Maritime SOF: Patrol Coastal Ships, A Vital Asset to the Theater CINC CSC 1999 Subject Area – Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Maritime SOF: Patrol Coastal Ships, A Vital Asset to the Theater CINC Author: Lieutenant Commander C. J. Gilbert, United States Navy Thesis: With the possibility of a reduction in the numbers of the Cyclone Class Patrol Coastal (PC) ship an argument must be made in support of the continued use of these important Special Operations assets. The PC is a valuable asset that the Theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) uses in his plan for engagement in his Area of Responsibility. These ships provide a capability needed for the conduct and support of Special Operations missions in the littoral waters of the world. Background: The lessons learned as a result of the escorting of tankers during Operation Earnest Will and difficulties with patrolling and interdicting the coasts of Iraq during the Gulf War brought about the Cyclone Class Patrol Coastal. Since 1993, the PC has proven an important asset in the engagement strategy of Theater CINCs. As a Special Forces asset, they are capable of conducting or directly supporting Special Operations missions:  Unconventional Warfare (UW)  Direct Action (DA)  Special Reconnaissance (SR)  Foreign Internal Defense (FID)  Counter-terrorism (CT) In addition to these operations, their inherent capabilities make them suitable for employment in additional missions:  Counter-drug (CD)  Security Assistance (SA)  Humanitarian Assistance (HA)  Personnel Recovery (PR)  Support to Coalitions The ability to conduct these missions makes the PC a viable and flexible asset for the CINC to use in creating and maintaining a common bond with countries within his region. There are currently not enough PCs to accommodate all of the CINC’s requests. The present United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plan calls for a force reduction to six PCs by the year 2005. Unless this trend is halted, the CINC’s will lose a very important tool for conducting littoral operations. Recommendations: Allocate the funding needed to maintain the current PC force level in the fleet. Continue to look at options that will ensure all CINCs receive the PC availability they need to accomplish their missions. Look to the future for a replacement vessel once the service life of the PC has terminated. i Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Maritime SOF: Patrol Coastal Ships, A Vital Asset to the Theater CINC 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. 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THIS PAGE Same as 49 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Table of Contents Page MMS Cover Sheet……………………………………………………………………..…i DISCLAIMER……………………………………………………………………….…..ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………….….iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………….…...v INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….…….1 BROWN WATER OPERATIONS: PATROL BOATS IN THE U.S. NAVY…….…….8 SPECIAL OPERATIONS MARITIME EMPLOYMENT……………………………...15 HOW THE PATROL COASTAL FITS WITHIN THE CINC STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK …………………………………………………………………………25 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………….35 APPENDIX A: SON OF CYCLONE……………………………………………………36 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..39 ii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACNO Assistant Chief of Naval Operations AOR Area of Responsibility ARG Amphibious Ready Group ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery Vehicle System AT Anti-Terrorism CENTCOM U.S. Central Command CCRS Combatant Craft Retrieval System CD Counter-Drug CINC Commander-in-Chief CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff CNO Chief of Naval Operations COMINT Communications Intelligence CP&I Coastal Patrol and Interdiction CPO Chief Petty Officer CRRC Combat Rubber Raiding Craft CT Counter-Terrorism CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group DA Direct Action EUCOM U.S. European Command FID Foreign Internal Defense FSI Fleet Support Initiative iii HA Humanitarian Assistance HIFR Helicopter in-flight Refueling HN Host Nation JCET Joint Combined Exercise for Training JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushioned LIC Low Intensity Conflict NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation NDI Non-Developmental Item NMS National Military Strategy NSW Naval Special Warfare NSWC Naval Special Warfare Command PB Patrol Boats PBC Patrol Boat, Coastal PC Patrol Coastal PCC Patrol Craft, Coastal PFP Partnership for Peace PHM Patrol, Hydrofoil, Missile PR Personnel Recovery RHIB Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat SA Security Assistance SBR Special Boat Squadron iv SBU Special Boat Unit SDV SEAL Delivery Vehicle SEAL Sea, Air, and Land SIGINT Signals Intelligence SLOC Sea Lines of Communication SO Special Operations SOC Special Operations Capable SOF Special Operations Forces SOP Standard Operating Procedures SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command SR Special Reconnaissance SWCC Special Warfare Craft, Coastal USCG United States Coast Guard USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command UW Unconventional Warfare v INTRODUCTION With today’s focus on the littoral, the Cyclone Class Patrol Coastal (PC) has proven to be an asset to theater Commander in Chiefs (CINC) for engagement strategies, maritime Special Operations (SO), and Counter-Drug (CD) operations. When USS CYCLONE was commissioned and began operations, the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community questioned the need for a commissioned warship of this size.1 However, the first break came during Operations Restore Democracy and Maintain Democracy in Haiti. Before the introduction of the PC, the Navy was unable to stop small boats from breaking through the naval blockade surrounding Haiti. These boats would simply run toward shallow water where the deeper drafted combatants could not go. With the arrival of the USS Cyclone (PC 1) and USS Tempest (PC 2) (later relieved on station by USS Hurricane [PC 3] and USS Monsoon [PC 4]), these ships were able to block the flow of boats into and out of Haiti.2 Today, PC has operated in every theater throughout the world and become a highly sought after asset by theater CINC’s.3 The CINC’s value the PC due to 1 Special Boat Squadron Two, Command History For 1991, April 1992. Navy Operational Archives, Washington, DC. 2 United States Special Operations Command, 10th Anniversary History, 1997, 48-52. Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. Hereafter NHC (AR). While the history does not point out the number of vessels detained due to the use of PC’s, it does state that “these operations sent a message to the Haitians to abide by the sanctions.” 3 Opinion gained from author’s experience as Commanding Officer, USS Cyclone. While in command the author gained this perspective from two years conducting operations in the European, Southern and Atlantic Commands. In addition, the author held numerous 1 its ability to enhance theater SO capabilities, operate with developing countries with predominantly brown water navies, and conduct presence operations in areas to small for larger ships to visit. These unique capabilities of the PC assist the theater CINC’s in accomplishing their two major tasks. These tasks are to “defend U.S. interests within its assigned area of responsibility, and assist the development of modern militaries within friendly nations throughout its area of responsibility.”4 Given these strengths, why has there been so much controversy surrounding the continued existence of these vessels? If the theater CINC’s feel these ships are a needed asset, then why are seven PC’s currently scheduled for decommissioning between the years 2000-2005?5 The PC provides a unique capability that should not be lost or even degraded. There is currently a prioritized “waiting list” for PC deployments and no end in sight to an interest in having them in-theater.6 In the beginning the controversy was between United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Navy over whom would be responsible for the operation, training and certification processes of the PC. This process was resolved after some growing pains and experience operating the PC and has resulted in a fairly good working relationship. Today’s controversy professional discussions with other PC Commanding Officers and CINC staff officers who had experience in operating in the Pacific and Central Commands. 4 USSOUTHCOM homepage, www.ussouthcom.mil, under “Our Mission,” downloaded from America Online, 1 April 1999. 5 CDR R. Elder, USN, Operations Officer, Special Boat Squadron Two, interviewed by author, 19 March 1999. The current POM for the year 2000 calls for decommissioning seven PCs. There are some active proposals aimed at maintaining all 13 PCs in the fleet. 2 centers around how many PC’s will remain active in the fleet and how USSOCOM will meet the theater CINC’s demand for the PC. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has requested a continuous presence of 4 to 6 PC’s, while U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) continue to request for regular PC deployments (figure 1 depicts the area controlled by the CINC’s).7 The requirement for the PC is still viable. The argument is will USSOCOM be able to meet the demand for PC assets considering their uncertain future. COMMANDER IN CHIEF’S AOR’S (Figure 1) 6 Ibid. The latest USSOCOM PC Conference in February 1999 revalidated the need for PC presence by the theater CINCs. 7 Ibid. 3 If PC’s are in such a high demand, how can USSOCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) justify the decommissioning and reduction of these important assets? It appears to boil down to dollars, but this discussion is not about budgetary issues. This is a discussion of the need for a maritime SO asset capable of conducting and providing support for SO forces and missions. In addition, this is a discussion of how that support is used by theater CINCs to further their mission of defending U.S. national interests and assisting friendly nations in support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) National Military Strategy (NMS). The Chairman’s NMS consists of promoting peace and stability, shaping the international environment and preparing for the future.8 From the Chairman’s NMS the CINC’s formulate their plans based on the tasks of defending U.S. interests and assisting the development of modern militaries within friendly nations. As part of their planning, the CINC’s define their missions and establish objectives they feel will accomplish the objectives of the Chairman’s NMS. The PC as an asset for the CINC is a tool used to accomplish the missions and formulated objectives of the CINCs. While there are fleet assets with some of the capabilities of the PC, there are no other assets that can provide a complete, dedicated package focused on supporting SO missions in support of the CINC’s regional objectives. Due to their larger relative size and inability to operate in shallow waters, destroyers and 4