German Council on Foreign Relations No. 1 January 2022 POLICY BRIEF Economic Equidistance is Not an Option Germany and the US-Chinese Geo-Economic Conflict Intensifying US-Chinese rivalry will increase pressure on Germany to support a more hawkish US geo-economic policy. The new German government should give Washington support in as far as US policies seek to create an economic level playing field vis-à-vis Markus Jaeger China. Given its dependence on international trade and investment, Fellow, The Americas Program Germany should seek to resist a broader politicization of inter- national economic relations. – In the face of intensifying US-Chinese competition, Germany needs to be able to deter, and, if necessary, retaliate against geo-economic measures affecting its interests. At a minimum, it must be able to reduce the negative impact of such measures. – As a first step, the new German government should conduct a broad and wide-ranging National Economic Security Review of all critical economic, financial, and technological vulnerabilities vis-a-vis economic partners outside the EU. – Ideally, Germany would cooperate with the EU or at least other EU member states to mitigate those vulnerabilities. Where this proves ineffective or impossible, national policies need to be devised. – Such policies should include a smart, targeted investment program aimed at addressing technological vulnerabilities as well as critical import dependencies. 2 No. 1 | January 2022 Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict POLICY BRIEF CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO nomic partner – to align with US geo-economic GREAT POWERS policies. A failure to do so would negatively affect Ger- man-US relations and German economic interests, Germany is at risk of sustaining collateral econom- as Washington is unlikely to shy away from pursuing ic damage in the face of intensifying US-Chinese its geo-economic goals unilaterally, including via ex- competition and conflict. China’s ascendance and port controls, secondary sanctions, and other similar America’s desire to preserve the geo-political status measures. However, if Germany does fall in line with quo have locked Beijing and Washington into a clas- US policies targeting China, it risks provoking Chi- sic security dilemma. The United States sees C hina’s nese economic retaliation. This could take the guise of rise as a threat to the status quo in Asia. It also sees trade and investment restrictions, regulatory discrim- China as a nascent global systemic challenger.1 As a ination, or even countersanctions. The potential for matter of fact, security competition is already well economic damage is significant, given that the Unit- underway in East Asia (and further afield),2 as is ed States and China are Germany’s two most import- geo-economic3 and geo-technological conflict.4 ant economic partners outside the EU. CHINA’S GDP GROWTH SPURT GERMANY IS CHINA’S MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC PARTNER GDP, USD trillion, PPP IN EUROPE 40 Export to / Imports from China, USD billion, 2020 35 200 30 25 150 20 100 15 10 50 5 0 0 France Germany Italy Spain 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 EXPORTS IMPORTS CHINA GERMANY UNITED STATES Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Intensifying US-China competition will have pro- Germany’s ability to affect the overall course of found consequences for Germany. Not only will se- US-Chinese relations will be very, very limited at curity competition limit the amount of resources best. Its ability to influence individual policies will Washington will be willing and able to commit to Eu- also be very circumscribed. To the extent that US ropean security. US-Chinese geo-political rivalry geo-economic policies vis-à-vis China are driv- will also have negative economic consequences for en by security interests, Washington will consider Germany. Geo-economic conflict will lead Washington any economic collateral damage caused to German to increase the pressure on Europe and especial- and European economic interests a secondary con- ly G ermany – China’s most important European eco- cern. In particular, Germany’s continued security 1 S ystemic in the sense of challenging the dominant position of the United States in the international system as well as in the sense of China challenging the norms and rules underpinning the present system. 2 D epartment of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed January 16, 2022). 3 Geo-economics can be defined as the use of economic means to pursue geopolitical ends. 4 C ongressional Research Service, US-China Relations, September 3, 2019: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45898 (accessed January 16, 2022). No. 1 | January 2022 3 POLICY BRIEF Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict dependence on the United States limits the extent Germany should be wary of US-China rivalry leading to which Berlin can afford to deviate from US posi- to a more general weaponization of economic inter- tions, let alone align itself – even if only economi- dependence and to international economic instabil- cally – with China. Washington would be reluctant ity. A broader politicization of US-Chinese and, by to underwrite German security to the extent that it extension, international economic relations is not in does if Berlin sided economically with Beijing. Germany’s interest. Policies aimed at nudging China to level the playing field are consistent with German A position of relative economic neutrality or eco- interests. Policies that risk fragmenting international nomic equidistance is not a viable option for economic relations and lead to economic, financial, Germany, either. For US geo-economic policies to be and technological decoupling are not. successful, Washington will require German cooper- ation, or at least compliance, lest Germany act as a The rules-based multilateral economic order is so-called ‘third-party spoiler’.5 Washington is high- an important factor underpinning German pros- ly unlikely to accept German economic neutrality, perity, and preserving it is a core German inter- as this would effectively allow Germany to indirectly est. Economic decoupling along geopolitical fronts, benefit from US geo-economic policies while weak- where Germany is forced to closely align itself with ening their heft. The more intense US-Chinese com- one side or the other, is to be avoided. Nonethe- petition, the more pressure Europe, and especially less, some ‘smart decoupling’ would make sense if it Germany, will be under to align with US geo-eco- was aimed at limiting critical economic vulnerabil- nomic policies towards China. ities and at keeping Germany’s technological lead- ership from being undermined by mercantilist or state-capitalist practices. Such measures could help US-CHINESE COMPETITION prevent longer-term damage to the country’s eco- AND GERMAN INTERESTS nomic and national security interests – provided they are smart, selective, and strategic. As a con- Germany does share many of Washington’s goals, in- sequence, decoupling should be limited to sectors cluding the preservation of the territorial status quo that are characterized by critical vulnerabilities and in East Asia, freedom of navigation, and the creation closely tied to national security. of an economic level playing field, namely reciprocal market access, an end to regulatory discrimination, a reduction of government subsidies, the elimina- STRATEGIC REASONS FOR tion of technology transfer requirements, and so on.6 SIDING WITH WASHINGTON However, it does not necessarily agree with the way the United States goes about pursuing these objec- Even a completely realpolitik-oriented Germany tives, including via unilateral measures which vio- would have good reasons to remain broadly aligned late the very rules-based order Germany wants to with the United States. Not only does Germany de- see being upheld. Berlin is also afraid of provoking pend on the United States for its security. The Chinese retaliation against German economic inter- transatlantic partnership is also a crucial econom- ests if it confronts Beijing too forcefully and too di- ic relationship, covering not just trade and invest- rectly. After all, the more hawkish US geo-economic ment (German FDI in the United States far outstrips policies become and the more Germany aligns it- German FDI in China), but also, critically, offer- self with the United States, the greater the risk is to ing Germany access to advanced technology. While German economic interests. Yet it is also true that China is catching up fast technologically, it currently the broader the international coalition is that con- still lags behind the United States. Critical technol- fronts China economically, the less effective and ogy is also more likely to be shared within alliances costlier it becomes for China to retaliate against in- than across, making it less likely that the United will dividual members of such a coalition. exploit technological dependencies extensively. 5 B ryan Early, Sleeping with your friends’ enemies, International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), 2009. A third-party spoiler is an actor (typically a state) that undercuts the effectiveness of another state’s sanctions by engaging economically with a sanctioned state. 6 G ermany has tightened FDI legislation and lent its support to a variety of EU-level initiatives aimed at making the level playing field less uneven, including trade defense measures, anti-coercion instruments, an EU FDI screening mechanism, and so on. 4 No. 1 | January 2022 Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict POLICY BRIEF GERMAN OUTWARD FDI FAR United States as the principal security provider and EXCEEDS INWARD FDI China as their most important economic partner, se- curity is, in the end, bound to trump economics. And German FDI by country, EUR billion, 2019 as long as Washington is perceived to be commit- ted to upholding the regional status quo, the present 400 geopolitical constellation and existing security alli- ances will not change much. Therefore, even if Ger- 300 many were a perfectly realpolitik-oriented actor (it isn’t, for sound historical and political reasons), it would nonetheless have good reason not to opt for a 200 policy of economic equidistance and instead remain broadly aligned with the United States. 100 Finally, the United States has a solid track record of relatively liberal leadership. By comparison, the 0 prospect of Chinese leadership or indeed hegemo- USA China France ny creates greater uncertainty – not just for security ASSETS LIABILITIES competitors like Japan or Australia, but also for eco- nomic partners like Germany. All of which is to say Source: Bundesbank, Direct Investment Statistics that Germany has plenty of reasons to broadly sup- port the United States. To the extent that US poli- Longer-term, the United States also looks ‘great pow- cies aim to preserve the territorial status quo in Asia, er competitive’ in spite of China’s impressive ascent. maintain an open international economic architec- The country stands a good chance of maintaining ture, and establish an economic level playing field, its geo-strategic and geo-economic position in Asia German has every reason to lend support. The chal- and beyond. China suffers from important structur- lenge for German decision-makers will be to selec- al weaknesses, including adverse demographics, the tively support US policies, namely where US and infamous middle-income trap, dependence on criti- German interests align, while deflecting intensifying cal foreign technology, and uncertainties concerning pressure to also conform to more hawkish US policies. the longer-term domestic political outlook. While the United States admittedly also faces important politi- cal and economic challenges, geopolitically it has one PROVIDE WASHINGTON WITH critical advantage: allies. Washington has security al- SELECTIVE SUPPORT liances with most of the world’s major powers. Beijing has no formal alliance with any country (except for Germany should consider pursuing a multi-track North Korea), at least as far as formal mutual defense approach consisting of offering Washington limited treaties are concerned. and conditional support for its China policy. Where US objectives include the establishment of a level Furthermore, China’s geographic position puts it at playing field and the imposition of narrow restric- a disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States. While tions in sectors critical to economic and national China faces out on two island chains, the United security, Germany should lend its support. Where States benefits from an unfettered access to both the policies endanger the broader multilateral econom- Atlantic and the Pacific. While the United States has ic architecture, Germany should seek to withhold friendly and far less powerful neighbors to its North its support. Equally, Germany should not endorse and South, China is surrounded by reasonably pow- a broader economic decoupling in the context of a erful states, few of which it is on very friendly terms weaponization of economic interdependence. Con- with. The United States acts as an offshore balanc- ditional support should be flanked by a policy aimed er in the region, while China is embroiled in a sig- at minimizing, or making more manageable, criti- nificant number of territorial and maritime disputes. cal German and European economic, financial, and Short of an armed conflict, a major geopolitical re- technological vulnerabilities. alignment in Asia is unlikely. Such a strategy should also be accompanied by ef- While it is certainly true that countries in the re- forts to resolve important outstanding US-EU gion would prefer not to have to choose between the economic disputes as well as efforts to deepen trans- No. 1 | January 2022 5 POLICY BRIEF Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict atlantic economic cooperation. Major trade and greater economic vulnerability that opens it up to investment deals will remain out of reach, given do- direct and indirect geo-economic pressure from the mestic political obstacles on both side of the Atlantic. United States as well as China. But issue-oriented cooperation is possible, including politically less onerous regulatory coordination, tech- While Washington and Berlin will not see eye to eye nological cooperation, standard setting, safeguarding on all issues, reaching wide-ranging, if imperfect of critical supply chains, and so on (for instance with transatlantic agreement on inward investment and the EU-US Trade and Technology Council).7 export control policies should be possible. To the ex- tent that many of these policies are only effective if Such cooperation and coordination should help they benefit from multilateral support, Germany and Americans and Europeans move towards a joint po- the EU may have some limited influence, which they sition with respect to reform of the multilater- might be able to use to nudge Washington away from al trading system and the levelling of the playing maximalist policies. The United States would pre- field vis-a-vis China. Broad agreement between the fer to win German and EU support rather than hav- United States and the EU might improve the chances ing to resort to more acrimonious and potentially of getting China to agree to at least some reform. less effective secondary sanctions to bring German Conveniently, such a broader transatlantic and mul- (and EU) policies in line. However, the more intense tilateral coalition would also provide Germany with US-Chinese competition becomes, the less influence some diplomatic cover and make it somewhat less Germany and the EU will have. vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. More specifically, Germany and the United States ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO should be able to agree on common policies per- REDUCE VULNERABILITIES taining to emerging technologies in light of their potential security externalities and implications for This is why the new German government (and the international leadership. National security is un- EU) should also intensify efforts to reduce critical doubtedly a more sensitive issue for the United economic, financial, and technological vulnerabili- States, given deteriorating US-Chinese security re- ties. Berlin (and Brussels) urgently needs to enhance lations. Washington is therefore bound to define na- its ability to deter, and, if necessary, retaliate against tional security more expansively. But, like the United geo-economic measures affecting its interests.8 At States, Germany also has an interest in preserving the minimum, it must try to reduce the negative im- technological leadership against unfair competition pact of such measures. and state-led, discriminatory economic practices. It is, or should be, equally concerned about the po- At EU level, the Commission has proposed trade de- tential security implications of emerging technolo- fense and anti-coercion policies.9 EU efforts have al- gies. Disagreement may nonetheless arise due to so focused on understanding existing supply chain Germany’s preference for more narrow restrictions vulnerabilities, especially concerning technology and hence more selective technological decoupling. and commodities.10 The next steps should be about making the anti-coercion measures operative and The United States is also far less sensitive to Chinese credible as well as addressing (rather than merely geo-economic retaliation than Germany and will identifying) supply chain related vulnerabilities. Risk therefore be more willing to weaponize the exist- mitigation policies related to trade should general- ing economic and technological interdependence in ly be pursued at EU level, given that most aspects of pursuit of broader political and strategic objectives. trade policy fall under EU purview. More important- Germany’s greater economic sensitivity and the ly, a common or at least coordinated EU policy both fact that it has fewer security-related concerns will helps mitigate risks more effectively and acts as a make it less inclined to support an extensive, hawk- greater deterrent vis-à-vis third parties. ish geo-economic agenda. It is precisely Germany’s 7 E uropean Commission, EU-US Trade and Technology Council, 2021: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_4951 (accessed January 16, 2022). 8 Markus Jaeger, Countering Secondary Dollar Sanctions, DGAP (forthcoming). 9 E uropean Commission, Trade Defence, April 17, 2020: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence (accessed January 16, 2022); Financial Times, EU plan to tackle ‘coercion’ against member states faces resistance, December 7, 2021. 10 E uropean Commission, Study on EU’s list of critical raw materials, 2020; European Parliament, Extraterritorial sanctions on trade and investment and European responses, November 20, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2020)653618 (accessed January 16, 2022). 6 No. 1 | January 2022 Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict POLICY BRIEF GERMANY IS HIGHLY TRADE such as discriminatory import policies of third coun- DEPENDENT tries, remain under the purview of the EU. % of GDP, 2020 DEVELOP AN INTELLIGENT, 7 FORWARD-LOOKING NATIONAL 6 ECONOMIC STRATEGY 5 This will require a thorough and comprehensive 4 cost-benefit analysis of both existing vulnerabilities 3 and the economic and financial costs of risk mitiga- tion policies. The new German government should 2 therefore conduct a broad and wide-ranging Nation- 1 al Economic Security Review of all critical economic, financial, and technological vulnerabilities vis-a-vis 0 economic partners outside the EU. Ideally, such vul- German EU Chinese US exports to exports to exports to exports to nerabilities should be mitigated in cooperation with the EU or at least other EU member states. Once USA CHINA GERMANY EU (ex-Germany) more, where this proves ineffective, national policies Source: IMF, own calculations need to be devised. The European Commission has also launched sev- The German government should approach interna- eral initiatives in terms of investment and technol- tional trade and economic policy more strategically. ogy policies.11 However, these are domains where it Given the rapid pace of technological development, has far fewer prerogatives, particularly in relation to future dependencies are bound to emerge sooner third parties. Therefore, it will be more difficult to rather than later. In light of accelerating US-Chinese find agreement on a common EU approach. This was strategic competition and intensifying state-sup- amply demonstrated by recent intra-EU disagree- ported technology competition (Made in China 2025, ment regarding FDI screening. Nonetheless, the EU’s China Standards 2035, US Innovation and Competi- anti-coercion policy may be helpful in addressing in- tion Act), Germany should study very carefully the vestment- and technology-related coercion, though potential costs and benefits of government-support- it is far from clear at the moment how effective it will ed innovation and technology policies. Particular turn out to be (see forthcoming Policy Brief). attention needs to be paid to transformative tech- nologies including AI and quantum computing. Some of the investment- and technology-related vulnerabilities will need to be addressed at the na- Designing successful industrial policy is tricky and tional level or, where expedient, at the inter-govern- fraught with risks, and ordo-liberal thinking remains mental level in cooperation with other like-minded prevalent in Germany. Nevertheless, the German countries. Comprehensive coordination at EU lev- government should appoint an independent ex- el may simply be too onerous and time-consuming port commission to make proposals on how to de- if any agreement on a sensible and effective policy sign such policies and which technologies to focus is to be reached at all. The new German government on. The Ministry of Economics with its Industrial should therefore consider launching an investment Strategy 2030 has already taken a first step towards program aimed at identifying and mitigating risk re- a national industrial policy.12 In light of America’s and lated to existing technological dependencies as well China’s innovation capacity and the huge amounts of as a policy aimed at identifying and addressing crit- public and private financial resources being deployed ical import dependencies. Both policies need to be in both countries, industrial policy and innovation closely coordinated with the private sector. Policies policies deserve greater and more detailed consider- aimed at mitigating export-related vulnerabilities, ation in the German context. 11 E uropean Commission, Foreign Direct Investment EU Screening Framework, February 2019: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/february/tradoc_157683.pdf (accessed January 16, 2022). 12 F ederal Ministry of Economic Affairs, Made in Germany: Industrial Strategy 2030, November 29, 2019: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/industrial-strategy-2030.html (accessed January 16, 2022). No. 1 | January 2022 7 POLICY BRIEF Germany and the US-Chinese Geo- Economic Conflict Reducing critical economic, financial, and techno- logical vulnerabilities will afford Germany greater flexibility by making it less susceptible to geo-eco- nomic pressure and coercion, wherever they may come from. Reduced vulnerability will in fact enhance the prospect for transatlantic and international – in- cluding transatlantic – cooperation, as economic exchange becomes less risky and more difficult to ex- ploit politically. Yet mitigation policies will not come for free, and policymakers need to carefully evaluate their costs and benefits in a comprehensive, strategic rather than piecemeal, haphazard manner. US-Chinese competition is going to intensify, as is the geo-economic pressure that Germany will face over the coming years and decades. The weakening of the multilateral, largely non-discriminatory in- ternational economic regime calls for a more stra- tegic and more political approach to foreign trade, investment, and technology policy. Preparing for more conflictual international economic relations will require astute diplomacy flanked by astute risk mitigation strategies. 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