Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives Law and Philosophy Library VOLUME102 SeriesEditors: FRANCISCOJ.LAPORTA,DepartmentofLaw, AutonomousUniversityofMadrid,Spain FREDERICKSCHAUER,SchoolofLaw,UniversityofVirginia,U.S.A. TORBENSPAAK,UppsalaUniversity,Sweden FormerSeriesEditors: AULISAARNIO,MICHAELD.BAYLES(cid:2),CONRADD.JOHNSON(cid:2), ALANMABE,ALEKSANDERPECZENIK(cid:2) EditorialAdvisoryBoard: AULISAARNIO,SecretaryGeneraloftheTampereClub,Finland HUMBERTOA´VILA,FederalUniversityofSouthBrazil,Brazil ZENONBANKOWSKI,CentreforLawandSociety,UniversityofEdinburgh, UnitedKingdom PAOLOCOMANDUCCI,UniversityofGenoa,Italy HUGHCORDER,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica DAVIDDYZENHAUS,UniversityofToronto,Canada ERNESTOGARZO´NVALDE´S,Institutfu¨rPolitikwissenschaft,Johannes GutenbergUniversitat,Mainz,Germany RICCARDOGUASTINI,UniversityofGenoa,Italy JOHNKLEINIG,DepartmentofLaw,PoliceScienceandCriminalJustice Administration,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice,CityUniversityofNewYork, U.S.A. PATRICIAMINDUS,Universita` DegliStudidiTorino,Italy YASUTOMOMORIGIWA,NagoyaUniversity,Japan GIOVANNIBATTISTARATTI,“JuandelaCierva”FellowinLaw,Facultyof Law,UniversityofGirona,Spain WOJCIECHSADURSKI,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,DepartmentofLaw, Florence,Italy HORACIOSPECTOR,UniversidadTorcuatoDiTella,Argentina ROBERTS.SUMMERS,SchoolofLaw,CornellUniversity,U.S.A. MICHELTROPER,Membredel’InstitutUniversitairedeFrance,France CARLWELLMAN,DepartmentofPhilosophy,WashingtonUniversity,U.S.A. Forfurthervolumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6210 Christian Dahlman (cid:129) Eveline Feteris Editors Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives 123 Editors ChristianDahlman EvelineFeteris FacultyofLaw UniversityofAmsterdam LundUniversity,Lund Amsterdam Sweden TheNetherlands ISSN1572-4395 ISBN978-94-007-4669-5 ISBN978-94-007-4670-1(eBook) DOI10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1 SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergNewYorkLondon LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2012947411 ©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2013 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped.Exemptedfromthislegalreservationarebriefexcerptsinconnection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. 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Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia(www.springer.com) Introduction Legalargumentationtheoryisa cross-disciplinaryresearchfield wheretheoretical toolsfor analyzingandevaluatinglegalargumentationare developedandapplied. Due to its cross-disciplinary nature, legal argumentation theory has become a meeting point for scholars with a background in argumentation theory, logic, artificial intelligence, rhetoric, legal theory, cognitive psychology,communication studiesandmanyotherdisciplines. This volume bringstogether two theoreticalapproachesto legalargumentation theory:thefirstapproachisbasedingeneralargumentationtheoryandcontributes tothestudyoflegalargumentationbydevelopinggeneralargumentationtheoryin application to law, the second approach is based in legal theory and contributes to the study of legal argumentation by developing legal theory with regard to argumentation. The chapters in this volume illustrate how research from one approachcomplementsresearch from the other approach,and show how they can befruitfulforeachother. The papersthatbelongto the first approachtake their pointof departurein the analysisofacertainkindofargument,aspecificargumentationfallacy,arhetorical strategy or in certain rules for a rational discussion, and apply this theoretical analysis to legal argumentation. Each of the first four contributions concentrates on a specific form of argument: the argument from consequences, the argument ad absurdum, the argument from precedent and the argument ad hominem. The authorsproposeanintegrationofideasfromargumentationtheoryandlegaltheory to develop tools for analyzing and evaluating arguments of this kind in legal argumentation. In her contribution, Flavia Carbonell investigates ‘consequentialist arguments’ in legal reasoning. She analyzes the diverse approaches to consequentialist argu- mentsgivenbyMacCormick’stheory,Wro´blewski’stheoryandFeteris’spragma- dialecticaltheory,withthepurposeof,firstly,comparing,atatheoreticallevel,the strengthsandweaknesseswhenarguingbyconsequencesisatstake.Fortestingthe scopeoftheproposals,thepaper,secondly,usestheselectedtheoriesinastudyof theconsequentialistargumentsusedinarulingoftheChileanConstitutionalCourt. The theoretical comparison, together with the outcomes to which the analysis of v vi Introduction judicialargumentationleads,shedslightonthecapacityandefficacyofthesetools inguidingtherationalconstructionandevaluationofjudicialreasoning. In his contribution, Thomas Bustamante concentrates on a specific form of argumentationin which judgesrefer to the consequencesof application of a legal rule,inthiscasetheunacceptableor‘absurd’consequencesofapplicationoftherule inthespecificcase.Heexplainsthattheadabsurdumargumentcanbeunderstood eitherasastrictlylogicaltool,whichisequivalenttoaproofbycontradiction,oras apragmaticargumentaboutthedesirabilityorundesirabilityofagivenproposition. Yet,inlegalreasoninglawyerstendtouseit,atleastinthevastmajorityofcases, onlyinthelattersense.Theargumentumadabsurdum,heargues,canbeclassified as a special kind of pragmatic argument whose specific feature is its special argumentativestrengthincomparisonwithgenericconsequentialistargumentation. Once we are able to grant that premise, the chapter intends to explain the most importantrulesofinterpretationthatmaybeusedtodeterminetheconditionsunder whichtheadabsurdumargumentcanbecorrectlydeployedinlegalreasoning. In his contribution, Fred Schauer investigates the argument from precedent. Schauerarguesthatitisamistaketoseetheargumentfromprecedentasaspecial case of the argument from analogy, and demonstrates that there are fundamental differencesbetween the two argumenttypes. An argumentfrom precedentclaims thatthepresentcasemustbedecidedinthesamewayasapreviouscase,sincethere are no relevant differences between the cases. An argument from analogy claims thatthereisanimportantsimilaritybetweenthepresentcaseandthepreviouscase, butdoesnotclaimthatthecasesareidenticalinallrelevantaspects.Furthermore, Schauer points out that a decision maker may disagree with the decision in the previouscase andstill makeanargumentfromprecedent,sinceanargumentfrom precedentismadeforthesakeofconsistency.Thisisnotpossiblewithanargument fromanalogy. In their contribution, Christian Dahlman, David Reidhav and Lena Wahlberg develop a theoretical framework for evaluating an argumentad hominem. This is highlyrelevantforlegalargumentation,aslawyersoftenuseargumentsadhominem tocastdoubtonthereliabilityofawitness.Theauthorsproposeageneraldefinition of ad hominem arguments, and a general framework that identifies the different waysinwhichadhominemargumentscangowrong.Accordingtotheauthors,an argumentadhominemisanargumentthatmakesaclaimaboutthereliabilityofa personintheperformanceofacertainfunction,basedonsomeattributerelatingto the person in question. On the basis of this definition, the authors identify seven different ways that ad hominem arguments can go wrong, and classify them as sevendifferentadhominemfallacies:falseattribution,irrelevantattribute,overrated effect, reliability irrelevance, irrelevant person, insufficient degree and irrelevant function. The followingtwo contributionsstartfroma specific argumentation-theoretical approach, the pragma-dialectical approach, and explain how legal argumentation canbeanalyzedandevaluatedfromthisperspectiveasa constructivecontribution to a rationallegal discussion. Harm Kloosterhuis starts by giving a description of thepragma-dialecticalapproachtolegalargumentationinwhichthejustificationof Introduction vii a judicial decision is considered as part of a critical discussion. In this approach it is assumed that legal argumentation theory should integrate descriptive and normative perspectives on argumentation. Legal discourse should be studied as a sampleofnormalverbalcommunicationandinteractionanditshould,atthesame time, bemeasuredagainstcertainstandardsofreasonableness.Thisimpliesfirst a philosophical ideal of reasonableness, second a theoretical model for acceptable argumentation and third tools to analyze actual legal argumentation from the perspective of the model. Analyzing argumentationin judicial decisions from the ideal-perspectiveof a critical discussion is sometimes criticized. One of the main objections is that a judge does not have a standpoint in a critical discussion, but simplydecidesa case. Asaresult,the criticalnormsforevaluatingargumentation arenotapplicabletoa legaldecision.In hiscontribution,theauthortriesto refute these two objections by showing how the ideals of a critical discussion relate to the ideals of the Rule of Law, and how these ideals function as starting points in analyzing and evaluating legal decisions, focusing on the reconstruction of standpointsinlegaldecisions. Eveline Feteris gives a further explanation of the pragma-dialectical approach andpresentsananalysisofthediscussionstrategyofthe DutchSupremeCourtin thefamouscaseofthe‘UnworthySpouse’.Theauthorexplainshowthetheoretical starting points of the pragma-dialecticaltheory can be used in the analysis of the strategic maneuvering of the Dutch Supreme Court in a case in which there is a difference of opinion about the argumentative role of certain legal principles. In its discussion strategy,the Supreme Courtaims at maintainingthe decision of the court of appeal while at the same time making a correction so that the decision is in line with the way in which the Supreme Court wants to make an exception to a statutory rule about the division of the matrimonial community of property. The discussion strategy consists of a specific, systematic and coordinated choice of the dialectical possibilities in the different stages of a critical legal discussion, consisting of particular choices of common starting points and particular choices in the evaluation of the argumentation. These choices are aimed at steering the discussionin aparticulardirectionsothata particularresultisreachedthatwould bedesirablefromtheperspectiveofcertainty,fromtheperspectiveofjusticeinthe specificcase,andtheperspectiveofthedevelopmentoflawwithrespecttotherole ofgenerallegalprinciplesandreasonablenessandfairness. Thechaptersthatarebasedinlegaltheoryinvestigatelegalargumentationinthe contextofvariouskeyissuesinlegaltheory:thenormativityoflegalargumentation, the nature of legal justification, the nature of legal balancing, the formation and revisionofnormativesystemsandtherelationbetweenlawandtruth. ThecontributionbyCarlosBernaldiscussesthedifferentrelationsbetweenlegal argumentation and the concept of normativity. On the one hand, legal norms are elements of the arguments which go together to make up legal discourse. On the otherhand,legalargumentationplaysanimportantroleingroundingthenormativity oflegalnorms.Bernalconsidersfouraspectsoftherelation:thenormativityofthe differentkindsoflegalnorms,therulesoflegalargumentation,theroleplayedby viii Introduction therulesoflegalargumentationingroundingthenormativityoflegalnormsandthe roleplayedbylegalnormsinlegalargumentation. The contribution by Bruce Anderson begins by arguing that the key elements inanyanalysisofweighingandbalancingarequestions,insightsandjudgmentsof value.ThispositionisusedtocritiquetheroleMarkoNovakassignstorationalityin balancingandRobertAlexy’sidealizedweightformula.Finally,byexaminingthe relationbetweendeliberationandexpression,hearguesthatawrittenlegaldecision represents the possibility of someone understanding and evaluating that decision. Expressions,inwhateverform,donotjustifylegaldecisions. ThecontributionbyJaapHagediscussesthetheoriesknownas‘legalconstruc- tivism’ and ‘ontological constructivism’. According to legal constructivism, the legal consequences of a case are what the best legal argumentssay that they are, and this means that legal judgments can be ‘true’ even in hard cases. Critics of legal constructivism say that there is no such thing as a ‘best legal argument’ in a hard case, and that judgments in such cases therefore cannot be ‘true’. Hage concludesthatlegalconstructivismisaviewthatcanneitherbeverifiednorfalsified, and moves on to discuss ontological constructivism. According to ontological constructivism,the legalconsequencesofa case dependonthebestpossiblelegal argument.Hage pointsout thatthis view incorrectlypresupposesthat the law is a closeddomain. Marko Novak discusses the problem of the separation between the context of discoveryandthecontextofjustificationoflegaldecisions,oneofthebasicthemes in legal argumentation theory. Whereas the context of discovery focuses on the process of reaching a legal decision, which concludesa decision-makingprocess, the context of justification is concerned with justification of the legal decision throughtheapplicationofrelevantlegalarguments.Themajorityoflegaltheorists interestedinlegalargumentationtheorysupportthepositionthatthementionedtwo contextsarerigidlyseparated,intheframeworkofwhichtheprocessofdiscovery ismainlystudiedbypsychologistswhiletheprocessofjustificationistheonlyarea that should be relevant for legal argumentation theory. The author opposes such a rigid separation between the two contexts and views it as a position that is too idealist.Instead,hesupportsamorerealisticpositionoftheirmoderateseparation, wherebyherecognizestheimportanceofthediscoverycontextwhilestillinsisting onthemajorrelevanceofthejustificationcontext. ThecontributionbyAntoninoRotoloandCorradoRoversiproposesaframework forreconstructinglegalargumentsthatsupportanextensiveorrestrictiveinterpre- tation of a legal provision. According to Rotolo and Roversi, these interpretative techniques correspond to revision operations in systems of constitutive rules. Extensive and restrictive interpretations of legal concepts require expansions and contractionsintheconstitutiverulesthatdefinethem.Theadvantageoftheproposed frameworkisthatitmakestheseargumentsmoretransparentandprovidescriteria forevaluatingthem. Jan Sieckmann’scontributiondiscusses legaljustificationswherenormativear- gumentsarebalancedagainsteachother.Sieckmannclaimsthatalegaljustification of this kind cannot be reconstructed as a deductive argument where a conclusion Introduction ix is drawn from certain premises. Balancing is a different method for justification. According to Sieckmann, balancing is a rational method for justification in its own right, since the balancing of normative arguments includes an element of autonomouschoice,subjecttoconstraintsofrationality. Inhiscontribution,GiovanniTuzetdiscussestheroleoffactsinlegalargumen- tation, and the functionof trials with regardto the truth. Tuzet criticizes the view thattrialsdonotaimatthetruth,andcannotaimatthetruth.Accordingto Tuzet, truthisanecessaryconditionforjustice. Most chapters in this volume were presented at a workshopon legal argumen- tationtheoryattheGoetheUniversita¨tinFrankfurtamMain(Germany)on18–19 August2011.TheworkshopwasorganizedbyChristianDahlman(LundUniversity) and Eveline Feteris (University of Amsterdam) as a special workshop at the IVR WorldCongressforPhilosophyofLawandSocialPhilosophy.Theparticipantsto the workshop included scholars from Germany,Canada, Brazil, The Netherlands, Italy,USA,Sweden,Chile,Polandandmanyothercountries. ChristianDahlman EvelineFeteris