The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire by Mackubin Thomas Owens Mackubin Owens is Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research/ Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, Newport, RI and Editor ofOrbis. Abstract: The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the ‘‘neoconservatives’’—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a warthatshouldneverhavebeenfought.Butfarfromabeinganeoconserva- tive innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America’s founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. TheBushDoctrineisonlythelatestmanifestationofthefactthatU.S.national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security. Our true situation appears to me to be this—a new extensive Country containing withinitselfthematerialsforformingaGovernmentcapableofextendingtoitscitizens alltheblessingsofcivilandreligiousliberty—capableofmakingthemhappyathome. This is the great end of Republican establishments. We mistake the object of our government,ifwehopeorwishthatitistomakeusrespectableabroad.Conquestor superiorityamongotherpowersisnotoroughtnotevertobetheobjectofrepublican systems. If they are sufficiently active and energetic to rescue us from contempt & preserveourdomestichappinessandsecurity,itisallwecanexpectfromthem—itis more thanalmost any otherGovernment ensurestoit citizens. CharlesPinckney, speechtotheFederalConvention, June25,1787 Ithadbeensaidthatrespectabilityintheeyesofforeignnationswasnottheobjectat which we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was domestic tranquility&happiness.Thiswasanidealdistinction.NoGovernmentcouldgiveus tranquility&happinessathome,whichdidnotpossesssufficientstabilityandstrength tomake usrespectable abroad. Alexander Hamilton, speechtotheFederalConvention, June29,1787 #2008PublishedbyElsevierLimitedonbehalfofForeignPolicyResearchInstitute. 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TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues?the ??neoconservatives???to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America?s founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 18 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 OWENS If any one therefore wishes to establish an entirely new republic, he will have to considerwhetherhewishestohaveherexpandinpoweranddominionlikeRome,or whetherhe intendsto confine herwithin narrowlimits. NiccoloMachiavelli,Discourses, I. 6. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the momenthasbecomeenamoredofthehonestyofsuchanunambitiouspart.Forwhat youholdis,tospeaksomewhatplainly,atyranny.Totakeitperhapswaswrong,but toletit goisunsafe. Pericles, FuneralOration WhenhewaselectedtotheAmericanpresidencyin2000,GeorgeW. Bush gave every indication that he, like his father before him, was a conven- tional ‘‘realist’’ in foreign affairs, committed to a grand strategy of selective engagementandcriticaloftheopen-endednatureoftheClintondoctrineand itsindiscriminateuseofmilitaryforceininstancesnotinvolvingvitalnational interests. In his speeches, Bush stressed foreign policy retrenchment and military ‘‘transformation’’ in preparation for the emergence of a future large peercompetitorin the veinof theSovietUnion during theColdWar.Neither Bushnorhisadvisers,mostnotablynationalsecurityadviserCondoleezzaRice andSecretaryofStateColinPowell,spokeofspreadingdemocracythroughout the world. Then came 9/11. To the surprise of almost everyone, the president abandoned his realism and embraced an approach to foreign affairs that seemed to be nothing short of revolutionary. The ‘‘Bush Doctrine,’’ was first enunciated in a speech he delivered on September 20, 2001, only nine days aftertheattacks,andthenrefinedandelaboratedinthreemorespeechesover the next nine months. ThedominantnarrativeconcerningGeorgeW.Bush’sforeignpolicy— especially his doctrine of preemptive war and his emphasis on the spread of democracy—is that it represents a radical break with the American past. According to this narrative, U.S. foreign policy was originally based on the principle of non-intervention; the American Founders are often invoked in support of the claim that the default position of U.S. foreign policy is isolationism. Who has not heard the argument that Washington’s Farewell Address counsels ‘‘virtuous isolationism,’’ that in the words of John Quincy Adams,whileAmericais‘‘thewell-wishertothefreedomandindependenceof all,’’sheisthe‘‘championandvindicatoronlyofherown,’’going‘‘notabroad, in search of monsters to destroy,’’ and that the Monroe Doctrine represents a ratification of this ‘‘isolationist’’ principle? But, the narrative continues, while isolationism and non-intervention prevailed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, circumstances required the United States to abandon this posture at the beginning of the twentiethcentury.Yeteventhen,Americadidsoonlyreluctantlyinresponse tothreatstoU.S.nationalinterests.Thus,withtheexceptionofthefailedeffort 24 | Orbis The Bush Doctrine by Woodrow Wilson to base U.S. foreign policy on idealistic principles and GeorgeW.Bush’squixoticefforttoimposedemocracyontheMiddleEast,the United States has normally adhered to the principles of foreign policy ‘‘realism,’’ a theory based on the idea that the driving force in international politicsisnationalsecurity,whichcanbeensuredonlybypossessingsufficient power relative to other states. According to the conventional narrative, neoconservatives are dangerously moralistic and idealistic when it comes to world affairs. They believeinAmerica’sexceptionalroleasapromoteroftheprinciplesofliberty anddemocracy,theyarecommittedtothepreservationofAmericanprimacy, theyaresuspiciousofinternationalinstitutions,andtheyfavortheunilateral use of power, especially military power, in order to defend and advance democracy. But the conventional wisdom is wrong. While all are entitled to their opinions concerning the wisdom or folly of the Bush Doctrine, they are not entitledtomakeuptheirownfactsregardingitsplaceintheAmericanforeign policy tradition. And the fact is that all of the elements of the Bush Doctrine have been observable in American foreign policy since the inception of the Republic. As Walter Russell Mead observes, the idea of America’s ‘‘virtuous isolationism’’ is an historical myth. Far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is in fact well within the mainstream of U.S. foreignpolicyandverymuchinkeepingwiththevisionofAmerica’sfounding generation,aswellasthepracticeoftheEarlyRepublic’sstatesmen.TheBush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest hasalwaysbeenconcernedwithmorethansimplesecurity—ithasalwayshad both a commercial and an ideological component.1 When it comes to the Bush Doctrine, the main issue—as is the case with foreign policy in general—is prudence, which Aristotle described as deliberating well about those things that can be other than they are (means). According to Aristotle, prudence is the virtue most characteristic of the statesman. In foreign affairs, prudence requires the statesman to adapt uni- versalprinciplestoparticularcircumstancesinordertoarriveatthemeansthat arebestgivenexistingcircumstances.Infact,theFoundersandthestatesmen of the Early Republic were not isolationist but prudent. The Bush Doctrine The most concise statement of the Bush Doctrine can be observed in GeorgeBush’sSecondInauguralAddress:‘‘itisthepolicyoftheUnitedStates to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in 1WalterRussellMead,SpecialProvidence:AmericanForeignPolicyandHowItChangedthe World (NewYork:Alfred A.Knopf, 2001), pp.3-29. Winter 2009 | 25 OWENS every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’2 While this statement captures the essence of the Bush Doctrine, it is useful to examine the principles upon which it is based.3 The first of these is therejectionof‘‘moralequivalency’’ininternationalaffairs.TheBushDoctrine unapologeticallyassertstheneedfor—andthepossibilityof—moraljudgment ininternationalaffairs.AsaspeciesofwhatRobertKaufmanhascalledMoral Democratic Realism, the Bush Doctrine holds that liberal democratic regimes are superior to tyrannies.4 The second principle of the Bush Doctrine is the repudiation of the ‘‘social work’’ theory of terrorism: the belief that economic factors—poverty andhunger—arethe‘‘root’’causesofthephenomenon.TheBushDoctrineis founded on the contention that the terrorism that spawned 9/11 and its precursors,bothagainsttheUnitedStatesandIsrael,isamurderousideology aimedatthedestructionofWesternliberalism.Accordingly,thisideologyisas dangerous as fascism/Nazism and communism. According to the Bush Doc- trine,thefountainheadof9/11andsimilaraggressionis‘‘thecultureoftyranny in the Middle East, which spawns fanatical, aggressive, secular, and religious despotisms.’’ The remedy for this is democratic regime change. The final principle of the Bush Doctrine is the recognition that after 9/11 the traditional approaches to threats—deterrence, containment, and ex post facto responses—are inadequate when dealing with terrorists and rogue regimes seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Thus, under the Bush Doctrine, the United States reserves the right to undertake preventive war.While international law and norms havealways acknowledgedthe right of astateto launcha preemptivestrikeagainst anotherwhen anattack bythe latter is imminent, it has rejected any right of preventive war. President Bush arguedthatinanageofglobalization,catastrophicterrorism,andweaponsof mass destruction, this distinction had become meaningless. If an attack is imminent, it is now too late to preempt it. As a policy or grand strategic approach to international relations, the BushDoctrineisaspeciesofprimacy,basedontheintersectionofhegemonic stability theory and the theory of the democratic peace. Hegemonic stability theory holds that a ‘‘liberal world order’’ does not arise spontaneously as the resultofsomeglobal‘‘invisiblehand.’’5Instead,suchasystemrequires,inthe 2George Bush,Second Inaugural Address,January, 20,2005. 3SeeNormanPodhoretz,WorldWarIV:TheLongStruggleAgainstIslofascism(NewYork: Doubleday,2007.Cf.MichaelAbramowitz,‘‘ManyVersionsof‘BushDoctrine’:Palin’sConfu- sioninInterviewUnderstandable,ExpertsSay,’’WashingtonPost,September13,2008;p.A01. 4Robert G. Kaufman, In Defense of the Bush Doctrine (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,2007), pp.87-99. 5Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72-80 and 85-92 and Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Under- standing the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.93-100. 26 | Orbis The Bush Doctrine words of Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, a ‘‘hegemonic power, a state willing and ableto providetheworldwiththecollectivegoodsofeconomicstabilityand international security.’’6 The United States, as Great Britain before it, took up theroleofhegemonnotoutofaltruismbutbecauseitisinitsnationalinterest to do so. Primacy can be caricatured as a ‘‘go-it-alone’’ approach in which the UnitedStatesintimidatesbothfriendsandallies,wieldspowerunilaterally,and ignoresinternationalinstitutions.Butwhilesomemaymocktheterm,theBush Doctrine, in fact, represents ‘‘benevolent’’ primacy, an approach in keeping with the liberal political traditions of the United States but which recognizes the world as a dangerous place in which a just peace is maintained only by the strong. This form of primacy is based on the assumption that U.S. power is goodnotonlyfortheUnitedStatesitselfbutalsofortherestoftheworld.The argument is that the United States can be fully secure only in a world where everyone else is also secure. The existence of liberal institutions is not sufficient. Donald Kagan observes that history seems to indicate that good will, unilateral disarmament, theavoidance of alliances, teaching and preachingtheevilsofwarbythosestateswhoseektopreservepeacearetonoavail. Whatseemstoworkbest...isthepossessionbythosestateswhowishtopreserve peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens of an responsibilities requiredtoachieve thatpower.7 SuchaliberalworldorderispossibleonlyiftheUnitedStatesiswilling and able to maintain it. In the words of Samuel Huntington, -themaintenanceofU.S.primacymattersfortheworldaswellasfortheUnitedStates -AworldwithoutU.S.primacywillbeaworldwithmoreviolenceanddisorderand lessdemocracyandeconomicgrowththanaworldwheretheUnitedStatescontinues tohavemoreinfluencethananyothercountryinshapingglobalaffairs.Thesustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and tothefuture offreedom, democracy, open economies, and interna- tional orderin theworld.8 According to the theory of hegemonic stability, the alternative to U.S. powerisamoredisorderly,lesspeacefulworld.TheprecedentfortheUnited States is the decay of Pax Britannica, which, many believe, created the 6EthanBarnabyKapstein,ThePoliticalEconomyofNationalSecurity:AGlobalPerspective (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1992), p.3. 7DonaldKagan,OntheOriginsofWarandthePreservationofPeace(NewYork:Double- day, 1995),p. 570. 8Samuel Huntington, ‘‘Why International Primacy Matters,’’ International Security, Spring 1993,pp. 82-93. Winter 2009 | 27 OWENS necessary,ifnotsufficientconditionsforthetwoworldwarsofthetwentieth century. As British hegemony declined, smaller states that previously had incentives to cooperate with Britain ‘‘defected’’ to other powers, causing the international system to fragment. The outcome was depression and war. The decline of American power could lead to a similar outcome.9 The ‘‘democratic peace’’ is based on the idea, popular among liberal internationalists, that liberal democracies do not fight one another.10 The concept originated with Immanuel Kant, who argued in Perpetual Peace that thespreadofconstitutionalrepublicswasanecessary,ifnotsufficient,causeof peaceamongstates.WhileBushhasinvokedtheideaonnumerousoccasions, he is not alone. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton said:‘‘Ultimately,thebeststrategytoensureoursecurityandtobuildadurable peaceis to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.’’11 In 2005, Congress passed legislation introduced by SenatorsJohnMcCainandJoeLieberman,theAdvanceDemocracyAct,which states: ‘‘Wars between or among democratic countries are exceedingly rare, while wars between and among nondemocratic countries are commonplace, withnearly170,000,000peoplehavinglosttheirlivesbecauseofthepoliciesof totalitarian governments.’’ 12 Far from representing a ‘‘neo-conservative’’ innovation in American foreign policy, the Bush Doctrine is in the tradition of the Founders and statesmenoftheEarlyRepublic,aswellasFranklinRoosevelt,HarryTruman, and Ronald Reagan. The Bush Doctrine represents a continuation of a policy thatfusesAmericansecurityandthe‘‘AmericanMission.’’The‘‘ultimategoalof ending tyranny in our world’’ has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy since the earliest days of the Republic. The Early Republic and the Genesis of the ‘American Mission’ Assuggestedearlier,criticsoftheBushDoctrinedismissitasthework ofacabalof‘‘neo-conservatives’’whoco-optedU.S.foreignpolicyinthewake 9RobertGilpin,War&ChangeinWorldPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981);JosephGreico,CooperationAmongNations(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1990);and CharlesKindleberger,TheWorldinDepression:1929-1939(Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia Press,1973). 10SeeMichaelW.Doyle,‘‘Kant,LiberalLegacies,andForeignAffairs,’’PhilosophyandPublic Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer, 1983, pp. 205–235 and ‘‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,Part2,’’Philosophyand PublicAffairs,Autumn, 1983,pp.323–353,aswellasDoyle, WaysofWarandPeace(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1997).Foracritique,seeChristopherLayne, ‘‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,’’ International Security, Autumn, 1994, pp.5–49. 11BillClinton,StateoftheUnionspeech,Jan.25,1994,http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou94.htm. 12109thCongress,1st Session, S. 516,AdvanceDemocracy Act. 28 | Orbis The Bush Doctrine of 9/11. So-called neo-conservatives have indeed frequently supported the Bush Doctrine because, as Francis Fukuyama observes in his recent book, AmericaattheCrossroads,neo-conservatives,unlikerealists,believethat‘‘the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the deepestvaluesofliberaldemocraticsocieties.’’Andunlikeliberalinternation- alists who seem to believe that international law and institutions alone are sufficient to achieve peace, neo-conservatives contend that there are certain problems that can be addressed only through the prudent exercise of Amer- ican power.13 ButthesuggestionthattheBushDoctrineisaninnovationattributable to neo-conservatism alone is simply a-historical. After all, Andrew Bacevich’s descriptionoftheneo-conservativeenterpriseas‘‘fus[ing]Americanpowerto American principles, ensuring the survival of those principles and subse- quentlytheirpropagationtothebenefitofallhumankind’’appliestoAmerican statecraft since the beginning of the Republic.14 Theprinciplesof theAmericanfoundinghavealwaysbeenatleastas important a determinant of U.S. foreign policy as ‘‘interests’’ in the narrow realistsense.Animplicationofthisargumentisthatthereislinearprogression fromtheDeclarationofIndependencetoPresidentBush’sattempttomid-wife the creation of an Iraqi democracy. As Walter Russell Mead has shown in A Special Providence, U.S. foreign policy cannot be understood in terms of the two dominant schools of international relations theory, realism on the one hand and liberalism or liberal internationalism on the other. In essence, the debate between aca- demic realists and liberal internationalists is little more than a sterile dispute between Machiavelli and Kant that only serves to illustrate the poverty of academic international relations theory. Realism stresses the importance of power and military security in international affairs and is most concerned about maintaining stability and a peacefulbalance of power.For therealist, the state’s mostvital interest—and itsonlymeaningfulgoal,nomatter itsformof governmentorwhatitsays for public consumption—is to maintain enough power to ensure its security. Realists ban economics, morality, and democracy from high politics. In contrast, liberal internationalists contend that the goals of actors within the international political system transcend power and security to include peace and prosperity. For realists, liberals are too abstract and place too much emphasis on the‘‘good side’’of humannature.For liberals,realistsaretoo pessimisticand 13FrancisFukuyama,AmericaattheCrossroads:Democracy,Power,andtheNeoconserva- tive Legacy(New Haven:Yale University Press,2006), p.48. 14Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (NewYork: Oxford University Press,2005), p.71. Winter 2009 | 29 OWENS cynical.Inaddition,theirtheoryistooparsimonious;itfailstoexplainenough in the world. The fact is that American principles have been at least as important in shaping U.S. foreign policy as the raw pursuit of power beloved by realists. America’s westward expansion and rise to global power have been inextricably linked to the idea that liberal democracy is the best form of government, not only for the United States, but also for the world at large. American ‘‘realism’’ has always been shaped by economic and moral considerations. For Americans, geopolitics, economic and commercial interests, and politicalprinciplehavealwaysbeeninseparable.Accordingly,Americanshave seenthespreadofliberalismasverymuchaU.S.interest.Thisdesiretoexpand the ‘‘American way’’ has transcended partisan differences. Forinstance,bothJeffersonandHamiltonagreedthattheUnitedStates was to be a republic, but they differed concerning the sort of republic that it would be. Jefferson and those who shared his views sought an agrarian republic and hoped to instill in Americans agrarian civic virtue. Hamilton, ontheotherhandbelievedtheUntiedStatesshouldbeacommercialrepublic andsoughttounleashamonghiscountrymenmodernfreedom.Jeffersonwas an advocate of Sparta, Hamilton an advocate of Athens.15 Despite their differences, both Jefferson and Hamilton agreed none- theless that the new Republic was destined for greatness. Remarkably, both Jefferson and Hamilton envisioned an American polity that combined the principles of republic and empire, despite the dominant view of the eight- eenthcenturythatviewedthetwoasincompatible.ThusHamiltonsoughta ‘‘republican empire’’16 while Jefferson envisioned a vast ‘‘empire of liberty’’ spreading west, north, and south across the continent.17 For both Jefferson and Hamilton, an American empire would be an innovation, not based on conquest, as had empires of old, but instead constitute a ‘‘new order for the ages.’’ 15Cf.Leo Strauss,TheCity and Man (Chicago: TheUniversity ofChicagoPress, 1978). 16SeeFederalistNumber1,inwhichPublius(Hamilton)addressestheissueconcerning‘‘the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarkedthatitseemstohavebeenreservedtothepeopleofthiscountry,bytheirconductand example,todecidetheimportantquestion,whethersocietiesofmenarereallycapableornotof establishinggoodgovernmentfromreflectionandchoice,orwhethertheyareforeverdestined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.’’ Cf. Karl-Friedrich Walling, RepublicanEmpire:AlexanderHamiltonOnWarandFreeGovernment(Lawrence:University Press of Kansas, 1999) and Patrick Garrity, ‘‘Foreign Policy and The Federalist,’’ in Charles Kesler, ed., Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (New York:Free Press,1987). 17Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, December 25, 1780, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., PapersofThomasJefferson,Volume4(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1951)pp.237-238. Cf.RobertW.TuckerandDavidC.Hendrickson,EmpireofLiberty:TheStatecraftofThomas Jefferson(NewYork: Oxford University Press,1990). 30 | Orbis The Bush Doctrine For the founding generation, the principles underlying the American Empirewereuniversalinapplication.AsRobertKaganhasargued,inanageof monarchyanddespotism,suchuniversalprinciplesbytheirverynaturemade America a ‘‘dangerous nation’’ because by liberating human potential, they would‘‘capturetheimaginationandthefollowingofallhumanity.’’18Realists in the tradition of Hans Morgenthau have criticized the ‘‘crusading spirit’’ in foreignrelations,butAmericanforeignpolicyhasoftenbeenmotivatedbythe belief that the United States stood in opposition to tyrannical power and despotism. American foreign policy has often been criticized for being ‘‘moralis- tic.’’ButitisimportanttonotethatbeforetheAmericanfounding,allregimes werebasedontheprincipleofinterestoradvantagealone—theinterestofthe stronger. That principlewas articulated bythe Greek historian Thucydidesin his description of the conversation betweenthe Athenians and the rebellious Melians: ‘‘Questions of justice arise only between equals. As for the rest, the strong do what they will. The weak suffer what they must.’’19 Inequality, whetherbetweenmasterandslaveorbetweenaristocratandcommonerwere simply part of the accepted order of things. The United States was founded on different principles—justice and equality. No longer would it be the foundation of political government that somemenwereborn‘‘withsaddlesontheirbacks’’toberiddenbyothersborn ‘‘booted and spurred.’’ In other words, no one had the right to rule over another without the latter’s consent.20 While the United States has not always lived up to its own prin- ciples, it has nonetheless created the standard of justice in both domestic and international affairs. For instance, the stated desire of the United States to free Cuba from a despotic Spain, which helped to bring about the Spanish-American War, can be traced Abraham Lincoln’s speech on the Dred Scott Decision of 1857, a speech that illustrates the logic of liberty. ‘‘I think the authors of [the Declaration of Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal—equal in ‘certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’’’21 18RobertKagan,DangerousNation:America’sPlaceintheWorldFromItsEarliestDaysto theDawn of theTwentieth Century (NewYork: Knopf,2006). 19Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Pelopon- nesian War(New York:Free Press,1996), Book 5,section89,p.352. 20Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman, June 24, 1826, in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Jefferson, Writings(New York:Libraryof America,1984), p.1517. 21Lincoln,‘‘TheDredScottDecision,’’SpeechatSpringfield,June26,1857,RoyBasler,ed., Abraham Lincoln: HisSpeeches andWritings (NewYork: DaCapo, 1946),p. 360. Winter 2009 | 31