Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States Monarchy, migration and hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula John Chalcraft October 2010 Number 12 The Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States is a ten-year multidisciplinary global programme. It focuses on topics such as globalization, economic development, diversification of and challenges facing resource-rich economies, trade relations between the Gulf states and major trading partners, energy trading, security and migration. The Programme primarily studies the six states that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, it also adopts a more flexible and broader conception when the interests of research require that key regional and international actors, such as Yemen, Iraq, Iran, as well as its interconnections with Russia, China and India, be considered. The Programme is hosted in LSE Global Governance, and led by Professor David Held, co-director of the Centre. It supports post- doctoral researchers and PhD students, develops academic networks between LSE and Gulf institutions and hosts a regular Gulf seminar series at the LSE, as well as major biennial conferences in Kuwait and London. The Programme is funded by the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences. www.lse.ac.uk/LSEKP/ Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula Research Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States John Chalcraft Government Department London School of Economics and Political Science [email protected] Copyright © John Chalcraft 2010 The right of John Chalcraft to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published in 2010. All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of John Chalcraft. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) or the Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States. Neither John Chalcraft nor LSE accepts any liability for loss or damage incurred as a result of the use of or reliance on the content of this publication. Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula JOHN CHALCRAFT Abstract Migrants make up a greater proportion of the workforce in the Arabian peninsula than perhaps in any other region of the world. Migration politics, however, has been either understudied – in comparative politics and conventional economics – or treated by authors influenced by modernization theory and Marxism alike in a deterministic manner. Using Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony, historic bloc and alternative hegemony, this paper aims to analyse the significance of migration for the changing fate of monarchy in the region since 1945. On the basis of primary and secondary sources in Arabic and English I argue that migration has played two different roles in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, it formed a part of an oppositional bloc challenging monarchy. From the 1970s to the 2000s, however, the oppositional bloc dissolved and migration became an adjunct rather than a challenge to the ruling order. INTRODUCTION Historians and social scientists have done remarkably little to connect migration to the changing fate of monarchy in recent decades on the Arabian peninsula. The literature on monarchy and patrimonial rule – dominated by comparative politics, but including some history and anthropology – has almost completely omitted to discuss the political significance of migration (Anderson 1991, 2000; Ashton 2008; Ayalon 2000; Beblawi 1990; Crystal 1990; Damis 1992; Davidson 2008; Entelis 1976, 1989; Halliday 2000; Hammoudi 1997; Huntington 1968; Khalaf 1992, 2000; Kostiner 2000; Luciani 1990; Maddy-Weitzman 2000; Mahdavy 1970; Okruhlik 1999; Ross 2001; Shlaim 2007; Waterbury 1970, 1973; Zagorski 2009; Zartman 1987). The emphasis has instead been on the ways in which monarchs have overcome the dilemmas of modernization and, more sotto voce, the contradictions of capitalism, through great-power support, the crafting of states and building of coalitions (using rents where possible), and on the way rulers have identified themselves as generous father-figures, authentic yet modernizing guardians of national, Arab and Islamic traditions and values. The relative lack of attention to migration may be regarded as a surprise given the fact that in six of the eight surviving monarchies in the Arab world, the workforce is between one-half and nine-tenths foreign. On the other hand, the literature on migration to the Gulf – dominated by economics – has done surprisingly little to probe the political significance of migration. The dominant approach since the 1970s has analysed migrants as 1 ‘manpower requirements’ in a story of ‘economic growth’ in which expert planners and responsible authorities either succeed or fail in implementing migration policies that will guarantee the undistorted operation of the market – while paying due attention to local ‘cultural’ and ‘demographic’ concerns (Bhagwati 1984; Birks and Sinclair 1980; Fergany 1982; Kapiszeswki 2001; Seccombe 1983, 1987; Seccombe and Lawless 1986; Serageldin 1983; Sherbiny 1981, 1984). This approach occludes both its own politics and those of migrant ‘manpower’ by making the profoundly unequal and consequential control over persons, their livelihoods and social and political relations, appear merely as the neutral and technocratic management of things. At best, such approaches only inform a conversation about markets and growth, which, in some very deliberate sense, is all they purport to do. They have done little to illuminate, except as primary sources, the political role played by migrants in the changing fate of monarchies in the Gulf (cf. Longva 1997: 2). Authors influenced by Marxism have argued that migration has been a way to divide and defeat the challenge posed to monarchy by the emergent forces of a socialist working class (Disney 1977: 22; Franklin 1985; Halliday 1977a, 1980, 1984; Khalaf 1985; Lackner 1978: 194, 197, 216). And scattered references, by writers influenced by modernization theory, to the convenience to ruling families of having an ‘apolitical’ and ‘transient’ workforce (for example, Davidson 2008) suggest an at least implicit account in which foreign and ‘disposable’ migrant workers helped reforming patrimonial rulers overcome the dilemmas of modernization. The problem with both of these accounts, however, is that they rely on determinist, materialist and teleological expectations of who workers are and how they are supposed to behave. Migrants are supposed to spring, fully formed, from the socioeconomic base, and then enter the political superstructure in order to enact certain anti-monarchical positions. Clearly this socioeconomic determinism will not do. The literature treating migrants as acculturated subjects, however, and that which takes politics more seriously, is growing (Abu Lughod 1985; Choucri 1986; Kapiszewski 2001; Khoury 1981; Lackner 1978; Longva 1997; Louër 2008; Russell 1988, 1989; Russell and Al-Ramadhan 1994; Vitalis 2007; Weiner 1982). The point of departure for this paper is best articulated by Longva: ‘[a]n approach that recognizes labor migration as an integral part of social life in the region is … urgently needed’ (Longva 1997: 2). Further, in order to escape the determinisms of modernization theory and materialist Marxism alike, but without rushing headlong 2 into the jaws of linguistic or discursive determinism, the paper makes use of Antonio Gramsci’s notions of historic bloc, hegemony and alternative hegemony. The aim is to build on existing conversations to develop a distinctive argument about the political role of migration in the Arabian peninsula from 1945 to the present. The paper argues that migration played two quite different roles depending on history and context. On the one hand, in the particular international and regional context of the 1950s and 1960s, migration was an element in a serious challenge to the rule of beleaguered monarchs in the peninsula. In the decades following 1947–8, Arab migrants – especially Palestinians, Egyptians and Yemenis – acted to transmit international and regional anti-monarchical pressures. They played a role in ‘the revolutionary, Arab nationalist tide which inundated the Gulf and Arab peninsula region in the 1950s’ (Al-Naqeeb 1990: 101). Domestically they formed an important element in oppositional assemblages, involving renegade princes, disaffected officers, merchants, professional and intermediary classes, workers and migrants. These groups were stitched together – articulated hegemonically in a way that made diverse social elements appear as a unity – in various ways by the ideas of pan-Arabism, Nasserism, leftism, statist developmentalism and reformism, and posed a real challenge to the ruling families. Migration took on a completely different political significance in the greatly altered international and regional context of the 1970s–2000s, when it became an adjunct rather than a challenge to the resurgent power of patrimonial ruling families in the region. In the two decades after 1973, migrants mediated via remittances a new international and regional balance in which Gulf monarchs became more powerful vis-à-vis increasingly indebted and divided Arab and Third World sending countries. Migrants, further, were a transmission belt for structural transformations and ideas that undermined the power and hegemony of the formerly radical single-party regimes vis-à-vis their monarchic competitors. Domestically, migrants of ever more varied national origins were disarticulated from oppositional assemblages with the attrition of radical pan-Arabism and leftism and the rise of local, conservative nationalism and neoliberalism. Alienated from local allies, understood as a demographic and cultural problem, and facing market forces, segregation and exclusion, migrants were now only able to lodge protests in corporate-economic terms, and the political challenge to monarchies of which they formed a part was defeated. 3 MONARCHY UNDER SIEGE In the 1960s, ruling families in the Arabian peninsula, with their patrimonial politics ‘based primarily on family ties, personal loyalty, and patronage’ (Zagorski 2009: 441), had strong reasons to feel under siege. True, geopolitical support for monarchs had long come from Britain and more recently from the United States, and such support was reaffirmed with the British–CIA coup of 1953 in Iran which faced down the forces of nationalism, liberal democracy and leftism and re-established the Peacock Throne on a more authoritarian basis (Abrahamian 2001). But ‘protection’ from the imperialist camp had not saved other monarchs – whether in Egypt in 1952 or Iraq in 1958 – and it was clear to most that the charge of being a British or American puppet could be devastating. Revolutionaries in Oman, for example, were inspired by the belief that ‘[King] Feisal [of Saudi Arabia] is [President Lyndon] Johnson’s ass’ (cited in Halliday 2002: 384), and the muwahhidun gunmen who seized the grand mosque in Mecca in 1979 believed that the Saudi royal family were the craven servants of American infidels (Trofimov 2007). Sometimes, moreover, the commitment of the British or the Americans to supporting ruling families was not as firm as those families themselves might have liked. Arms and resources were usually forthcoming, but did even the British and the Americans really believe that the monarchs would last? Their left intellectuals certainly did not. Instead, some heralded the way combined and uneven capitalism promised anti-monarchist revolution and anti-imperialism. Socialism and class politics ‘opened up the possibility of an alternative fate for the peoples of the Middle East still under various intense oppressions … the radical anti-imperialism developing in the Arabian peninsula pointed to a liberated future’ (Halliday 2002: 29). That several copies of Halliday’s book were seen in Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal’s office in the 1970s implies that these things were noted ‘on high’ (Halliday 2002: 1). But more ominously for rulers, even prominent US political scientists on the political right and close to power who frowned on instability and popular movements were convinced that monarchs worldwide were due to fall. Samuel Huntington, to pick the most oft-cited example, reckoned in the 1960s that monarchy would never be able to survive the acute ‘king’s dilemma’ it faced: monarchy needed to centralize power in order to deliver reform, but this would make ‘difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new groups produced by modernization’. The outlook for these monarchs was ‘bleak’ and 4 the only real questions concerned ‘the scope of the violence of their demise and who wields the violence’ (Huntington 1968: 5, 177, 191; cf. Halpern 1963). The British diplomatic records for Saudi Arabia emphatically confirm that British officials held similar views until 1971, when it was decided that the prospects for monarchical survival were improving (Burdett 1997, 2004). Beyond the United States and Britain, the picture was bleaker. Certainly the geopolitical manoeuvres of the Soviet Union and China were sometimes ambiguous, but it is still probably fair to say that the general thrust was anti-monarchical. The Communist Party of Iraq, for example, had to swallow many a difficult directive from the Kremlin (such as the recognition of Israel in 1948 in the midst of the catastrophic dispossession of the Palestinian people), but they were never asked to support the Iraqi monarchy. Of course the official line in the world communist movement, as well as the ideas that motivated people to become communists, were strongly opposed to the feudal, bourgeois or imperialist anachronism that was monarchy, seen as irrelevant to or nugatory for liberation, progress and development. Elsewhere, the eruption of the Non-Aligned Movement onto the world stage at Bandung in 1955 as the embodiment of the political aspirations of newly independent Third World nations was just another threat to the sultans of Arabia. None of the major figures in the movement – Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Nkrumah of Ghana and Tito of Yugoslavia – was a monarch. Third Worldism generally depicted Arabian amirs and shaykhs as the old-fashioned, reactionary puppets of neocolonialism, and adjuncts of economic dependency and underdevelopment (Khalili 2007; Malley 1996; Prashad 2007). If anything, the regional stage was even less comforting. In Morocco, the monarchy lurched from crisis to crisis in the 1960s and early 1970s (Hudson 1977: 223; Waterbury 1973). Sultan Muhammad V (ruling 1927-61) seemed to survive independence only because France’s decision to deport him in 1953 inadvertently worked to cement his nationalist credentials. Jordan’s King Hussein was nearly unseated in 1956-7. His dynasty remained under threat until 1961 only to face a further crisis in 1970 (Ashton 2008; Shlaim 2007). Could Hussein’s much-remarked political skill really be reliably emulated? And these were the success stories. All the other Arab monarchs had been besomed into the dustbin of history: King Farouk of Egypt in 1952-3, Muhammad VIII al-Amin of Tunisia in 1956-7, the Hashemites of Iraq in 1958, the Imam of Yemen in 1962 and King Idriss of Libya in 1969. 5 The republican and revolutionary governments in the region voiced their opposition to monarchs loudly, and appeared very much to hold the political initiative in terms of their identification with the ascendant forces of the Third World, pan-Arab anti-imperial national liberation, economic development, social justice, progress and modernization. The officers who put an end to the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 triumphantly claimed to have ‘liberated the country from the domination of a corrupt group which was installed by imperialism to lull the people’. In Egypt, the Free Officers declared that the whole nation was ‘unanimous in wishing to see the monarchical regime disappear forever’. Closer to home, the Yemeni Revolutionary Council which deposed the imam defined the primary goal of the revolution as putting ‘an end to those things that have blocked all progress in Yemen – tyranny, reaction, corrupt government, and the evil system of monarchy’ (quoted in Ayalon 2000: 34). These regional governments, which, together with Syria, were increasingly viewed as playing key roles on the pan-Arab stage, were ready to give troops, arms, money and logistical support to anti-monarchical opposition movements in the peninsula. Thus Egypt threw its military weight behind the anti-monarchists in the eight-year civil war in North Yemen which began after the revolution of 1962 (Halliday 1980: 215-17), and Nasser supported and gave a platform to Gulf opposition movements through Sawt al-Arab (‘Voice of the Arabs’), the popular pan-Arab radio station. In short, in the regional and international context of the 1950s and 1960s, the kings, shaykhs and amirs of the peninsula had many persuasive reasons to peer out from their palaces, city-states and desert kingdoms with considerable anxiety about their future. It should be no surprise that the Arab migrants – especially Palestinians, Egyptians and Yemenis – who flocked to the peninsula after the Second World War seemed to, and actually did, transmit external anti-monarchical pressures. ARAB MIGRANTS After the Second World War, Arab migration to the peninsula greatly increased. Until the 1940s, notwithstanding relatively small numbers of Palestinian and Egyptian school teachers arriving to work in Kuwait and Bahrain from the late 1920s, ‘most of the immigrant labor present in the region … was drawn from the Indian sub- continent’ (Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 573). This changed during the 1950s and 1960s. Ironically, perhaps, national independence and the break-up of the British empire played an important role. On the one hand, Indian independence in 1947 6