United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives March 2012 AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges GAO-12-175 March 2012 AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges Highlights of GAO-12-175, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Airborne electronic attack involves the The Department of Defense’s (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting airborne use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family of systems, including suppress enemy air defense and traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, communications systems. Proliferation and related mission systems and weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade of sophisticated air defenses and have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but advanced commercial electronic budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan devices has contributed to the have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, accelerated appearance of new DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services revised their operating weapons designed to counter U.S. concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing airborne electronic attack capabilities. DOD to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among GAO was asked to assess (1) the systems during operations. As acquisition plans have evolved, capability Department of Defense’s (DOD) limitations and sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, strategy for acquiring airborne prompting the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls. electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made in developing and DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its fielding systems to meet airborne growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, electronic attack mission requirements, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental and (3) additional actions taken to and production challenges that have slowed fielding of planned systems. Some address capability gaps. To do this, programs, such as the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and the Air Force’s modernized GAO analyzed documents related to EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable production and have completed significant mission requirements, acquisition and amounts of testing. Other key programs, like the Navy’s Advanced Anti-Radiation budget needs, development plans, and Guided Missile, have required additional time and funding to address technical performance, and interviewed DOD challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain systems in officials. development may offer capabilities that overlap with one another—a situation What GAO Recommends brought on in part by DOD’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. Although services have shared technical data among these programs, they GAO recommends that DOD conduct continue to pursue unique systems intended to counter similar threats. As military program reviews for certain new, key operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate systems to assess cost, schedule, and current acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may performance; determine the extent to be hampered by DOD’s acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated, joint entity to them; align service investments in coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and planned acquisitions will not fully science and technology with the address materiel-related capability gaps identified by DOD—including some that departmentwide electronic warfare date back 10 years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps. priority; and review capabilities To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts provided by certain planned and to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, existing systems to ensure investments services are evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems to do not overlap. DOD agreed with three enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the recommendations and partially agreed utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with with the two aimed at reducing potential overlap among systems. DOD equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on DOD plans to assess coordination among successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has systems, whereas GAO sees recently taken actions that begin to address long-standing coordination shortfalls opportunities for consolidation, as in this area, including designating electronic warfare as a priority investment area discussed in the report. and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities View GAO-12-175. For more information, ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned implementation roadmap for contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component research investments are aligned with the departmentwide priority. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 3 DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems 5 Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results 16 Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps 30 Conclusions 35 Recommendations for Executive Action 36 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 40 Appendix II Analyses of Select Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 43 Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 64 Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 69 Tables Table 1: Characteristics of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems in Sustainment 13 Table 2: Recent and Planned DOD Investments toward Acquiring Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 17 Table 3: DOD’s Progress Developing and Fielding New Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 19 Table 4: Potential Overlap among Communications Jamming Systems Supporting Ground Forces 25 Table 5: Primary Airborne Electronic Attack Capability Needs Identified since 2002 29 Table 6: Current DOD Science and Technology Initiatives Related to Airborne Electronic Attack 32 Table 7: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-6B Prowler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 44 Page i GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack Table 8: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 46 Table 9: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EC-130H Compass Call, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 48 Table 10: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-22A Raptor, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 50 Table 11: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-18G Growler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 52 Table 12: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for AARGM, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 54 Table 13: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for IDECM, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 56 Table 14: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the Next Generation Jammer, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 58 Table 15: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for MALD/MALD- J, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 61 Table 16: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-35 Lightning II, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 63 Figures Figure 1: Key Analyses Underpinning Airborne Electronic Attack Acquisition Strategy and Investments 6 Figure 2: Airborne Electronic Attack Family of Systems Strategy for Countering Near-Peer Adversaries 9 Figure 3: Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Tailored to Counter Irregular Warfare Threats 11 Figure 4: EA-6B Prowler 43 Figure 5: AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System 45 Figure 6: EC-130H Compass Call 47 Figure 7: F-22A Raptor 49 Figure 8: EA-18G Growler 51 Figure 9: AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) 53 Figure 10: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) 55 Figure 11: Next Generation Jammer 57 Figure 12: Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD)/Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer (MALD-J) 59 Figure 13: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) 62 Page ii GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack Abbreviations AARGM Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array ASD (R&E) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering CEASAR Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance and Reconnaissance DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DOD Department of Defense HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile ICAP Improved Capability IDECM Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures ITALD Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems LAIRCM Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures MALD Miniature Air Launched Decoy MALD-J Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation TALD Tactical Air Launched Decoy This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iii GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 March 29, 2012 The Honorable Howard P. McKeon Chairman The Honorable Adam Smith Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S. military operations ranging from irregular warfare1 to major combat against potential near-peer adversaries.2 Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either through destructive or disruptive means. These aircraft employ a variety of mission systems and weapons to prosecute threats, and they rely on defensive countermeasures to provide additional protection. Global proliferation of more sophisticated air defenses and advanced, commercial digital electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities and limit U.S. access to theaters of combat. These weapons—some held by both nation-state and nonstate actors—vary from advanced, integrated air defense systems to simpler, digital radio frequency memory devices. As the range of adversary weapons increases, electronic jammers and other equipment must respond with improved capabilities or may have to operate farther from the battle, lessening their effectiveness. In light of these developments, you asked us to review the Department of Defense’s (DOD) airborne electronic attack capabilities and investment 1Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric (dissimilar) approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. 2Potential near-peer adversaries can be defined to include countries capable of waging large-scale conventional war on the United States. These nation-states can be characterized as having nearly comparable diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capacity to the United States. Page 1 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack plans. In response to this request, we assessed (1) the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities; (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements; and (3) additional compensating actions taken by the department to address capability gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures and investments in science and technology. In a separate report, we plan to address the effectiveness of the department’s governance structure for overseeing its electronic warfare policies and priorities and the relationship between electronic warfare and cyber operations. To assess the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities, we analyzed documents outlining mission requirements and acquisition needs including the 2009 Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, service roadmaps related to airborne electronic attack, budget documents, and program briefings. We corroborated this information through discussions with officials responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements and systems, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps requirements branches; U.S. Strategic Command; and the Joint Staff. To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed materials outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes including, capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports, budget submissions, and program briefings. These same materials afforded information on key attributes of individual airborne electronic attack systems, which we used to assess potential overlap among systems in development. Further, we identified persisting capability gaps by reviewing DOD analyses related to airborne electronic attack requirements. To supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility and perspective into these issues, we conducted numerous interviews with DOD officials charged with managing airborne electronic attack requirements and those responsible for developing, acquiring, and testing airborne electronic attack systems. To assess additional compensating actions taken by the department to address airborne electronic attack capability gaps, we reviewed service documents outlining recent improvements and refinements to tactics, techniques, and procedures for key airborne electronic attack aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency announcements to understand ongoing science and technology activities. We corroborated this information through interviews with the user community responsible for developing and maintaining operating procedures for airborne electronic attack systems and with DOD airborne Page 2 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack electronic attack research leaders. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Background DOD invests in electronic warfare capabilities as a means to maintain unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum during war and selectively deny adversary use of the spectrum. Traditionally, electronic warfare has been composed of three primary activities: • Electronic attack: Use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. • Electronic protection: Passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum. • Electronic warfare support: Actions directed by an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat recognition, targeting, and planning, and the conduct of future operations. Airborne electronic attack—a subset of the electronic attack mission— involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either through destructive or disruptive means. These capabilities are increasingly important and complex as networked systems, distributed controls, and sophisticated sensors become ubiquitous in military equipment, civilian infrastructure, and commercial networks— developments that complicate DOD’s ability to exercise control over the electromagnetic spectrum, when necessary, to support U.S. military objectives. Airborne electronic attack systems increase survivability of joint forces tasked to enter denied battlespace and engage anti-access threats or Page 3 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack high-value targets,3 whether involved in major combat operations against a potential near-peer adversary or in irregular warfare. They also enable access to the battlespace for follow-on operations. Aircraft executing airborne electronic attack missions employ a variety of mission systems, such as electronic jammers, and weapons, such as antiradiation missiles and air-launched expendable decoys. These aircraft also rely on aircraft self-protection systems and defensive countermeasures for additional protection. All four services within DOD contribute to and rely upon airborne electronic attack capabilities using a variety of different aircraft. Each service is also separately acquiring new airborne electronic attack systems. Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretaries of the military departments, submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare strategy.4 Each report must contain (1) a description and overview of the department’s electronic warfare strategy and organizational structures for oversight; (2) a list and description of all electronic warfare acquisition programs and research and development projects within DOD; and (3) for the unclassified programs and projects, detail on oversight responsibilities, requirements, funding, cost, schedule, technologies, potential redundancies, and associated capability gaps, and for the classified programs and projects, a classified annex addressing these topics, when appropriate.5 In response to this requirement, DOD submitted its first Electronic Warfare Strategy of the Department of Defense report in October 2010. The department produced its second electronic warfare strategy report in November 2011. 3Anti-access threats can be defined as those that impede the deployment of U.S. forces into the combat theater, limit the locations from which those forces could effectively operate, or force them to operate from locations farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer. High-value targets are persons or resources that an enemy commander requires for the successful completion of a mission. 4Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (a) (2009). 5Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (b) (2009). Page 4 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack DOD Strategy to DOD’s strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements— including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs—centers on Lower Costs Also acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low Reduced Synergy observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a decade have among Systems identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities. However, budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, the department canceled some acquisitions, after which services revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing the department to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during operations. As acquisition plans for these systems have evolved, operational stresses upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have grown. These stresses have materialized in the form of capability limitations and sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting the department to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate shortfalls. Airborne Electronic Attack Key DOD analyses completed since 2002 identified capability gaps, Acquisition Strategy Has provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack Evolved systems, and supported an overarching acquisition strategy for achieving these requirements. The department outlined its findings in reports that included an analysis of alternatives, a capabilities-based assessment, and initial capabilities documents. Figure 1 highlights a chronology of these analyses and identifies key airborne electronic attack components of each report. Page 5 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack