UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II Special Studies CIVIL AFFAIRS: SOLDIERS BECOME GOVERNORS by Harry L. Cotes and Albert K. Weinberg CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1986 Foreword In the midst of the large-scale combat operations of World War II, the Army was called on to occupy, to govern, and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn countries and economies. Few of its task turned out to be as difficult and chal- lenging as these civil affairs missions. The present history, consisting for the most part of documentary material, deals primarily with civil administration in Italy, France, and northwest Europe. Its purpose is to illustrate certain basic and generic problems of civil affairs- their character, the approaches to their solution, and their impact upon the people who had to deal with them. Because of the ideological aspect of the struggle and because the United States acted as a member of a coalition of Allies, U.S. military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of the statesman and the politician. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On an- other level—in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient civilization—they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian rather than military. For its insight into how the Army met its civil affairs mission, for its focus on the vital and continuing problem of the relationship between soldier and civilian—in short, for its graphic analysis of soldiers as governors—this volume will be read with profit in a world where the problems of the soldier have become increasingly political. Washington, D.C. WILLIAM H. HARRIS 25 May 1961 Brig. Gen., U.S.A. Chief of Military History The Authors Albert K. Weinberg received his Ph. D. from The Johns Hopkins University and has taught there, in addition to being for a time a member of The Institute for Advanced Study. His principal publication is Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History. During World War II he served, successively, as an analyst in the Civil Affairs Section of the Office of Strategic Services, as Chief of the Reports Division in UNRRA, and as senior editor and later Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in the Office of the Chief of Military History. Harry L. Coles, Professor of History at Ohio State University, received the Ph. D. degree from Vanderbilt. He has been awarded both a Rosenwald Research Fellowship and a Mershon Post-Doctoral Fellowship. He served as an Army Air Forces historian in World War II and was later assigned to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. A contributor to the seven-volume Army Air Forces in World War II, he is also the editor of the recently published Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military. Preface The title of this volume may not convey the precise scope of its contents but the authors could think of no other that would be more suggestive without being overponderous. Broadly speaking the volume deals with U.S. Army and Anglo-American planning and operations in the sphere of relations with civilians in certain liberated and conquered countries in World War II. Although far more than mere difference in nomenclature was involved, the Army manuals generally referred to occupational operations in liberated countries as civil affairs and to those in conquered countries as military government.1 In both types of occupation the range and complexity of the problems to be dealt with were as great as in the whole scope of modern government. In liberated coun- tries the Army needs and Allied aims could be satisfied largely through existing governmental regulations and personnel, but in enemy countries drastic changes in laws, institutions, and administrators were necessary. Whether old or new governmental machinery was used, civil affairs doctrine emphasized the desira- bility of indirect control. In spite of this emphasis, in areas of military govern- ment Allied officers, whether from necessity or impatience, sometimes per- formed various governmental functions and in any case closely supervised them. In the liberated areas their intervention was far less direct, but, under the paramount authority residing in the theater commander by either the laws of warfare or by international agreement, they advised or assisted the indig- enous authorities. Thus, in various senses and degrees, soldiers became governors. The long and crowded history of Allied civil affairs activities, like the history of tactical activities, may be divided into the operations that took place before and those that took place after the military drive into the main enemy areas—Germany and Japan. The scope of this volume encompasses only the pre-Germany-Japan phase of the war, in which the Army prepared and organized for its tasks, conducted its first belligerent occupation (in Italy), and carried on the liberating occupations in France and northwest Europe prelim- inary to invasion of Germany. It was in this phase, in short, that the Army initiated and gained maturity in its civil affairs responsibilities. The omission of Germany and Japan may well disappoint some readers insofar as the operations in those countries were the largest and most consequential of the war. But the basic aims and methods took form in the earlier operations, and the occupation of Germany and Japan, however distinctive in some respects, cannot be adequately understood except in the light of what went on before. Moreover, when this project was first undertaken the records of military govern- ment in Germany and Japan were still located in those countries for the use of 1 In this volume, as also quite commonly in military usage, "civil affairs" has generally been employed for greater brevity to designate military occupation generically. VII historical sections engaged in writing first narratives. In any case it would have been impossible to include all civil affairs operations in this volume without doing far less than justice to any one. The historiography of civil affairs encounters, indeed, in World War II a documentation unique in broad scope and variety. Though the civil affairs problem was not new in World War II, as the wealth of novels and other popu- lar literature about it might suggest, the Army did go beyond its traditional role in an unprecedented degree and manner. In the American experience military occupations had followed the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish- American War, and World War I. World War II differed from these earlier conflicts in that the duration and size of civil affairs operations were much greater, there was a far larger degree of specialization, and soldiers from the very outset found themselves required to handle political problems to an extent never necessary before. As for size, it has been estimated that Army operations overseas vitally af- fected the lives of more than 300 million people. At the same time, like all other phases of World War II, civil affairs required more specialization than ever before. In earlier wars a good soldier was generally a jack-of-all-trades. In the Civil War, for example, an artilleryman or the driver of a supply wagon might be temporarily detailed to clearing roads or dispensing relief and would then return to his regular duties. Civil affairs being of limited scope, no special train- ing or indoctrination was considered necessary. In World War II, however, a Civil Affairs Division was created, on a high War Department level, to co- ordinate all planning as well as training. An extensive recruiting and specialized training program was organized for the first time, and G-5 (civil affairs and military government) staff sections were added at the theater army, corps, and even division levels. Most important of all, in World War II soldiers became governors in a much broader sense than ever before—so much more than was foreseen that the Army's specialized training proved scant preparation for perhaps the most important phase of their role. They became not merely the administrators of civilian life for the Army's immediate needs but at the same time the executors and at times even, by force of circumstances, the proposers of national and international political policy. This broader role arose from the fact that in World War II the Allies strove to realize from the very beginning of occupation political aims that had usually not been implemented during war or, if during war at all, not until active hostilities had ended. Thus, in enemy countries civil affairs officials were immediately to extirpate totalitarian governmental and economic systems, in liberated countries they were as soon as possible to aid in restoring indigenous systems and authorities, and in both types of countries they were to make an all-out effort to effect gradual transition toward the envisaged postwar national and international order. This unprecedented mission was com- plicated, moreover, by the fact that occupation was joint rather than zonal as in World War I. Thus British and American military authorities found them- selves compelled to take part in reconciling often quite conflicting views on both immediate and long-range goals. Believing that these essentially political tasks called for civilian rather than military aptitudes, the President and his advisers VIII planned initially to entrust the conduct of civil affairs to civilian rather than military agencies as soon as military conditions permitted. But the plan was not carried out, and as matters developed the Army had on its hands for the duration a twofold task which required the soldier to serve military expediency on the one hand and politico-social directives on the other. The question of why, despite every initial prospect to the contrary, soldiers rather than civilians became and remained governors is indeed an interesting one. To the extent that they could do so without neglecting equally important though less dramatic problems, the authors have attempted to present and to emphasize the materials that suggest the explanation. There is no simple answer and certainly not, it seems to the authors, one so simple as the hypothesis that the Army wanted and strove to capture as broad a role in civil affairs as possible. Materials in Part I, concerned with the preparatory and organizational stage, suggest that the President's eventual decision to entrust the responsibility in the initial phase to the Army was due to civilian unreadiness rather than to any inveterate Army ambition. Portions of Part II make clear the difficulties of fitting civilian agencies, even in later phases of the Italian operation, into the context of battle and a military framework, and indicate reasons for the resultant decision to leave the military authorities in exclusive administrative control. As Part III reveals, despite this experience, Allied authorities, in planning for the liberated countries of northwest Europe, still proposed to delegate civil affairs as far as possible to indigenous civilian authorities, subject only to the Supreme Commander's right to determine how soon a complete delegation was militarily feasible. In Part IV, dealing with operations, it is disclosed that despite this purpose, and despite also the competence of indigenous authorities, conditions during and immediately following hostilities made it necessary for the Allied armies to render these authorities, in matters of civil affairs, substantial assistance. The problem of the soldier's role in civil affairs was vigorously debated, particularly during the earlier part of these experiences. Some may feel that history should contribute to a solution, but to these authors it does not seem possible to suggest the answer to so complex a question on the basis of history alone, especially since history is subject to different interpretations. Perhaps, however, candor with the reader requires acknowledgment that any initial bias against entrusting largely political responsibilities to soldiers gradually became modified in the course of the authors' studies and thinking. Certainly this change came about partly from the growing suspicion that the soldier's degree of admin- istrative involvement in CA/MG, as also the degree of connection between ad- ministration and political influence, are likely to be determined by forces stronger than any political theory. But it came about much more as evidence seemed to accumulate that at least Anglo-American soldiers, professional or lately civilians, were—or at any rate gradually became—capable of viewing and handling political problems not too differently from civilians. Another consid- eration was that not only organizational machinery but the attitudes of military and civilian authorities alike ensured civilian control of basic policy, although the capacity of the military leaders for properly interpreting and applying civilian policy would probably have developed more quickly and fully if their IX