REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY TEAM INTO THE ADEQUACY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND’S PAST CASES REVIEW 2008-2009 Sir Roger Singleton Amanda Lamb Donald Findlater June 2018 1 CONTENTS Paras • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 – 2 • INTRODUCTION 3 – 7 • BACKGROUND 8 – 30 • OUR APPROACH 31 – 34 • FINDINGS: The content of the Protocol 35 – 46 Compliance with the Protocol 47 – 64 Independence of the Reviewers 65 – 67 Victims and survivors 68 – 69 Accuracy of reporting 71 – 86 Oversight by the National Church 87 – 94 Individual dioceses and provinces 95 – 101 • CONSIDERATIONS 102 – 120 • RECOMMENDATIONS 121 • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 122 – 123 • APPENDICES A – Abbreviations used B – DSA check-list C – Authors’ biographies 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. This Executive Summary is followed by the main body of the report which provides background, the approach of the scrutiny team and the findings. The report concludes with some considerations, recommendations and acknowledgements. 2. In summary: A Curate’s Egg. More specifically: • The House of Bishops decided on the need for a review of past cases in May 2007. This followed court appearances by several clergy and church officials charged with sexual offences against children. A working group was established to advise on how the review should be conducted. The protocol which emerged provided for the then diocesan Child Protection Adviser to draw up a list of known cases of child safeguarding concerns relating to clergy and other church officers and to submit this to an Independent Reviewer who would advise the Diocesan Child Protection Management Group on whether any further action was required. Following that the reviewer was to read the files of all licensed clergy; all readers and those in lay ministry; employee files of those having access to children via the Church; and the files of all clergy with permission to officiate. If any new concerns arose from this work then names and relevant details were to be added to the list of known cases for further action to assess and manage risk. When this was completed, the Diocesan Child Protection Management Group was to prepare a report for the bishop who would send it to the National Safeguarding Adviser together with an anonymised copy of the Known Cases List and a statistical report, the format for which was later prescribed by the National Church. • The Independent Scrutiny Team found the protocol to be a thoughtful and well- intentioned piece of work. Advice was taken from agencies with relevant expertise and the Church embarked on the initiative without knowing what the outcome would be. There were some shortcomings in the protocol, principally a lack of clarity about which roles were within the scope of the review; the exclusion of parish employees and volunteers; little involvement of church bodies and institutions outside episcopal oversight; an absence of involvement by victims and survivors; and a lack of clarity about some of the reporting requirements. But as one person commented: “We were working in the dark. Nothing like this had happened before.” 3 • Whilst compliance with the protocol was generally high there were some exceptions in relation to the choice of independent reviewers; the conduct and comprehensiveness of the file review; and the mixed quality of recording in relation to the actions taken and the outcomes. • Some diocesan staff experienced difficulty in locating files and independent reviewers commented adversely on the quality of case recording, file content and maintenance. Notwithstanding this, over 40,000 files were reviewed – a not inconsiderable achievement. • The evidence is that most independent reviewers adopted a thorough approach to their task with any indication of a child protection issue being identified and noted for further action. • We were not asked to examine or sample individual case records although we have seen some case vignettes and summaries. Consequently, it was not possible to adopt a wholly consistent approach to forming views on the judgements which had been exercised in 2008-09 in relation to names put on the known cases lists, action plans or outcomes. Our assessments have, of necessity, been made on highly variable data. However, three quarters of the current diocesan safeguarding advisers, most of whom were not in post in 2008-09, regard the Past Cases Review as having been competently conducted in their dioceses and have evidenced their views. Many of the cases have been reviewed several times: by the Independent Reviewer; the Diocesan Child Protection Management Group; by subsequent diocesan safeguarding advisers; and in some dioceses, by later external reviewers. And with a small number of exceptions, the number of cases per diocese which might have been identified in 2008-09 but were not and which have subsequently come to light is none or one. • We found little evidence of work with victims or survivors as a direct consequence of the review. • There were considerable inconsistencies in the completion of the statistical reports such that care should be exercised when drawing conclusions from the returns. The form itself was confusing; the instructions accompanying the form contained ambiguities; and the form was only available after many dioceses had commenced or almost completed their reviews. • A decision was taken by the House of Bishops to report publicly only on newly identified cases and those requiring formal church action. “Formal church action” was narrowly defined. Consequently, the public statement, made via a press notice, whilst factually accurate in most respects, failed to reflect the true extent of 4 the issues which needed to be addressed. Moreover, its claim that “…. nobody representing the Church in a formal capacity has allegations on file that have not been thoroughly examined…” could not be wholly evidenced. • Whilst acknowledging that the staffing resources available at the time were scant, the National Church’s oversight of the past cases review process was limited to seeking reports whilst engaging – with some exceptions in relation to the statistical returns – in little interrogation. • In considering whether any form of repeat activity is required by dioceses, we conclude that no further work is needed in 35 dioceses and the provinces. An updated form of PCR is recommended in 7 dioceses. • In relation to all dioceses, files not available or known not to have been examined in 2008-09 should be independently reviewed including any files of diocesan employees working with children not considered in 2008-09 or since. • We also make recommendations to: o ensure that all safeguarding concerns relating to parish employees and volunteers working with children have been notified to the diocesan safeguarding adviser o arrange for Cathedrals and all other parts of the Church with their own decision-making bodies to conduct a suitably updated review if they were not involved in the PCR or have not subsequently undertaken such a review o engage with these other parts of the Church to facilitate a “Whole Church” approach to safeguarding o recognise the minimal response which the Church made to victims and survivors following the PCR and more generally improve the Church’s responses to those who have suffered abuse by clergy and church officials o give renewed impetus to enhancing the quality and consistency of recording, file maintenance and appropriate cross-referencing of safeguarding issues and develop its thinking and practice for preventing child sexual abuse and not just responding to it • In conclusion we found the Past Cases Review to be well motivated and thoughtfully planned given the limited resources available at the time. It led to hundreds of cases of concern being reviewed and additional actions taken where appropriate. There were some limitations in relation to its execution and the public statements which were subsequently issued. Recommendations have been made 5 to address these shortcomings and to help the Church to build on the strong policy, procedures and training foundations which have now been laid. Roger Singleton Amanda Lamb Donald Findlater June 2018 6 INTRODUCTION 3. In May 2016 Roger Singleton was asked by the National Safeguarding Advisor (NSA) of the Church of England to lead a moderation panel to consider the accuracy of judgements made from a screening process conducted by two assessors on behalf of the Church’s National Safeguarding Team (NST) earlier in the year. This screening process was in relation to the Past Cases Review (PCR) carried out by all dioceses of the Church between 2007 and 2009. He recruited Ms Amanda Lamb and Mr Donald Findlater to join the moderation panel. Both had extensive experience of safeguarding matters and our short biographies are at Appendix C. None of us had any involvement in the PCR until asked to carry out this scrutiny assignment, except that Mr Findlater contributed to the Lucy Faithfull Foundation’s comments on the draft of a protocol which was to prescribe the modus operandi of the PCR (see para 11). 4. For purposes of clarity we refer to the moderation panel as the Independent Scrutiny Team (IST). The title Child Protection Adviser (CPA) refers to diocesan safeguarding staff in post at the time of the PCR itself. The role, in most dioceses, was renamed Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser (DSA) and we use this for the staff engaged in subsequent and contemporary work. 5. We had access to the two NST assessors’ brief notes of their telephone interviews with the current DSAs; copies of statistical reports submitted to the National Church in 2009/10; and an assortment of other emails and documents. The limitations of the screening process soon became apparent and it proved impossible to form a credible judgement on the adequacy of the PCR in each diocese based on the information made available to us. Following consultation with the Church’s National Safeguarding Steering Group in January 2017 our task and terms of reference were revised: a) To review the process and content of the PCR 2007-09 in relation to the objectives and procedures set for it in the House of Bishops’ Protocol (described below at para 16) and having regard to the reports and returns made by the dioceses at the conclusion of the PCR; the follow-up sought in October 2010; the reflection on the standard of the PCR requested as part of the Review of Deceased Clergy Files in October 2013; and the screening exercise carried out on behalf of the NST in 2016; b) From the available documents, to assess the extent to which the PCR was conducted effectively in each diocese; 7 c) In dioceses where reliance cannot be placed on the thoroughness of the PCR, to identify, seek and evaluate additional information relating to further work which has been done since the PCR which may address its shortcomings; d) In making these judgements, to have regard to the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) audits of contemporary work in each diocese to assess whether a repeat form of PCR is necessary; and e) To produce a final report setting out findings and recommendations which for the purposes of transparency will be published and submitted to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA). 6. We were subsequently given access to substantially more information relating to the PCR and following appraisal of this we invited dioceses to submit any additional documents which bore on the thoroughness or otherwise of the PCR 2007-2009 and any follow-up work undertaken. Whilst there have been a number of clarifying conversations and e-mail exchanges with persons directly involved in the PCR and follow-up work and with the current DSAs, this report has been principally compiled from the documents we have read and the judgements we have made. 7. We are aware that since 2009 there have been cases of actual or alleged historical abuse against some senior clergy which have received significant national publicity. These have been the subject of separate inquiries. We have limited ourselves to commenting on whether these cases, if known about in 2007, were considered as part of the PCR process and dealt with appropriately. 8 BACKGROUND 8. At its meeting on 22 May 2007 the House of Bishops considered the need for a review of past cases. This was prompted by a number of high profile convictions involving child abuse by clergy and church officials and in particular by the sentencing the previous month of Peter Halliday, a former choirmaster at St Peter’s Church in Farnborough, who had admitted to 10 counts of sexual abuse of boys between 1986 and 1990. We understand that in 1990 the rector and the Bishop of Dorking were informed about the abuse but that they did not notify the police. Instead Peter Halliday was told that he could leave quietly as long as he had no more contact with children. He went on to be a governor at a secondary school and work with a children’s choir. The Church was accused of a cover-up. 9. The day after the sentencing hearing, the then Archbishop of Canterbury issued a statement expressing his deep sorrow over the suffering experienced in child abuse cases involving the Church. 10. The outcome of the House of Bishops’ debate in May 2007 was a request to the Church’s Central Safeguarding Liaison Group (CSLG) for advice on how a review of past cases should be managed. On Radio 4’s Today programme the Archbishop of Canterbury explained that the House of Bishops had agreed to take advice “.... on how we should best conduct a review. We don’t just want to look good, we want to do it properly, and so we need to have the best professional advice on how we might review these historic cases.” 11. In the weeks following the Archbishop’s interview the CSLG established a Past Cases Review Working Group (WG) to develop a protocol for the PCR. The protocol was to be based on best practice for reviewing historic cases and the WG drew on the experience of the (Roman) Catholic Office for the Protection of Children and Adults, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Lucy Faithful Foundation and the Churches’ Child Protection Advisory Service. 12. A draft protocol was put before the House of Bishops at its meeting on 3 October 2007. Although the discussion centred around the draft protocol, it also involved a range of related matters. It covered practical areas including the location of files of retired clergy; the question of costs and resources, nationally and for dioceses; the role of the NSA (then being only a part time post); publication of statistical data; whether and how to request information from past senior office holders or from all retired clergy; whether the scope should include lay workers and volunteers; and the fact that many historic files had apparently been shredded in accordance with perceived data protection requirements. The discussion also addressed more substantial issues concerning the nature and purpose of the review and 9 ambivalence was expressed by some in this regard. A concern was raised as to whether there was a danger of over-reaction and whether the review process should proceed as planned. On the one hand, it was pointed out that the process could not be ‘fool-proof’, that the Roman Catholic Church’s approach had proved destructive of clergy morale, and that the real victims could include those clergy and church officials about whom unfounded allegations had been made. On the other hand, it was noted that there was widespread expectation that the review would be carried out and that a failure to proceed might be taken as evidence of a church culture which colluded with child abuse. 13. In the light of these comments, the WG made amendments to the draft and on 5 December 2007 the House of Bishops’ Standing Committee agreed to sign off the Protocol. On 10 December 2007 the Lead Bishop on Safeguarding at the time, the Bishop of Hereford, wrote to diocesan bishops enclosing a copy of the Protocol; explaining that the CSLG was working on a question and answer document; and that there would be a ‘low-key’ press announcement the following day. In relation to deceased clergy, the letter said, “the reviewer will not often have the necessity to review the file of a person who is deceased.... unless information arises, which necessitates further examination of all the issues including the file”. 14. The letter advised that a copy of the Protocol would be sent to Church bodies and institutions with their own decision-making arrangements – Cathedrals, Religious Communities, Theological Colleges, the Central Council for Church Bell Ringers, Missionary Agencies, Royal Peculiars and the Royal School of Church Music. It was suggested that bishops may wish to be in touch with such groups in their own dioceses. 15. The letter raised concerns about the need to ensure, as far as possible, a consistent and thorough approach across the dioceses. Dioceses were, therefore, invited to work with the model Protocol as approved and adopt it as fully as possible. In the preface to the Protocol, the Lead Bishop on Safeguarding said that the Protocol should be adopted by each diocese to ensure consistency in good practice and emphasised that it was important to ensure that there were no situations where either there were outstanding allegations that were unaddressed or where children may still be at risk. It was anticipated that the PCR would be completed by June 2009. 16. The Protocol identified six “purposes”: 1. “Bishops, together with their Diocesan Child Protection Management Groups (DCPMG) and Child Protection Adviser(s) (CPA), should ensure that any cases which were known of in the past but not adequately responded to, should be the 10