On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. Summary Frank Furstenberg examines how the newly extended timetable for entering adulthood is affecting, and being affected by, the institution of the Western, particularly the American, fam- ily. He reviews a growing body of research on the family life of young adults and their parents and draws out important policy implications of the new schedule for the passage to adulthood. Today, says Furstenberg, home-leaving, marriage, and the onset of childbearing take place much later in the life span than they did during the period after World War II. After the disap- pearance of America’s well-paying unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs during the 1960s, youth from all economic strata began remaining in school longer and marrying and start- ing their own families later. Increasing numbers of lower-income women did not marry at all but chose, instead, non-marital parenthood—often turning to their natal families for economic and social support, rather than to their partners. As the period of young adults’ dependence on their families grew longer, the financial and emotional burden of parenthood grew heavier. Today, regardless of their income level, U.S. parents provide roughly the same proportion of their earnings to support their young adult children. Unlike many nations in Europe, the United States, with its relatively underdeveloped welfare system, does not invest heavily in education, health care, and job benefits for young adults. It relies, instead, on families’ investments in their own adult children. But as the transition to adulthood becomes more protracted, the increasing family burden may prove costly to society as a whole. Young adults themselves may begin to regard childbearing as more onerous and less rewarding. The need to provide greater support for children for longer periods may discourage couples from having additional children or having children at all. Such decisions could lead to lower total fertility, ultimately reduce the workforce, and further aggravate the problem of pro- viding both for increasing numbers of the elderly and for the young. U.S. policy makers must realize the importance of reinforcing the family nest and helping reduce the large and compet- ing demands that are being placed on today’s parents. www.futureofchildren.org Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. is the Zellerbach Family Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 67 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. The striking changes in the tim- what used to be called the “family of procre- ing and sequencing of adult ation,” though that term is becoming obsolete transitions charted by other because of the sizable fraction of couples articles in this volume have who remain childless. After briefly examining been accompanied by equally intergenerational exchanges among young dramatic transformations in the institution of adults and their parents, I conclude with a the family. In this article I examine how the brief discussion of policy issues that arise Western, and most particularly the American, from the changes in early adulthood and family is affecting and, in turn, being affected the family. Clearly, this is a larger bundle of by the newly extended social timetable for issues than can be fully addressed in a single entering adulthood. I review a growing body article, but I want to highlight what research- of social science research on the family life of ers have learned so far and what remains to young adults and their parents that identifies be discovered to inform policy choices that a set of puzzles and issues that require fur- promote both successful young adult transi- ther investigation, and take note of the enor- tions and the long-term welfare of families. mous policy implications of this new schedule for the passage to adulthood, not just for the The Changing Family and family but also for the larger society. the Changing Course of Early Adulthood Contrary to a popular misconception that Western family systems have only recently During the final third of undergone widespread change, the form and the twentieth century, the function of the family in the West have been changing for as long as reliable records exist.1 institution of the family did Marriage, fertility, patterns of parent-and- undergo a radical shift in child co-residence, parenting practices, and indeed virtually anything that can be mea- form and function for reasons sured by family demographers and historians that social scientists still only have fluctuated over time. As economic conditions, demographic patterns, cultural partially understand. beliefs, and social institutions have varied, the family has responded and adapted. In this sense, the “traditional” family has no golden I begin by identifying some of the sweeping past.2 But during the final third of the twenti- changes in Western family systems—in the eth century, the institution of the family did institution of marriage, in gender-based divi- undergo a radical shift in form and function sions of labor, and in the meaning of parent- for reasons that social scientists still only hood—that have complicated and extended partially understand. the life course of young adults. I then address young adults’ lengthening co-residence The advent of “the post-modern family,” with their parents, a topic that is attracting as it is sometimes called, has been marked increasing research interest. Next I explore by sharp increases in women’s labor force family formation patterns among young participation, a gradual breakdown of the adults: the move from the natal family to gender-based division of labor, a precipitous 68 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change Figure 1. Proportion of Youth in School, by Age Cohort, 1950–2007 50 18 to 24 45 25 to 29 n 40 30 to 34 o ati 35 ul p po 30 hort 25 o c of 20 n ortio 15 op 10 Pr 5 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, October, 1961, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2007. fertility decline (owing in part to postpone- the two are closely related. All the conditions ment of marriage and parenthood and in part implicated in transforming the family during to the growing number of childless couples), the final third of the twentieth century have and rising rates of divorce, cohabitation, and helped to delay and complicate the passage nonmarital childbearing.3 Many converging to adulthood. For example, the advances in forces helped to alter family practices. Rising women’s education that have been linked to levels of education among women provided their growing participation in the labor force a growing demand for employment after also tend to delay marriage and parenthood.6 marriage. Economic pressures to maintain or increase consumption propelled women Young people today, men and women alike, into the labor force. Improved contraception aspire to jobs that require postsecondary allowed women to postpone childbearing. education. It simply takes more time than it Ideological changes led to increased demands did even a half-century ago to gain a job that is for equality in the marketplace and at home. secure enough to form and support a family.7 The confluence of these forces reinforced a Couples do not invariably wait to marry or to decline in the patriarchal family, which had have children until they complete their school- persisted well into the twentieth century in ing or get a secure job, but they have more the West and still prevails in many regions of compelling reasons to do so than they did in the world.4 the years after World War II, when it was still common to enter full-time, relatively well-paid Many of these same social, economic, techno- (often union) work before completing high logical, and cultural changes have also been school, much less college. It follows, then, prolonging early adulthood.5 Although family that marriage and the onset of childbearing scholars have not explicitly linked family generally take place far later in the life span change and the new schedule of adult transi- than they did in the postwar period, because tions, there are many reasons to believe that a growing proportion of young adults realize VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 69 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. Figure 2. Proportion of Youth Living at Home, by Age Cohort, 1960–2007 60 18 to 24 25 to 34 50 n o ati pul 40 o p hort 30 o c of ge 20 a nt e c er 10 P 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 Sources: U. S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2; 1970 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2; 1980 Census of Population, PC80-2-4B, table 4; Current Population Survey, March and Annual Social and Economic Supplements, 1990, 2000, and 2007. they cannot make sound family decisions until Perhaps related to the delay of marriage, their economic fortunes are established.8 Fig- young people, and women in particular, ure 1 shows the increase in the share of young began to engage in sexual relationships adults remaining in school. Figures 2, 3, and 4 earlier and with no immediate intention to show the dramatic delays in the age of home- marry. The availability of reliable birth leaving, marriage, and childbearing in the control for women and access to legal United States. Similar trends can be observed abortion no doubt made it possible for young in Canada and Europe.9 people to escape the seemingly inevitable consequences of sex. As marriage age It is probably no coincidence that the expan- climbed, fewer young adults who became sion of higher education beginning in the late pregnant elected to marry, in part because 1950s corresponds with the rising age of first they had begun to feel that settling down into marriage in the United States, as it did in family life so early was undesirable.10 Family Europe a decade later. Beginning in the demographers and sociologists have also 1960s, the decline of manufacturing jobs also argued that the rising marital instability began to undermine the prevailing pattern of during the 1960s and early 1970s, tied to early marriage in the United States. As early marriage and shotgun weddings, made well-paying unskilled and semi-skilled jobs young people more sensitive to the risks disappeared, the single-earner family became less tenable for most Americans. Education associated with a hasty decision to marry. through high school and beyond was no Women, in particular, became more con- longer a luxury but a necessity for both men cerned about having enough education and and women who aspired to middle-class work experience to support themselves employment and earnings. should they remain or become single.11 70 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change Figure 3. Proportion of Youth Married, by Age Cohort, 1950–2007 100 18 to 24 90 25 to 29 n 80 30 to 34 o ati 70 ul p po 60 hort 50 o c of 40 n ortio 30 op 20 Pr 10 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 Sources: Historical Census of the United States, Millennial Edition Online, edited by S. B. Carter and others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), table Aa614-683: Population, by Marital Status, Sex, and Race: 1880–1990; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2000 and 2007. The growth of the consumer economy, perhaps feeding into the belief that it was stimulated by advertising and mass market- better to wait to have children.13 Some ing, may have also contributed to the desire scholars have argued that parents began to of couples to increase their earning potential perceive the importance of investing in before marrying. Although solid evidence is “quality” children who could compete in a lacking on couples’ perceptions of what they growing skills-based economy.14 The growth need to set up an independent household, it of inequality in the United States beginning is likely that the demand for more material in the 1970s may have also contributed to goods and the perceived and actual cost of the perception that, for children to succeed rearing children affected couples’ choices later in life, parents must invest more in about whether and when to marry and have them over a longer time span.15 Early children. Overall, childbearing became a autonomy from the natal household, so more conscious decision as new forms of valued at mid-century, gave way to a longer contraception allowed, or perhaps even period of co-residence. Parents, it appears, required, couples to make deliberate choices. increasingly believe that their children need Moreover, as women became more indepen- their support longer than they did a half- dent, they began to take more control over century ago, and youth feel less compelled family building, timing parenthood to fit their to leave the natal home in late adolescence expanded roles in the household economy.12 and their early adult years.16 Finally, childrearing itself changed as I have sketched some of the overlapping parents began to view their responsibilities sources of change in family patterns and in the differently. Men were under greater pres- length of adult transitions without reference to sure to become actively involved as parents, variations in gender, ethnicity, or social class. VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 71 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. Figure 4. Proportion of Female, Ever-Married Youth with at Least One Child, by Age Cohort, 1950–2006 95 15 to 19 90 20 to 24 85 25 to 29 n o ati 80 30 to 34 ul op 75 p ort 70 h co 65 of n 60 o orti 55 p Pro 50 45 40 1950 1960 1970 1980 1992 1998 2002 2006 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Census of the Population: 1950 Special Report, Fertility, Part 5; Census of the Population: 1960 and 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part 1, U.S. Summary; Current Population Survey, June, 1980, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2006. Although I will address some of these differ- family support spend more time gaining ences later, some general comments about necessary credentials to become economically these variations are appropriate here. self-sufficient. Dependency on parents for both the advantaged and disadvantaged Men and women have become more alike sometimes extends late into the third decade over the course of the past century in how of life, albeit for different reasons. In either they move into adult roles.17 Class differences, case, the financial and emotional burden on however, have increased.18 Youth from all families has grown in ways that were almost economic strata are remaining in school unimaginable just a half-century ago. longer and marrying later, but young adults from less-advantaged households are finding Changing Patterns of Co-Residence it increasingly difficult to adhere to an orderly and Home-Leaving and predictable sequence of education, The impression that American youth are full-time employment, home-leaving, cohabi- remaining at home much longer now than tation or marriage, and parenthood.19 In more they once did, while not inaccurate, is privileged families, youth more often adhere nonetheless often exaggerated in the mass to the traditional sequence but take far longer media.21 As shown in figure 2, the period of to complete the demographic milestones of co-residence with parents has lengthened successful passage to adulthood and remain notably since the 1960s, when youth left financially dependent on their parents while home at a very young age. Today’s home- they complete their education.20 In short, leaving patterns are, in fact, much closer young adults without resources find it difficult to those of the early 1900s. But though the to attain independence on the traditional two patterns are similar, the driving forces (early) schedule, while those with ample behind them are very different: more young 72 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change adults remained with their parents longer at thirties.25 By international standards, Ameri- the beginning of the twentieth century not cans still leave home relatively early. Women because they were dependent on them but are typically younger than men when they because they were obliged to contribute to leave home because they complete college the family economy.22 earlier, form cohabiting unions earlier, and marry about two years earlier, on average, All the increase in the age of home-leaving in than men. Regionally, co-residence is substan- the United States since the 1960s is attribut- tially higher among families in the Northeast able to delayed marriage.23 Unmarried young than elsewhere, likely because of the higher adults are, of course, more likely to reside costs of housing, higher rates of college with their parents than those who wed. Con- attendance, and later entry into full-time sequently, with couples marrying later, youth employment.26 The rapid growth of immigrant in their late teens and early twenties moved families may have also contributed to the out of the home more slowly than they had rise of co-residence in the early adult years, during the postwar years when couples although as Rubén Rumbaut and Golnaz married earlier. This trend is especially Komaei note in their article in this volume, pronounced if young adults are continuing this trend would probably emerge only among their education, as was the case during the second-generation immigrants because decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The rate of foreign-born residents often migrate in their co-residence declined slightly between 1990 early adult years without their families. and 2000, perhaps because a strong economy during much of the 1990s afforded young Whereas cohabitation or marriage is generally adults the opportunity to move out on their associated with earlier home departure, single own, although co-residence with parents will parenthood often works in the opposite likely increase during the first decade of the direction: young mothers who do not enter a century owing to the recession of 2008. union before bearing a child typically remain in the parental home for several years and The trend toward a later exit from home in receive financial support and child care from the United States parallels that in almost all their parents. Indeed, the federal Temporary Western nations, although with considerable Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) pro- variation, particularly in Europe. In the gram and parallel state assistance programs for Nordic countries, for example, youth leave young parents have required co-residence for home in their late teens, largely owing to teen mothers, a policy that was aimed both at the availability of state support. By contrast, restricting public assistance and at assuring lack of state support and long-standing greater parenting supervision for children of cultural norms favor an extended period of young mothers. Whether young parents and co-residence among youth in Mediterranean their children do better if they remain in their nations, lasting for men into their mid-thirties.24 natal home is an unsettled question. In a longitudinal study of teen parents in Balti- Here in the United States, nearly half of all more, I found that mothers and their children young adults in their late teens and early did better if they lived with the young moth- twenties still live with their parents. That er’s parents for one or two years, but if they fraction drops below one in seven by the late failed to move out thereafter, they fared twenties and below one in ten by the early somewhat worse, perhaps owing to differences VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 73 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. between the families that moved out and Few studies, however, have examined the tex- those that remained at home.27 ture of family life when young adults reside in the natal household. For example, what In general, youth are more likely to remain at kinds of rules, routines, and understandings home when their biological parents are still emerge regarding household obligations, living together. In particular, divorce and expenses, and the comings and goings of remarriage among parents have been associ- young adults and other family members? ated with earlier home-leaving among young Qualitative reports from parents and youth adults and with earlier provision and receipt and perhaps analysis of time diaries would go of assistance.28 Youth who grow up living with a long way in filling this gap. The media fre- their mothers only are distinctly less likely to quently speculate about the irresponsibility receive help from or provide assistance to of youth in their dealings with their parents, their fathers in later life, while children but very little solid evidence substantiates the growing up apart from their mothers are not presumed tensions. as likely to curtail contact and exchange with their mothers when they reach adulthood. In What happens inside families on a day-by- short, divorce and remarriage tend to create a day basis when young adults co-reside with matrilineal tilt to kinship ties in the United their parents remains a largely unexplored States.29 topic. Whether parents provide continued guidance, set expectations, and provide Research has documented not only the assistance in promoting development after lengthening of home-leaving but also the the adolescent years is a topic for further quality of the relations between co-residing research. Both anecdotal evidence and stud- parents and young adult children. Studies ies of parental spending give every reason report that bonds are close, particularly when to believe that parents continue to invest the young adults are on a clear path toward heavily, both financially and emotionally, in moving out. For example, those who remain their young adult children. What is lacking is at home in their early and mid-twenties get good qualitative evidence on how parents and along better with their parents when they are young adults work things out. studying, working, or looking for work than when they are having serious difficulties Along this same line, researchers know more moving toward independence.30 Results of the about the timing of home-leaving than about third wave of the Add Health study, a nation- how either young adults or their parents ally representative, longitudinal sample of manage the process.33 For example, how young adults between the ages of twenty and much do young people consult or involve twenty-four, reveal that relations with mothers their parents in the decision to leave, and are closer than those with fathers, particularly how much advice, support, and resources nonresident fathers (author’s tabulations). do parents provide as young adults depart? This finding, replicated in numerous studies, Analysts could learn a great deal about the indicates the partial withering of paternal impact of the process on both young adults relationships outside of marriage.31 To some and their parents by following both parties degree, paternal involvement remains some- during and after the departure from the thing of a “package deal” that comes with home. According to census data, of every marriage or at least cohabitation.32 six young adults who move out, one moves 74 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change back in at some point before age thirty-five.34 The process of family formation today, more Reverse transitions appear to be occasioned than in the recent past, is shaped by educa- by financial setbacks, career changes involv- tion and employment opportunities.41 And ing a return to school or bouts of unemploy- now, more than ever, the sequence and ment, and the dissolution of cohabitation and timing of family formation in the United marriages.35 Sharon Sassler and her col- States differs sharply by socioeconomic leagues conducted one of the few qualitative status. Family formation has long differed in studies on the strategies of managing a return timing and sequence (for example, pregnancy to home. The study reveals the dilemmas of or parenthood before marriage) between economic dependency in early adulthood for poor and less-educated youth and better-off both parents and youth, as well as the ways youth who manage to complete college.42 But that young adults cope with receiving support now, despite consistent evidence that young from their parents while still psychologically adults, regardless of social class, continue to considering themselves “adults.”36 Renegoti- endorse the importance of marriage and ating authority inside the family turns out to parenthood, there is a growing perception be a challenging task when youth continue to among less-advantaged youth that marriage is rely on their parents for economic support, less attainable.43 though it appears that many learn ways of achieving greater equality inside the family. Nonetheless, youth and parents from less- Whether and how this negotiation differs in advantaged families continue to favor an the households of the foreign-born is a ques- earlier departure from the home than do tion that merits further attention. those of more advantaged means.44 Advan- taged youth are far more likely to attend a Differing Pathways to Family residential college and possibly graduate Formation among Young Adults school (which the Census Bureau classifies as In the recent past, the maturational steps of still living with parents), enjoying a period of leaving home and marrying were tightly semi-autonomy that may or may not include sequenced.37 During the middle years of the part-time work and cohabitation. By contrast, twentieth century, young people left home to youth from lower-income families, if they marry and have children as soon as they had attend college at all, are likely to do so while the wherewithal to do so, and not infre- still residing with their parents.45 quently before they had adequate resources and secure employment.38 Today the process Complicating the home-leaving process for of family formation (entering unions and lower-income youth, particularly women, is having children) has become less orderly and the growing likelihood of non-marital parent- more protracted.39 The onset of sexual hood. Forty percent of all first births now relations and marriage today is typically take place outside marriage, and almost all separated by at least five years, and often are to young women who have not completed more. Cohabitation, and sometimes parent- college. Although rates of teenage pregnancy hood, occurs in the intervening years. and childbearing have declined during the Marriage has become a culminating event, past fifteen years (until 2006, that is), nearly still indicating social maturity, but social half of all young adults with a high school maturity increasingly occurs well before education or less become parents in their late marriage.40 teens and early twenties.46 These pregnancies VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 75 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. are generally unplanned, and relatively few growing up in less than advantaged circum- of the parents are fully prepared to take on stances. Compared with the relatively weak the economic responsibilities of supporting a bonds established between sexual partners family. Data from the Fragile Families Study, and even prospective parents, bonds with a long-term examination of family forma- natal families among these young adults are tion among largely young, largely poor urban strong, particularly their reliance on families couples who are having a child, reveal the for economic assistance and practical help in fluidity of the relations between the partners childrearing. In the Baltimore study, it was over time.47 Although a substantial minor- common for young parents to remain at ity of nonmarital births to young adults is to home and coordinate child care with their couples who are cohabiting at the time of the parents. And many of the young children in pregnancy, these unions often are ephemeral, turn regard their grandmothers as a, if not only rarely resulting in marriage, even though the, primary parent figure in their lives. most young parents in the Fragile Families Fathers often continue to see their children, Study profess a desire to wed eventually.48 but over time, many become shadowy figures in their lives, creating further difficulties in In the past, most of these young parents the early adult years.52 would have wed before or shortly after the birth of the child. Today, however, they perceive, correctly given the evidence, that Youth from disadvantaged the benefits of a hasty marriage are few. circumstances with limited Many of the fathers lack job experience, are beset by mental health problems, or have prospects for a well-paid job been involved in the criminal justice system.49 or a partner with solid For economic and social support, young mothers often turn to their families rather earnings increasingly opt than to their partners, who cannot provide for cohabitation, which steady assistance. In a long-term study of teenage mothers in Baltimore, I found a deep has become a weak form pessimism, especially among the parents of of matrimony. the pregnant teens, about the wisdom of relying on the men who fathered their children. As one mother told her daughter, “It don’t do your child no good if his father Among disadvantaged African Americans, can’t take care of him.”50 marriage often takes place, if it does at all, long after the onset of childbearing and In recent decades, a growing number of following a series of cohabitations. This low-income and less-educated white and pattern is becoming common as well in other Hispanic couples have joined African Ameri- disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities, cans in forming families before they are though considerable variation exists by ethnic economically independent.51 Thus, the and national origin. A study I conducted with traditional ordering of school, employment, Rachel Margolis found that this pattern of home-leaving, and family formation has delayed marriage after childbearing is broken down for an ever larger share of youth emerging among less-educated whites as 76 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN