppress. Furthermore, fear and hatred can also prompt us to take or allow action that will cause the erosion of our civil liberties and human rights as an expedient to fight terrorism. In the face of terrorist attack, espe- DISCONTENTS (James Strachey, trans.) (1961). For an interesting fictional musing on the subconscious, see IRVIN D. YALOM, WHEN NIETZSCHE WEPT: A STUDY OF OBSESSION (1992). 12. For example, in Rwanda, Georges Ruggiu, the infamous "Italian Hutu," who pleaded guilty before the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in May 2002, of persecution and incitement to genocide and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 53 (1999), available at 1999 WL 33268309 (noting that broadcast speeches, for example, "referred to the Tutsis and Hutus from the opposition parties as collaborators of the RPF. These speeches encouraged the militias to target Tutsis in their daily acts of vandalism"). Ruggiu, actually a Belgian national of Italian origin, is a former journalist who worked for Radio Tildvision Des Mille Collines (RLTM). Id. Donald McNeil wrote an article in March on Rwanda's most famous musician, Simon Bikindi. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Killer Songs, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 17, 2002, at 58. His songs were played on Radio des Milles Collines during the period of the genocide. The article quotes Alison DesForges, the Human Rights Watch Rwanda specialist: Alison DesForges, the lead Rwanda specialist for Human Rights Watch, says that "Bikindi's songs are subtle, using poetic language and oblique references. There's a Rwandan proverb," she says. "A message is given to many, but those who are meant to understand, understand. There's always a subtext in Rwanda. You don't have to resort to brutal language. People understand." See also Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza is Boycotting His Trial at the ICTR: Lessons in Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315 (2001); ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 71 (1999); Christine L. Kellow & H. Leslie Steeves, The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide, J. COMM., Summer 1998, at 107-116; Ameer F. Gopalani, The International Standard of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide; An Obstacle to U.S. Ratification of the InternationalC riminal Court Statute?, 32 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87 (2001). 13. See, e.g., Bill Keller, The Monster in the Dock, N.Y. Times.corn Online News Report (Feb. 9, 2002), available at http://dupagepeace.home.att.net/monster.html. 1046 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1041 cially one as senseless and atrocious as that of September 11, we are tempted to promulgate rules for "protection" and "security" that ulti- mately could erode protection, security, and the very values our troops fight for by leading us to a society that conforms more to what the per- petrators of terrorism may live under and would want us to suffer.' 4 We must, therefore, be vigilant to ensure that we are not manipulated by the terrorists or by our own overreactive leaders into taking action or acqui- escing to action, terroristic in and of itself, that is destructive of our liberty and other important values. In addition to the moral traps and dangers facing us, we have to address several very difficult legal, constitutional, and technical problems. One problem, for example, is to determine whether flying airliners into buildings constitutes an "armed attack" under domestic and international law. This question is important because under current international law, the nature of the legal response depends on it. Since September 11, however, the traditionalist position has been ques- tioned.'5 If it was not an "armed attack" as traditionally contemplated, did it constitute some other sort of attack that would allow violent action to be taken in response? If so, what responses does international law allow? Also, what protections does the law provide to those upon whom the response impacts? When prosecuting alleged participants, what pro- tections and rights obtain for those captured or arrested pursuant to the response?'6 These are very important and difficult questions that foster vigorous disagreement. " When an "armed attack" is committed against a person or group, it may require, and both domestic and international law may permit, a reaction in self-defense. 8 The September 11 attacks on the World 14. See, e.g., The USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. The so-called "Patriot Act" makes terrorism a predicate act for which a wiretap under Title III can be authorized. Id. § 201. The USA Patriot Act also authorized law enforcement to conduct wiretapping for crimes related to computer fraud and abuse. See id. § 202; see also Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1064-65 (2001). 15. I am questioning it here, of course. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self- Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 539, 540 (2002); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (2002); Cf George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002). 16. See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-9 (2002). 17. Cf Ruth Wedgwood, The Casef or Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A18; Harold Honjgu Koh, Editorial, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 0,8599,186581,00.html; Akhil Reed Amar, Nation-WarP owers: Is Bush Making History?, TIME, Dec. 03, 2001, at 62. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 11-12 (1946). 18. Principles of necessity and proportionality, rather than issues of jurisdiction, may inform considerations of self-defense based military responses to terrorism. See, e.g., Robert J. Beck & 2003] RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania airspace were acts of terrorism and crimes against humanity. Armed attack under interna- tional law is not required to be "military" in nature. 9 To participate in or plan atrocities like those of September 11 is certainly criminal conduct. One response may be to attack the perpetra- tors or those who are protecting them, but whether this is "legal" under the circumstances and current international law is open to debate.2° When the conduct that fits these crimes is prosecuted, is it correct to suggest, as the Bush Administration does, that participants may have no protection under international law, including the Geneva Conventions?2' The conduct of the perpetrators constituted at least terrorism and murder. It appears that the following elements of the crime occurred: (1) over three thousand human beings were killed; (2) the conduct on that day involved commission of multiple acts committed as part of a wide or systematic attack upon innocent civilians (in the WTC and in the airliners); and (3) at least some of the perpetrators (and their leaders) had the necessary mens rea of intending or at least knowing that they were part of a systematic attack on a civilian population.2 The armed attack does not have to be "military" in the traditional sense.23 ON DEFINING TERRORISM: CONSIDERING ITS CAUSES I will define terrorism, for purposes of this article, to be the use of violence against innocent individuals for the purpose of obtaining some Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994) (discussing the U.S. response to Iraqi government's attempt to assassinate former President Bush); Alberto Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287 (1987) (discussing proposed responses to increases in terrorism against Americans); William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defense in CounterterrorO perations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 423 (1990). 19. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Roy S. Lee, How the World Will Relate to the Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 756-57 (2002). In fact, the use of non-military common modes of transportation and innocent civilians as weapons shows that, perhaps, the military/non-military distinction no longer makes sense. 20. See Glennon, supra note 15, at 540; Feldman, supra note 15, at 457; Fletcher, supra note 15, at 635. 21. See Wedgwood, supra note 17; Koh, supra note 17; Amar, supra note 17, at 62; see also Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8, 11-12 (1946); Paust, supra note 16, at 1-9; Glennon, supra note 15, at 540; Feldman, supra note 15, at 451. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 635; Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 373, 375, 434-38 (2002). 22. These seem to be the constituent elements of the crime against humanity of murder under customary international law which is reflected in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, in art. 7(l)(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ statute/contents.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See Lee, supra note 19, at 755-57. 23. See Rome Statute supra note 22. 1048 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1041 military, political, or philosophical end from a third-party government or group. The violence must be aimed at or must wantonly impact inno- cent civilians. In this way, it obviates any application of self-defense because, as we shall see below, innocents include non-combatants in war and non-attackers in a non-war setting. As such, one has no right to defend oneself against a person who is not threatening one's life or limb. Terrorism is political or ideological violence without restraint of law or morality. Terrorism may be fully domestic, but it is international terror- ism only when the conduct transcends borders or is so massive or includes a use of weapons of mass destruction that it poses a threat to international peace and security. Later in this paper, I will provide a more detailed definition of terrorism, determine its constituent elements, and analyze them. We will consider whether a war crime or crime against humanity is a functional equivalent of terrorism, but which occurs during legally recognized or recognizable armed attack. It will be necessary in this process to distinguish both domestic and interna- tional self-defense and to distinguish the legal and illegal use of violence in war. It may be that the offenses relevant to this paper (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terrorism) have equivalent elements and a similar harmful impact, but they occur in different factual and legal cir- cumstances. The differing circumstances are crucial to an understanding of terrorism and to adopting any proper legal response to it. On August 8, 1945, the London Charter declared certain conduct, including specifically the slaughter of civilian populations, even when committed during war, to be intolerable.24 The rule of interconnecting irony, especially inherent in international law and reality, is emphasized once again when one notes that on that very day the United States dropped its second atomic bomb, this time on an "undefended town," Nagasaki, killing at least 70,000 of its mostly civilian population." The juxtaposition of law, innocence, and military necessity could not have been manifest more starkly. Is a similar irony at work today? We face the unspeakable terrorism committed against innocent non-combatants going about their daily business on airplanes, only to become part of the weaponry that slaughtered thousands more innocents in the name of religious necessity and to escape "oppression." Reaction to this terror- 24. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279, at art. 6(c); Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1, 4 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997). 25. The 70,000 souls were the least number of immediate deaths in Nagasaki. Within the next five years, at least another 130,000 inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki died as a result of the atomic bombings. Elliot L. Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 19, 32 (Arthur Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984). 2003] RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM 1049 ism has been swift and violent, although it remains to be seen whether it has been sure. How one defines terrorism is obviously important. Harvard Professor of Government Michael Ignatieff recognizes and accepts this irony. He writes in a New York Times Book Review essay26 that: "Caleb Carr, a popular novelist and a military historian, makes two arguments in 'The Lessons of Terror."'27 The first is that punitive warfare by states against civilians amounts to terrorism.28 The second is that terrorism never works.29 Both of these arguments strike me as wrong. Ignatieff argues that war against civilians has been a feature of the Western military tradi- tion since the Romans razed Carthage. Carr argues that indiscrimi- nate war against the Carthaginians, and then against the barbarians, helped bring about Rome's downfall. The slaughter of civilians, which was supposed to terrify and subdue, only incited further rebel- lion and, besides, taught the barbarians to be indiscriminate in 30 return. First, both Carr and Ignatieff are not correct that "war against civilians" has been a feature of "Western military tradition since [the razing of Carthage by the Romans].''3' First, even in the "West," that sort of bar- barity was occurring long before Carthage. Furthermore, the "tradition" was close to worldwide, not only "Western." Carr's point that the razing of Carthage was "indiscriminate" is incorrect also, because it was dis- criminate in that the civilian population was intentionally slaughtered.32 This slaughter of innocents did "work." Indeed, the result for the Romans is ironically called the "Carthaginian Peace." Sadly, as Igna- tieff correctly points out, it continues to work, at least in the short-term. Ignatieff continues: "If Carr were saying only that warfare against civilians has perverse consequences, he would be pointing out some- thing worth remembering. If he were saying only that when empires teach barbarians to be indiscriminate, they end up being victims of bar- barism themselves, no one could object." But, the main weakness in Carr's analysis, according to Ignatieff, is that, "Carr persists in equating war against civilians with terrorism, and this leads to absurdity."33 Igna- tieff attempts to refute Carr's position with the following examples of historical depredation: 26. Michael Ignatieff, Barbarism at the Gates: Warfare Against Civilians, Caleb Carr Argues, Should Always Be Viewed as Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2002, at 8. 27. See generally CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR (2002). 28. Id. 29. Id. 30. See Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8. 31. See id. 32. See id. at 8; CARR, supra note 27, at 85. 33. See Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8.