AD-A252 533 4T 1 1992ESIS Theater Missile Defenses and U.S. Foreign Policy Kyle W. Conway, 2nd Lt AFIT Student Attending: Harvard University AFIT/CI/CIA- 92-036 AFIT/CI Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6583 Approved for Public Release IAW 190-1 Distributed Unlimited ERNEST A. HAYGOOD, Captain, USAF Executive Officer ri1cTR5UTIOR WTMNIT A 92-17932 41 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Policy Analysis Exercise by Kyle W. Conway April 7, 1992 John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Advisors: Peter Zimmerman Ashton Carter TABLE OF CONTENTS EX ECU TIVE SUM M AR Y .................................................................................. 1 THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ................................................... 4 Implications for the United States ............................................................................ 5 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES AND U.S. POLICY ................................ 8 Present Systems and Development ............................................................................ 8 Traditional Foreign Policy Roles ............................................................................ 9 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................... 11 TMD AND THE NATO ALLIES ............................................................................ 11 The European Perspective ............................................................................ 11 The U.S. Perspective ..................................................................................... 14 Policy Implications ........................................................................................ 14 TM D AND RUSSIA ............................................................................................... 16 The Russian Perspective ................................................................................. 16 The U.S. Perspective ..................................................................................... 17 Policy Implications ........................................................................................ 17 TM D AND TH E MI DDLE EAST ......................................................................... 18 The M iddle Eastern Perspective ..................................................................... 18 The U.S. Perspective ..................................................................................... 20 Policy Implications ........................................................................................ 21 TM D AND ASIA ................................................................................................... 22 The Asian Perspective ................................................................................... 22 The U.S. Perspective ..................................................................................... 24 Policy Implications ........................................................................................ 24 TM D A ND FOREIGN POLICY ....................................................................... 26 An Assessment ...................................................................................................... 26 Possible Roles ........................................................................................................ 26 TMD and Arms Control: Another Foreign Policy Role .......................................... 28 Im plications for TM D: Policy Options ................................................................... 30 Policy Implementation: Decision Guidelines ......................................................... 31 Specific Criteria ...................................................................................................... 31 CON CLU SIO N ................................................................................................... 33 BIBLIO G RA PH Y ................................................................................................. 34 A PPEND IX .......................................................................................................... 38 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Theater Missile Defenses program element shall include programs, projects, and activities, including those previously associated with the Tactical Missile Defense Initiative, which have as primary objectives the following: (A) The development of deployable and rapidly relocatable advanced theater missile defenses capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary United States armed forces. Such a program shall have the objective of downselecting and deploying more capable TMD systems by the mid-1990s. (B) Cooperation with friendly and allied nations in the development of theater defenses against tactical or theater missiles.I Congress' mandate for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) recognizes the emerging threat ballistic missiles pose for future U.S. policy options. While official estimates differ, various public sources list twenty four developing countries as having some form of ballistic missile. Missiles are not only growing in numbers, but also in capabilities. In an even more disturbing trend, many of the same countries are also seeking to combine their missile technology with weapons of mass destruction. The heaviest proliferation is concentrated in the Middle East and Asia, where the U.S. has obvious economic and strategic interests. Presently, the continental United States may not be in danger, but our allies and forward deployed troops face an immediate threat. Theater Missile Defenses (TMDs), offer some protection against a threat which previously went uncountered. TMD systems can play a wider role in foreign policy besides just protecting U.S. troops. In the past, arms transfers and joint ventures in development and production have been used to further U.S. interests. TMD systems can be used in the same way, but with the distinct advantage of being less provocative and less destabilizing than offensive, strike-capable weapons. A survey conducted in this paper of the major regions of the world where the U.S. has compelling interests concludes that while joint development or production ventures may not be likely, there is a role for the sale or outright transfer of TMD systems. Ballistic missiles pose a threat militarily, politically, and psychologically. Theater missile defenses can play a role in all three dimensions: I U.S., Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 19 July 1991, Rept. 102-113, pp. 38-39. --Militarily, TMDs can protect forward troops and assets, as well as form closer links to regional security structures. --Politically, defenses can reaffirm U.S. commitment, foster closer ties, help balance offensive capabilities, and provide options for crisis management. --Psychologically, defense systems can counter the terror of ballistic missiles and act as substitutes for the stationing of U.S. forces. An expanded role for TMD in foreign policy is its linkage with arms control efforts. This paper discusses the possible role TMD could play as an incentive for countries to join in arms control processes where they had no incentive in the past. Defenses could be used as incentives to: reduce current missile forces; not procure missile technology or weapons of mass destruction; and not supply such capabilities. By addressing the fears and instabilities generated by ballistic missiles, theater missile defenses could provide a first small step towards opening the arms control process. Depending on the circumstances, the U.S. may want to exercise a certain degree of control or influence over the transferred systems. With this in mind, the various policy options proposed in this paper are: --Outright refusal of transfer. --Deployment only in conjunction with U.S. forces. --Allow purchase, with or without strings attached. --Subsidized purchase or outright gifts with strings attached. --Lend/Lease arrangements. TMDs are advantageous in that they offer a specific counter to a growing threat that has until now gone unanswered without inherently increasing the recipient's offensive capability. However, TMDs can suffer the same pitfalls endemic to the use of any weapon system as a foreign policy tool. Therefore, this paper presents a general framework to guide the use of TMD transfers in foreign policy. Defenses should: --maintain a low political profile; --be used to pursue carefully selected policy objectives; --be coordinated and integrated with other prioritized U.S. policies and objectives. More specifically, transfers of defenses from the U.S. to other countries need to be handled on a case-by-case basis within a regional context. Certain characteristics of 2 the recipient nation should be taken into account when deciding what sort of transfer should take place: --regional stability and political climate; --national doctrine; --sophistication of military forces and infrastructure; --relationships with other countries that may conflict with U.S. interests. TMDs represent a powerful tool in foreign policy for protecting and promoting U.S. interests abroad. Being developed by an organization bent on the research and development of space-based defenses, and funded by a Congress focused mainly on developing continental defenses, the unique characteristics of theater missile defenses might be overlooked. As a result, their role as a tool in foreign policy is likely to to be underutilized or misused. Acoession For NTIS GRA&I 1" DTIC TAB ] Unannounced 0l Just if Icat io By Distribution/ ~4j? Code* r-Availability 3Avail and/or Dist Speolal 3 THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the uncertainty surrounding the shape of the new world order, one foreseeable threat of growing significance is the proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the Third World. Although attempts to control proliferation have been made through measures like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), little headway has been made. With the increasing availability of ballistic missile technology, threats to regional and international stability will undoubtedly increase. Although estimates vary, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute lists twenty four developing nations as having some form of ballistic missile capability.2 While most Third World missiles have ranges of about 1,000 km (600 miles) or less, U.S. officials estimate that by the year 2000, six or more nations will have missiles of 3,000 to 5,000 km (1800-3300 miles), and some may be able to reach the United States.3 The increasing accuracy of missiles is also disturbing. The circle error probable (CEP) of a Scud B is approximately 1000 yards at a range of 190 miles. If such a missile were to be equipped with an inertial navigation system available for commercial aircraft, it might be possible to obtain a CEP of 40 yards at 200 miles or 70 yards at 500 miles.4 Another disconcerting trend is the increasing ability of Third World countries to produce ballistic missiles indigenously. Nine countries can already produce missiles and eight others are trying.5 Director of Central Intelligence William Webster testified that by the 2 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," in SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and DiarmamenL Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 287-318. Rachel Schmidt also lists 24 nations as having some sort of ballistic missile capability in her RAND report, U.S. Export Control Policy and the Missile Technology Control&Rgim, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1990), pp. 7-8. Official U.S. Government estimates have been lower, ranging from 14 to 20. 3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, Director of the Strategic Defense Organization, Statement n the Strategic Defense Initiative 102d Cong., 1st sess., 20 June 1991 4 Aspen Strategy Group, New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear Chemical. and Delivea Capabilities in the Third World (Lanham: Aspen Institute & University Press of America, 1990), p. 8. 5Robert Shuey, Missile Proliferation: A discussion of U.S. Objectives and Policy Options (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 21 February 1990), p. 4. 4 year 2000, some fifteen developing countries will be able to produce missiles 6 indigenously. Perhaps the greatest concern over ballistic missile proliferation is the devastating effect they could wreak if coupled with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that ten developing nations have either nuclear weapons or active research programs. Fourteen possess chemical weapons.7 Added to these fears is the Third World's demonstrated willingness to use their missiles in conflict. The Gulf War is only the most recent example. Implications for the United States Many assert that the military significance of ballistic missiles is over emphasized. Due to their limited ranges and accuracies, ballistic missiles have relatively little military value in the eyes of nations with advanced militaries. In most cases, modem aircraft are cheaper and more efficient delivery platforms.8 Advanced countries that have sophisticated air forces and are confident of achieving air superiority in a conflict have little need to rely on missiles. According to a study conducted by Stanford University, "Ballistic missiles are of principal concern to the degree they are coupled to the delivery of nuclear, and to a somewhat lesser extent, chemical weapons." The study also points out that "there is an Iaura' accorded these systems in the developing world that is fed by high-level pronouncements of concern, handwringing and overemphasizing the importance or military utility of missiles."9 The threat posed by ballistic missile should not be lightly dismissed. Not all countries have sophisticated militaries. Ballistic missiles have become militarily 6U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Brief: Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World" in World Military Expcnditures and Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 17. 7Robert Shuey et al. Missile Proliferation Survey of Emerging Missile Forces (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, revised 9 February 1989), pp. 3, 35. 8For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of ballistic missiles, see Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Missile Proliferation Matter?" Qbis 35 (Winter 1991): 29-39. 9Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control (Executive Summary), John Harvey and Uzi Rubin, co-chairs (Stanford: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, October 1991), pp. 6, 8. 5 important to countries which might not have the capacity to achieve air superiority in a conflict. Thus, missiles represent the only means of striking an opponent. In addition, the "aura" accorded ballistic missiles is significant in itself. Missiles are important symbols of national prestige and advancement in countries with little else to parade for the rest of the world. Perhaps most importantly, Third World ballistic missiles are extremely effective as weapons of political and psychological terror. Their speed and guaranteed ability to penetrate enemy territory--regardless of accuracy--offer a means of power projection and intimidation some countries would not otherwise have. The capacity for terror inherent in ballistic missiles was well demonstrated in the attacks on Israel by Iraqi Scuds. As a CRS report points out, "even countries that have impressive armed forces capable of defending against ground, sea, and air attacks are vulnerable to missile attacks."'0 While the continental United States may not be directly endangered for some time, Third World ballistic missiles have been used against U.S. forces. Iraq did not hesitate to fire its missiles in the Gulf War, and Libya fired two Scuds at a U.S. installation on the Italian island of Lampedusa in 1986. There was also concern that U.S. troops deployed in Lebanon in 1984 would be vulnerable to Syrian missiles." U.S. forces in South Korea also operate under the specter of a missile threat. The threat posed by ballistic missiles limits the options available for U.S. action. Bases and forward deployed troops are endangered, as well as the ports and airfields used for rapid deployment. The growing missile threat necessitates the dispersal of assets far away from an area of conflict. Assets may also have to be diverted for counter operations against the missiles themselves.12 Missile proliferation does not just threaten U.S. forward deployed forces, but also several allies and countries friendly to the U.S. For example, a Libyan missile with a 1000 km range could hit targets as far north in Italy as Rome, Israel's major cities, parts of Turkey, and all of Greece and Egypt.13 Thus, unilateral action as well as coalition action could be hamstrung. In a world where cooperation and coalition may be 10Shuey, et al., p. 10. I lSeth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 54. 12During the Gulf War, up to 72 aircraft per day were dedicated to counter operations against Scuds. 33C arus, p. 54. 6 increasingly required for action, the impact of a distant, undefendable threat could be devastating. If Israel had entered the war in response to Iraqi missile attacks, the fragile Gulf coalition might have collapsed. 7