DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited Wings at War Series, No. 5 Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front The Role of the XIX Tactical Air Command during August 1944 An Interim Report Published by Headquarters, Army Air Forces Washington, D. C. Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence New Imprint by the Center for Air Force History Washington, D. C. 1992 004 "20050429 Wings at War COMMEMORATIVE EDITION Originally published shortly after key air campaigns, the Wings at War series captures the spirit and tone of America's World War II experience. Eyewitness accounts of Army Air Forces' aviators and details from the official histories enliven the story behind each of six important AAF operations. In coopera- tion with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Center for Air Force History has reprinted the entire series to honor the airmen who fought so valiantly fifty years ago. A, Crntrfor Air Force History Washington. D.C. 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REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 1992 na/ 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front n/a 5b. GRANT NUMBER n/a 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER n/a 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER n/a 5e. TASK NUMBER n/a 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER n/a 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Air Force History Support Office 3 Brookley Avenue Box 94 n/a Bolling AFB DC 20032-5000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORIMONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) n/a n/a 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) n/a 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES n/a 14. ABSTRACT Describes close air support and battlefield interdiction in action. Part of the Wings at War Commemorative Booklets series. 50 pp., maps, photos GPO Stock No.008-070-00671-5 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE ABSTRACT OF Richard I. Wolf PAGES UU U U 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) UUU50 202-404-2186 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 Foreword Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front describes close air support and battlefield interdiction in action. A single, month-long campaign-the famous thrust across northern France in August 1944 of Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army and Maj. Gen. 0. P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command-became a model for close cooperation between army and aviation forces in future conflicts. This day-by-day, blow-by-blow account shows how the ground forces raced forward, fre- quently twenty miles per day, because friendly air power protected their flanks, shielded them from the Luftwaffe, and devastated the opposition in front of them. CONTENTS PAGE N arrative of the O peration ................................... I Highlights of Day by Day Air Operations ...................... 27 Notes on Organization, Tactics, and Technique ................. 44 ILLUSTRATIONS Maj. Gen. 0. P. W eyland ............................. Frontispiece Ground Situation, i August 1944 .............................. 7 Ground Situation, 7 August 1944 .............................. 13 P- in Communication with Armor .......................... 23 47 Ground Situation, 15 August 1944............................. 33 Ground Situation, 2.2 August 1944 ........................... 41 Ground Situation, i September 1944 ......................... 47 Official Photo USAAF. Maj. Gen. 0. P. Weyland, Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command. Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front HEN the history of this war is written, one of the signifi- cant developments t6 be noted and discussed will be the forniation and rapid growth of the air-ground tactical team. Born of resourcefulness and necessity, cradled in the African desert, the lusty infant quickly grew into a creature of bone and sinew until, when Normandy was invaded, it had become a smoothly functioning striking force of terrific power, destined to change many tactical theories theretofore accepted as axioms. This booklet focuses its attention upon one phase of air-ground cooperation, the drive across France of Maj. Gen. 0. P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Com- mand (XIX TAC) and Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army. For 30 days this new battle team moved ahead without pause- eastward, southward, and westward. Six days after it went into operation, all Brittany had been conquered except for three belea- guered ports; 9 days later, one jaw of the Falaise-Argentan trap had been clamped shut; in another week the Seine was crossed above and below Paris; and by the end of the first month this air- ground combination was fighting within 6o miles of Germany. In the course of these incredibly rapid operations XIX TAC was called upon to carry out many assignments that no air arm had ever done before. To keep up with the advance of Third Army's forward command post, frequently 20 miles a day, XIX TAC had to move its combat headquarters five times during the 31 days of August. It was an air force that never could settle down, that always must keep trucks and vans ready to roll closer to the front, that never could permit a time lag in its operational planning and coordination. In August, Thunderbolts and Mustangs of XIX TAC flew on five different fronts, none of which was stable. The fighters probed and disorganized with their bombs deep areas of enemy concen- trations and shallow zones directly ahead of Third Army tanks; they protected the Third Army's rearward supply roads, at one time very narrow and precarious, from ground attack and sabotage aircraft; they flew almost daily against suicide garrisons which the Germans left behind in encircled, sternly defended harbor cities; and finally, in a completely unorthodox move, they were given full responsibility for the protection of General Patton's long, vulnerable right flank along the Loire. This diversity of assignment meant that the aircraft of XIX TAC had to operate simultaneously along an irregular, shifting 500-mile front ranging from Brest almost to the Rhine. Dozens of high- priority missions were required on every good flying day to meet threats along the whole uneven battle line, to keep the Germans in every sector immobile and off balance, and to prevent any massing of enemy strength to oppose the Third Army. Background of the XIX Tactical Air Command By i August most elements of General Weyland's command had fought the enemy for at least 5 months, and some had been in combat since December. XIX TAC joined the Third Army with a backlog of combat experience in all three of its tactical assign- ments: neutralization of enemy air power; interdiction of enemy movement on roads, rails, and rivers to and from the battle zone; and close cooperation with ground forces. General Weyland took command of XIX TAC, then one of the two components of IX Fighter Command, on 4 February 1944. His first headquarters was at Aldermaston Court, near Reading in Berkshire, from where he directed the administration and helped to plot the operations of Thunderbolts and Mustangs flying from East Anglian bases with Eighth Air Force Fortresses and Liberators. Soon after its activation XIX TAC consisted of two fighter wings, the iooth and o3d, embracing five groups of Thunderbolts and 3 two of Mustangs. Gradually the aircraft of IX Fighter Command shifted from long-distance escort missions, protecting the heavies against the Luftwaffe, to fighter-bomber operations against all types of enemy defensive and logistic targets in northern France, the Lowlands, and within the borders of the Reich. As invasion drew close, General Weyland's seven groups moved to advanced landing strips in Kent, a few minutes' flying time from the enemy, the better to 2 carry out their part in the softening of the German garrison armies in France. In the weeks of furious air warfare before D-day, XIX TAC's operations were coordinated with those of its sister organization, IX Tactical Air Command, under Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. XIX TAC participated in the preinvasion rail- and road-smashing campaigns and helped to destroy bridges across the Seine, the Meuse, and the Oise to divide from each other all possible invasion sectors and to make transportation from the big German weapons and materiel factories to the Westwall difficult and perilous. To take one obvious example, the destruction of all bridges across the Seine from Paris to the sea separated the German Seventh Army in Brittany and Normandy from the enemy Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais. Fighter-bomber pilots, learning their trade the hard way during April and May, returned to base each day with new techniques for sealing tunnels, blowing up bridges, blocking tracks, and derailing railway cars. They approached their targets from a dozen different angles, ranging from a horizontal, almost zero-degree bomb run, to the nearly perpendicular approach of straight dive bombing. Their record of enemy vehicles destroyed and rails severed ran into impressive figures. From D-day to i August, when the First Army was the only American army operating in France, XIX TAC groups, based first in England, then in Normandy, were under operational control of IX TAC. General Weyland's airmen participated in all the close cooperation missions of those first 2 invasion months-the 3-, 4-, and 5-missions-a-day schedule of the assault stage; the interdiction of traffic across the Loire and through the Paris-Orleans gap; the harry- ing of enemy movement inside Normandy and Brittany; the con- centrated 2-hour bomber and fighter-bomber attack on the pyramidal forts ringing Cherbourg; and the historic operations south of St. L6. On 2 July General Weyland's field headquarters were set up at Cricqueville in Normandy. A few days later he moved to Nehou, near the secret command post of the still secret Third Army. Until i August, while XIX TAC's Thunderbolts and Mustangs continued to fly in cooperation with the First Army, the operations and intelli- gence personnel of XIX TAC and Third Army made plans for their 3 independent air-ground campaign, to start with the activation of General Patton's forces. Background of the Third Army The Third Army had been in Germany before. Its shoulder patch, a white "A" and red "0" on a field of blue, proclaimed months spent in the Reich after the last war as the army of occu- pation. From the outset, General Patton made no secret of the fact that the Third Army would again go to Germany. He had taken command of the army in England on 26 March x944. Until 6 July he directed a rigorous training program, empha- sizing the physical fitness of his men, aircraft recognition, firing of individual and combined weapons, and familiarity with mines, mine- fields, and booby traps. On 6 July General Patton established headquarters at Nehou in Normandy. Under his command were four corps, the VIII, XII, XV, and XX. When the Third Army became operational on i August it had three immediate objectives: to drive south and southwest from Avranches, to secure the area around Rennes and Fougeres, and then to wheel westward to capture the peninsula of Brittany and open the Breton ports. First Phase of the Operation The front on r August.-On i August American armor and infantry were smashing forward on the impetus of the break-through at St. L6. The surge of five armored columns cut the Germans to ribbons. Dozens of powerless, unequipped, and disorganized enemy units were scrambling southward and eastward to escape annihilation. Fighters of the XIX and IX TAC hunted the foe on the roads, where they moved two and three trucks abreast with- out discipline in planless escape; in the undergrowth in valleys and stream beds, where Panther and Tiger tanks and isolated artillery sought refuge; in bivouac areas, where Germans pitched their oblong tents for a few hours' respite in their headlong flight. This sudden rout followed the massive air operation of July, 25 which helped to break the month-old deadlock along the base of the Cotentin peninsula. From the capture of Cherbourg until 4