Inscriptions –contemporary thinking on art, philosophy and psycho-analysis– https://inscriptions.tankebanen.no/ Title: Returning to persons and values in pragmatic phenomenology: a response to Simon Smith’s uncharitable review Author: J. Edward Hackett Section: Commentaries © Copyright 2022 Hackett. Correspondence: J. Edward Hackett, e: [email protected]. Received: 11 October, 2021. Accepted: 12 November, 2021. Published: 15 January, 2022. Howtocite: Hackett,J.Edward. “Returningtopersonsandvaluesinpragmaticphenomenology: a response to Simon Smith’s uncharitable review.” Inscriptions 5, no. 1 (January 2022): 109-111. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. Returning to persons and values in pragmatic phenomenology: a response to Simon Smith’s uncharitable review J. Edward Hackett1 In what follows, I respond to Simon Smith’s as an example of essences and how essences review of my book. In that piece, Smith char- function in experience according to Scheler. acterizes my writing as “sloppy” without ever Smith says colors are phenomenal properties. engaging substantively with my book. This is Meanwhile it is well established in Scheler’s thechargeandresponseIamdescribinginthis Formalismus as well as Manfred Frings’s com- article. mentary on Scheler that the talk of essences is Let’s take a look at each example and see. analogous to perceiving something like blue’s First, let’s take a look at how Smith cites my givenness in experience. Where Smith con- page 1. He quotes me as saying “the how of cludes abruptly that the examples do not work values”2 when the expression from my book on the fourth page, these are common exam- on page 1 is not that expression at all: ples used to talk about these issues in the phe- nomenological literature. Values, like color for Second,wecanlookatvaluesitself Scheler, have a functional existence.4 They to see which form of phenomenol- are given in the immediacy of that experience ogy can capture how values are and are not properties. In fact, one assump- given. The “how of givenness” (if tion of phenomenology is that the thing-like we were to call it that) is the man- character language reifies aspects of experienc- ner in which a phenomenon can ing while concealing other facts of the same be given (as it appears).3 experience. Phenomenologists desire a way of articulating, describing, and discerning entire The “how of givenness” is in quotation marks experiences in phenomenological description to emphasize that we are looking at phe- thatsustainsanawarenesstopreventthereifica- nomenondirectlyintheprocessofundergoing tion of thing-like language that might conceal experience and describing how it is that val- how the structure of any candidate experience ues are given in experience. It is not as Smith manifests. 5 says “the how of values.” Is he judging me on Given Smith’s assumptions about color per- quotations that do not exist? ception here, it does not seem that Smith is Second, we get the fact that something is workingoutwhatphenomenologycouldmean wrong with my reference to the color blue 1 AssistantProfessoratSouthernUniversityandA&MCollegeinLouisiana. 2 SimonSmith,“ReviewofPersonsandValuesinPragmaticPhenomenology,”Inscriptions4,no. 2(July2021),220. 3J.EdwardHackett,PersonsandValuesinPragmaticPhenomenology: AnExplorationinMoralMetaphysics(Malaga, Spain: VernonPress,2018),1. 4ManfredFrings,TheMindofMaxScheler: TheFirstComprehensiveGuideBasedontheCompleteWorks(Milwau- kee: MarquetteUniversityPress,1997),24. 5 Hackett,PersonsandValuesinPragmaticPhenomenology,4. January 2022 – Volume 5 109 Returning to persons and values in pragmatic phenomenology Hackett in Scheler nor is he approaching the topic of emotions in the scholarship of Tanja Staehler. phenomenological ontology with an eye to Maybe reviewers do not read the footnotes of how these terms are employed within phe- books when clearly established scholarly con- nomenology. What’s more, if there is a prob- ventions are followed and their passages are lem with a technical term, I often include the clearly given in the text? Maybe Smith dis- German counterpart to how that term is trans- agrees with the scholarly conventions of Hei- lated, so if he wishes to look them up either degger scholarship regarding phenomenology in Scheler or Heidegger scholarship, then he or the neologisms invented inside Being and can. Ifsomeonehastroubleunderstandingthat Time,butIamclearlyusingtheterm‘mood’in these are terms being rendered and explained this very explicit sense. I will cite another Hei- insidephenomenologyandaroundthispassage degger scholar that appears a page later about and before it there are clear footnotes from the point of what I am doing with this term where in the text I am explaining these terms, ‘mood’. “As Weberman puts it, ‘we are always thenperhapsareviewercanseethatexposition affected because although we may not always of technical jargon goes hand and hand with be in the grip of some episodic emotion, we attempting to understand that term within the are always in some mood since we are always textbeingreferenced. There’snomysteryhere. affectively attuned to the world.’”7 One can disagree with that methodological as- Smith is free to disagree with both me and sumption about phenomenology. It’s not mys- Heidegger on these points, but to insist in teryastowhatisbeingdonehereonthefourth the book review confusion about how I em- page or on the hundredth. ployed the term ‘mood’ is extremely dishon- Third, he takes issue with the expression of est. I am well versed in how Iain Thomson, ‘mood.’ Smith says, “Similarly, forgetting to Parvis Emad, Bernard Boelen, David Weber- do one thing while doing another does not ex- man, Tanja Staehler, and the translation con- plain the notion ‘mood,’ nor does it exemplify ventionsofBeing and Time employtheseterms. the way in which ‘[t]hrough mood, Dasein is These authors are referenced in and around always brought before itself’ (74). Unless, that the pages Smith is citing. Part of the problem is, ‘mood’ is being used as yet another unex- maybethattheseconventionsareidiosyncratic plained technical term.”6 On page 71, I have a to Heideggerian phenomenology, but for a re- section titled “Befindlichkeit in Section 29 and viewer to not see that given this section of my 30 of Being and Time” that contains the refer- book is impossible. enced passage by Smith. This section explains Smith is also similarly disingenuous with what the experience of attunement is in Being respect to using the term ‘person.’ My re- and Time. There are clear footnotes referenc- peated usage of this term and not some per- ingthesesectionsofthebookunderdiscussion sonal pronoun of ‘he’ or ‘she’ reflects that I andalsokeepinginreferencetotheMacquarie spentanentirebookinformingthereaderthat and Robinson translation in which the neol- the project of a moral phenomenology from ogism Heidegger invented – Befindlichkeit – Scheler is that the term person is understood is translated as both attunement and mood. I phenomenologically just like Heidegger’s Da- even reference how other Heidegger schol- sein or Husserl’s transcendental subject. The ars have translated this as “fundamental mood” term ‘person’ cannot be objectivized as it is to contrast against everyday understanding of the source of meaning for Scheler and while 6 Smith,“ReviewofPersonsandValuesinPragmaticPhenomenology,”221. 7 DavidWebermanascitedinHackett,PersonsandValuesinPragmaticPhenomenology,75. 110 January 2022 – Volume 5 Hackett Returning to persons and values in pragmatic phenomenology cultural moments on the news we are told do that make up what he calls the structure of objectivize persons, the book was in principle care. Scheler invents the ordo amoris and value- about constructing a moral metaphysics using qualitiesandfeelingacts. Ifanalyticphilosophy the resources Scheler has on offer. Again, cer- were adequate to thematize moral experience tainly Smith is free to disagree with me and no ethical phenomenologist would have to in- Scheler, but to say that I am somehow using vent neologisms to describe aspects of moral thing-like language with how I use the term experience that remain hidden. Like Scheler ‘person’issomethingIclearlydonotdo. “Each and Levinas, I think that other philosophical respective phenomenological thinker has had traditions are inadequate to their treatment of a term for human life revealed through phe- whatgetsconcealedinmoralexperience. Some nomenological analysis: Dasein for Heidegger, neologisms and difference in method should transcendental subjectivity in Husserl, and for be expected. Scheler, the term is person.”8 I do not think In conclusion, Smith misquotes me once in Smith got that far into my book. His citations thereviewforsomethingthatdoesn’tappearin only go to about p. 80. the book. Next, he attacks usages of the terms Icouldgoon. Whatwehavehereisnotthat ‘person’ and ‘mood’ arguing they should be I published my book to be published rather understood how he regards them rather than thanread,Ijustdidn’tthinksomeonewhopaid seeing these terms are employed inside phe- noattentiontophenomenologywouldtakeen- nomenology.9 The fact that I present refer- tire passages out of context and not be charita- ences to those same passages here10 Smith did ble tothe point of ignoring entire conventions not care to learn about these authors. When of a philosophical tradition they clearly do not I am explaining a concept internal to a text, inhabit regularly. Like many commentators Smithmisrepresentsexpositionofaconceptfor who extoll only one interpretive possibility for someunarguedassumptionhethinksyou,dear philosophical language, Smith ignores that the reader, should adopt about it. He’d rather ig- point of phenomenological language is to cre- nore the hermeneutic realities that good cross- ate an awareness about how the relation be- over philosophy requires and view my work tween acts of consciousness and their intended myopicallyfromanuncharitablevantagepoint correlatemanifestinexperiencing. Alongthese of what he uncritically accepts as the only way lines, Heidegger invents the four existentiales to do philosophy. 8 Ibid.,90. 9Toreviewmybookin2021threeyearslaterandtonotinvestigatewhetherornotmyunderstandingofthese conceptshavechangedisjustoddtome.Ihavedevelopedtheconceptofpersoninmuchmoreexactingdetailina newpiecebeyondmybook. Seemy“Thebecomingofthepersonalsphere: aproposedframeworkforPersonalist PhilosophicalAnthropology”inAppraisal12,nos. 1and2(SpringandAutumn2020),https://www.britishperson- alistforum.org.uk/121–2-j-edward-hackett.html. Usuallygoodscholarswillinquireintowhetherornotascholar haschangedtheirmindsinphilosophicalliteratureiftheyaretoreviewabookfromthreeyearsago. 10Thereaderwillhavetosettleforfootnotes,ascommentariesinthisjournalissubjecttostrictlengthrestrictions. ReaderswhoareinterestedinaverylengthyanddevelopedresponsewhereIciteinexactingdetaileverymistake that Smith made can e-mail me at [email protected] for those references. In this shorter response, I am highlightingthemostegregiousmistakes. Idonothavetimetoreferencethetechnicaltermofparticipatory realismandSmith’squipsagainstthattermhereeither. January 2022 – Volume 5 111 © Copyright 2022 Hackett. Correspondence: J. Edward Hackett, e: [email protected]. Received: 11 October, 2021. Accepted: 12 November, 2021. Howtocite: Hackett,J.Edward. “Returningtopersonsandvaluesinpragmaticphenomenology: a response to Simon Smith’s uncharitable review.” Inscriptions 5, no. 1 (January 2022): 109-111.