W o The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is n no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the g best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held Ethics that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting M Moral Relativism o and abortion. ra l R e la and Pluralism t iv is m a n d P lu r a lis About the Series Series Editors m This Elements series provides an extensive Ben Eggleston overview of major figures, theories, and University of concepts in the field of ethics. Each entry Kansas David B. Wong in the series acquaints students with the main aspects of its topic while articulating Dale E. Miller the author’s distinctive viewpoint in a Old Dominion sserP manner that will interest researchers. University, Virginia ytisre v in U e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d Cover image: Walking in twilight. Vural/Getty Images //:sp IISSSSNN 22551166--44003213 ((opnrilnint)e) tth sse rP y tisre v in U e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth ElementsinEthics editedby BenEggleston UniversityofKansas DaleE.Miller OldDominionUniversity,Virginia MORAL RELATIVISM AND PLURALISM David B. Wong Duke University sse rP y tisre v in U e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth ShaftesburyRoad,CambridgeCB28EA,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 103PenangRoad,#05–06/07,VisioncrestCommercial,Singapore238467 CambridgeUniversityPressispartofCambridgeUniversityPress&Assessment, adepartmentoftheUniversityofCambridge. WesharetheUniversity’smissiontocontributetosocietythroughthepursuitof education,learningandresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781009044301 DOI:10.1017/9781009043496 ©DavidB.Wong2023 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisions ofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytake placewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress&Assessment. Firstpublished2023 AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-009-04430-1Paperback ISSN2516-4031(online) sse ISSN2516-4023(print) rP ytisrev CoarmacbcruidrgaceyUonfivUeRrLsistyfoPrreexstse&rnAalsoserstshmiredn-ptahratsyninoterernseptownseibbsiliitteysforerfethrreepdetrosiisntetnhcise inU publicationanddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwill eg remain,accurateorappropriate. d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth Moral Relativism and Pluralism ElementsinEthics DOI:10.1017/9781009043496 Firstpublishedonline:January2023 DavidB.Wong DukeUniversity Authorforcorrespondence:DavidB.Wong,[email protected] Abstract:Theargumentformetaethicalrelativism,theviewthatthereisno singletrueormostjustifiedmorality,isthatitispartofthebest explanationofthemostdifficultmoraldisagreements.Theargument forthisviewfeaturesacomparisonbetweentraditionsthathighlyvalue relationshipandcommunityandtraditionsthathighlyvaluepersonal autonomyoftheindividualandrights.Itisheldthatmoralitiesarebest understoodasemergingfromhumancultureinresponsetotheneed topromoteandregulateinterpersonalcooperationandinternal motivationalcoherenceintheindividual.Theargumentendsinthe conclusionthatthereisaboundedpluralityoftrueandmostjustified moralitiesthataccomplishthesefunctions.Thenormativeimplications ofthisformofmetaethicalrelativismareexplored,withspecificfocus onfemalegenitalcuttingandabortion. Keywords:moralrelativism,ethicaltheory,comparativephilosophy, normativeethics,naturalisticethics ©DavidB.Wong2023 sse rP ISBNs:9781009044301(PB),9781009043496(OC) y tisre ISSNs:2516-4031(online),2516-4023(print) v in U e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth Contents 1 WhyArePeopleSoExercisedaboutMoralRelativism? 1 2 HowShouldThesesaboutMoralRelativismBeFramed? 2 3 RelationshipandCommunity,AutonomyandRights 3 4 EpistemicReasonstoDelveFurtherintotheConflict betweenRelationship-Centered andRights-Centered Moralities 6 5 AnEthicalArgumentforExtendedInquiryintoRivalsto One’sOwnEthicalViews 9 6 OvercomingStereotypesofRelationship-Centered Moralities 13 7 ComplicatingtheContrastbetweenRelationship-and Autonomy-CenteredMoralities 18 sse rP ytisre 8 TheUnderdiscussedQuestionofWhatMoralityIs 22 v in U e 9 ANaturalisticApproachtoUnderstandingWhyHuman g d irb BeingsHaveMoralities 24 m a C y b e 10 PuttingTogetherMoralAmbivalenceandaNaturalistic n iln ConceptionofMorality 27 o d e h silb 11 ConstraintsontheRangeofViableMoralities 28 u P 6 9 4 34 12 TheSocialConstructionofMorality:BytheIndividualor 0 9 00 Group? 32 1 8 7 9 /710 13 WhenPeopleDifferinTheirMoralBeliefsaboutanIssue, 1 .01 WhenDoTheyActuallyDisagree? 37 /g ro .io d //:sp tth Contents v 14 WhyWeHaveDifferentBeliefsinMetaethics 40 15 HowMoralReasonsEnterintotheTruthConditionsof MoralJudgmentsandHelpShapeOurMoralMotivations 42 16 SummaryoftheArgumentforaPluralisticFormof MetaethicalMoralRelativism 45 17 ConfusedReasoningThatIsSometimesAttributedto ThoseWhoBelieveinNormativeMoralRelativism 46 18 AnArgumentforNormativeMoralRelativismThatIs ContingentupontheAcceptanceofCertainValuesand theAdoptionofMetaethicalMoralRelativism 47 19 WhyNormativeMoralRelativismCannotBeaSimple MatterofLettingOthersBe 48 20 WhatIsFemaleGenitalCutting? 49 21 AccommodationandtheFraughtIssueofAbortion 53 22 UnderminingStereotypesoftheOtherSide 57 23 FosteringPluralisticEncounters 59 sse 24 SummaryofNormativeMoralRelativism 61 rP y tisre v in U References 62 e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth sse rP y tisre v in U e g d irb m a C y b e n iln o d e h silb u P 6 9 4 3 4 0 9 0 0 1 8 7 9 /7 1 0 1 .0 1 /g ro .io d //:sp tth MoralRelativismandPluralism 1 1WhyArePeopleSoExercisedaboutMoralRelativism? GrowingupChineseAmericanintheAmericanMidwest,thewaysofmyfamily, includingwhatwasexpectedofmeasason,seemedpainfullydifferentfromthe waysofthefamiliesofmyEuropeanAmericanfriends.Familyseemedsomuch more important in my home. This did not mean that my European American friendshadnoresponsibilitiestotheirfamilies,butingeneral,theirdutiesrested upon their shoulders more lightly. My mother once said to me that she simply didn’tunderstand(maybeshemeantdidn’tapproveof)theAmericanobsession withhappiness.Shethoughtthemostimportantthingwastofulfillone’srespon- sibilitiestoothers,andofcoursetheweightiestoneswereowedtofamily.Idon’t think she meant to deny the importance of a subjective sense of contentment (what I think she meant by “happiness”), but her point was that the subjective sensehadtobeearnedthroughtheperformanceofresponsibilities,asbestasone could.Irespectedhersentiments,andhalfofmeagreedwithher,buttheother halfwantedtobefreetopursuehappiness. The question was about how I should live my life, and so it took on the greatest personal importance for me. When I began to take moral relativism seriously, some of those closest to me wondered whether I should find some other philosophical subject to write about. Many people think that moral relativismlicensesanyanswerapersonwouldbeinclinedtogive,oranyanswer theirsociety’sculturegives.Thatiswhy“moralrelativism”isoftenusedasan epithet,atermofderisionbypeoplewhoassumethatmoralityisamatterfor reasoned judgment. I agree with this assumption, but depart from the oft- associated,butverydifferentonethatforanymoralquestionthereisasingle sserP correct answer to be found and that conflicting answers are incorrect. Others, ytisre andIamamongthem,havecometoquestionthelatterassumptionbyreflecting vin on the nature of moral disagreement. The kinds of disagreement that can be U eg mosteffectivelyadducedinsupportofmoralrelativismtypicallyinvolvevalues d irbm that come into conflict, each of which are compelling in their own right a C y (consider liberty versus equality). The experience of moral conflict can be b en interpersonal, in which different sides have different views as to which value iln o d ismostcompellinggiventhecircumstances.Conflictalsocanbeintrapersonal. e h silb Thatis,onecanbeinternallydividedbetweentwomoralviewpoints,aswasthe u P 6 caseformeaftermydiscussionwithmymother. 9 43 Themerefactthatpeopledisagree,intrapersonallyorinterpersonally,isnot 4 0 90 in itself a reason to think that there isn’t a single correct answer to be found. 0 1 87 Insufficientevidencetoresolveadisagreementiscompatiblewiththerebeing 9 /7 10 a single correct answer. The interpretive frameworks that people bring to 1 .01 assessing the evidence can differ markedly, producing conflicting views, but /g ro .io d //:sp tth 2 Ethics thistooiscompatiblewiththerebeingasinglecorrectanswer.Themotivation thatpeoplehaveforadoptingbeliefs,moralandotherwise,andwhethertheyare aware of their motivation or not, is often that these beliefs are held by others with whom they identify or align themselves. Beliefs can help people protect their self-esteem, and this can lead to motivations to overlook evidence that undermines these beliefs and focus on evidence that supports them. Take the belief that people are solely responsible for what they have achieved in life, whichplaysakeyroleincertainconservativeviewsaboutdistributivejustice.If onehasenjoyedreasonablesuccess,onemaystronglybelievethatonedidsoon one’sown,focusingonthegenuinelydifficultsituationsonehadtoworkone’s waythrough,butnotsomuchkeepinginmindthehelpothersprovidedalong the way. This is a very familiar way of coming to an ill-founded belief, and philosopherspointtosuchepistemicpitfallstoarguethatmoraldisagreement provideslittleornoevidenceagainstmetaethicaluniversalism(e.g.,seeBrink 1989).Butonecanagreethatsuchpitfallsexist,andstillrejecttheideathatthey “explainaway”allimportantmoraldisagreement. In what follows, I make a case for this rejection and for accepting some versionsofmoralrelativism.Thepathbeginswithadiscussionofhowtoframe the issue of moral relativism. What exactly are the views being debated for whichcertainkindsofmoraldisagreementsareadducedasevidence? 2HowShouldThesesaboutMoralRelativismBeFramed? Inphilosophy,somuchdependsonhowyouframethequestion.Thebestwayof framing the question enables interlocutors to fully consider the main consider- sse ationsthathavemotivatedthecontendingsides,andtoevaluatethefullarrayof rP ytisrev pdoessisriabblelecforanmcliunsgiownsouthldatncaroruolwd btheejruasntigfieedofbmyotthivoasteincgocnosindseidraetriaotnios.nsAorletshse- in U e possibleconclusionsthatcouldbereached.Withthisinmind,“metaethicalmoral g d irb relativism”isdefinedhereasthethesisthatthereisnosingletrueormostjustified m aC morality (with some adaptation, this formulation is from Harman 2000, 77). y b e Moralityhereistakenasaguidetowhatsortofactionsandattitudesarerequired, n iln o prohibited,andpermissible,andmuchofitssubjectmatterconcernshowoneisto d e hsilb relatetoandaffectothers,thoughitcanalsospecifyfortheindividualwhatitisto uP liveaworthwhilelife.Thedisjunction,“trueormostjustified,”ismeanttoallow 6 9 4 forthepossiblepositionthatmoralityisnotthesortofthingthatistrueorfalse(as 3 4 0 9 an order or admonition might not be true or false), but nevertheless can be 0 0 187 justified, perhaps in greater or lesser degree (as an order or admonition might 9 /71 bemoreorlesswelltaken).Relativism,thusdefined,isopposedtowhatIshall 0 1 .01 call“universalism”:theviewthatthereisasingletrueormostjustifiedmorality. /g ro .io d //:sp tth