Project Gutenberg's A History of Philosophy in Epitome, by Albert Schwegler This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: A History of Philosophy in Epitome Author: Albert Schwegler Translator: Julius H. Seelye Release Date: November 19, 2012 [EBook #41412] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN EPITOME *** Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital Libraries.) Transcriber’s note: The letters A and B with the plus sign at the top are shown as A+ and B+. A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN EPITOME, BY DR. ALBERT SCHWEGLER. TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GERMAN, BY JULIUS H. SEELYE. THIRD EDITION. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 443 & 445 BROADWAY. LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN. 1864. Entered, according to act of Congress, in the year 1856, By Julius H. Seelye, In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY HENRY B. SMITH, D. D. The History of Philosophy, by Dr. Albert Schwegler, is considered in Germany as the best concise manual upon the subject from the school of Hegel. Its account of the Greek and of the German systems, is of especial value and importance. It presents the whole history of speculation in its consecutive order. Though following the method of Hegel’s more extended lectures upon the progress of philosophy, and though it makes the system of Hegel to be the ripest product of philosophy, yet it also rests upon independent investigations. It will well reward diligent study, and is one of the best works for a text-book in our colleges, upon this neglected branch of scientific investigation. The translation is made by a competent person, and gives, I doubt not, a faithful rendering of the original. Henry B. Smith. Union Theological Seminary, New York, Nov. 6, 1855. TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE. Schwegler’s History of Philosophy originally appeared in the “Neue Encyklopädie für Wissenschaften und Künste.” Its great value soon awakened a call for its separate issue, in which form it has attained a very wide circulation in Germany. It is found in the hands of almost every student in the philosophical department of a German university, and is highly esteemed for its clearness, conciseness, and comprehensiveness. The present translation was commenced in Germany three years ago, and has been carefully finished. It was undertaken with the conviction that the work would not lose its interest or its value in an English dress, and with the hope that it might be of wider service in such a form to students of philosophy here. It was thought especially, that a proper translation of this manual would supply a want for a suitable text-book on this branch of study, long felt by both teachers and students in our American colleges. The effort has been made to translate, and not to paraphrase the author’s meaning. Many of his statements might have been amplified without diffuseness, and made more perceptible to the superficial reader without losing their interest to the more profound student, but he has so happily seized upon the germs of the different systems, that they neither need, nor would be improved by any farther development, and has, moreover, presented them so clearly, that no student need have any difficulty in apprehending them as they are. The translator has therefore endeavored to represent faithfully and clearly the original history. As such, he offers his work to the American public, indulging no hope, and making no efforts for its success beyond that which its own merits shall ensure. [Pg iii] [Pg iv] [Pg v] [Pg vi] J. H. S. Schenectady, N. Y., January, 1856. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTORY NOTE, by Henry B. SMITH, D. D. iii TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE v TABLE OF CONTENTS vii Section I. —WHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 11 II.—CLASSIFICATION 16 III.—GENERAL VIEW OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 17 1. The Ionics 17 2. The Pythagoreans 18 3. The Eleatics 18 4. Heraclitus 18 5. The Atomists 19 6. Anaxagoras 19 7. The Sophists 20 IV.— THE IONIC PHILOSOPHERS 21 1. Thales 21 2. Anaximander 22 3. Anaximenes 23 4. Retrospect 23 V.—PYTHAGOREANISM 23 1. Its Relative Position 23 2. Historical and Chronological 23 3. The Pythagorean Principle 24 4. Carrying out of this Principle 25 VI.—THE ELEATICS 27 1. The Relation of the Eleatic Principle to the Pythagorean 27 2. Xenophanes 28 3. Parmenides 28 4. Zeno 30 VII.—HERACLITUS 31 1. Relation of the Heraclitic Principle to the Eleatic 31 2. Historical and Chronological 32 3. The Principle of the Becoming 32 4. The Principle of Fire 33 5. Transition to the Atomists 33 VIII.—EMPEDOCLES 35 1. General View 35 2. The Four Elements 35 3. The Two Powers 36 4. Relation of the Empedoclean to the Eleatic and Heraclitic Philosophy 36 IX.—THE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY 37 1. Its Propounders 37 2. The Atoms 37 3. The Fulness and the Void 38 4. The Atomistic Necessity 38 5. Relative Position of the Atomistic Philosophy 39 X.—ANAXAGORAS 40 1. His Personal History 40 [Pg vii] [Pg viii] 2. His Relation to his Predecessors 41 3. The Principle of the νοῦς 41 4. Anaxagoras as the close of the Pre-Socratic Realism 42 XI.—THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY 43 1. The Relation of the Sophistic Philosophy to the Anaxagorean Principle 43 2. Relation of the Sophistic Philosophy to the Universal Life of that Age 44 3. Tendencies of the Sophistic Philosophy 46 4. Significance of the Sophistic Philosophy from its relation to the Culture of the Age 47 5. Individual Sophists 48 6. Transition to Socrates, and characteristic of the following Period 51 XII.—SOCRATES 52 1. His Personal Character 52 2. Socrates and Aristophanes 55 3. The Condemnation of Socrates 57 4. The Genius of Socrates 60 5. Sources of the Philosophy of Socrates 61 6. Universal Character of the Philosophizing of Socrates 62 7. The Socratic Method 64 8. The Socratic Doctrine concerning Virtue 66 XIII.—THE PARTIAL DISCIPLES OF SOCRATES 67 1. Their Relation to the Socratic Philosophy 67 2. Antisthenes and the Cynics 68 3. Aristippus and the Cyrenians 69 4. Euclid and the Megarians 70 5. Plato as the complete Socraticist 71 XIV.—PLATO 72 I.Plato’s Life 72 1. His Youth 72 2. His Years of Discipline 73 3. His Years of Travel 73 4. His Years of Instruction 74 II.The Inner Development of the Platonic Philosophy and Writings 75 III.Classification of the Platonic System 82 IV.The Platonic Dialectics 83 1. Conception of Dialectics 83 2. What is Science? 84 (1.) As opposed to Sensation 84 (2.) The Relation of Knowing to Opinion 86 (3.) The Relation of Science to Thinking 86 3. The Doctrine of Ideas in its Genesis 87 4. Positive Exposition of the Doctrine of Ideas 91 5. The Relation of Ideas to the Phenomenal World 93 6. The Idea of the Good and the Deity 95 V.The Platonic Physics 96 1. Nature 96 2. The Soul 98 VI.The Platonic Ethics 100 1. Good and Pleasure 100 2. Virtue 102 3. The State 102 XV.—THE OLD ACADEMY 107 XVI.—ARISTOTLE 108 I.Life and Writings of Aristotle 108 II.Universal Character and Division of the Aristotelian Philosophy 109 III.Logic and Metaphysics 112 1. Conception and Relation of the Two 112 2. Logic 113 3. Metaphysics 115 [Pg ix] (1.) The Aristotelian Criticism of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas 116 (2.) The Four Aristotelian Principles, or Causes, and the Relation of Form and Matter 120 (3.) Potentiality and Actuality 123 (4.) The Absolute Divine Spirit 124 IV.The Aristotelian Physics 127 1. Motion, Matter, Space, and Time 127 2. The Collective Universe 128 3. Nature 129 4. Man 129 V.The Aristotelian Ethics 131 1. Relation of Ethics to Physics 131 2. The Highest Good 132 3. Conception of Virtue 134 4. The State 135 VI.The Peripatetic School 136 VII.Transition To the Post-aristotelian Philosophy 137 XVII.—STOICISM 138 1. Logic 139 2. Physics 140 3. Ethics 142 (1.) Respecting the Relation of Virtue to Pleasure 142 (2.) The View of the Stoics concerning External Good 142 (3.) Farther Verification of this View 143 (4.) Impossibility of furnishing a System of Concrete Moral Duties from this Standpoint 143 XVIII.—EPICUREANISM 145 XIX.—SCEPTICISM AND THE NEW ACADEMY 148 1. The Old Scepticism 149 2. The New Academy 150 3. The Later Scepticism 151 XX.—THE ROMANS 152 XXI.—NEW PLATONISM 154 1. Ecstasy as a Subjective State 154 2. The Cosmical Principles 154 3. The Emanation Theory of the New Platonists 155 XXII.—CHRISTIANITY AND SCHOLASTICISM 157 1. The Christian Idea 157 2. Scholasticism 159 3. Nominalism and Realism 160 XXIII.—TRANSITION TO THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY 161 1. Fall of Scholasticism 161 2. The Results of Scholasticism 162 3. The Revival of Letters 163 4. The German Reformation 164 5. The Advancement of the Natural Sciences 165 6. Bacon of Verulam 166 7. The Italian Philosophers of the Transition Epoch 167 8. Jacob Boehme 169 XXIV.—DESCARTES 172 1. The Beginning of Philosophy with Doubt 173 2. Cogito ergo sum 173 3. The Nature of Mind deduced from this Principle 173 4. The Universal Rule of all Certainty follows from the same 174 5. The Existence of God 174 6. Results of this Fact in Philosophy 176 7. The Two Substances 177 8. The Anthropology of Descartes 177 9. Results of the Cartesian System 178 XXV.—GEULINCX AND MALEBRANCHE 180 [Pg x] [Pg xi] 1. Geulincx 180 2. Malebranche 182 3. The Defects of the Philosophy of Descartes 183 XXVI.—SPINOZA 184 1. The One Infinite Substance 185 2. The Two Attributes 186 3. The Modes 188 4. His Practical Philosophy 189 XXVII.—IDEALISM AND REALISM 192 XXVIII.—LOCKE 193 XXIX.—HUME 198 XXX.—CONDILLAC 201 XXXI.—HELVETIUS 203 XXXII.—THE FRENCH CLEARING UP AND MATERIALISM 205 1. The Common Character of the French Philosophers of this Age 205 2. Voltaire 206 3. Diderot 206 4. La Mettrie’s Materialism 207 5. Système de la Nature 208 (1.) The Materiality of Man 208 (2.) The Atheism of this System 209 (3.) Its Denial of Freedom and Immortality 210 (4.) The Practical Consequences of these Principles 210 XXXIII.—LEIBNITZ 211 1. The Doctrine of Monads 213 2. The Monads more accurately determined 214 3. The Pre-established Harmony 215 4. The Relation of the Deity to the Monads 216 5. The Relation of Soul and Body 217 6. The Theory of Knowledge 218 7. Leibnitz’s Théodicée 219 XXXIV.—BERKELEY 220 XXXV.—WOLFF 222 1. Ontology 224 2. Cosmology 225 3. Rational Psychology 225 4. Natural Theology 226 XXXVI.—THE GERMAN CLEARING UP 227 XXXVII.—TRANSITION TO KANT 229 1. Examination of the Faculty of Knowledge 230 2. Three Chief Principles of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge 232 XXXVIII. —KANT 235 I.Critick of Pure Reason 238 1. The Transcendental Æsthetics 238 (1.) The Metaphysical Discussion 239 (2.) The Transcendental Discussion 239 2. The Transcendental Analytic 241 3. The Transcendental Dialectics 246 (1.) The Psychological Ideas 247 (2.) The Antinomies of Cosmology 248 (3.) The Ideal of the Pure Reason 249 (a.) The Ontological Proof 249 (b.) The Cosmological Proof 250 (c.) The Physico-Theological Proof 250 II.Critick of the Practical Reason 252 (1.) The Analytic 254 (2.) The Dialectic: What is this Highest Good? 256 (a.) Perfect Virtue or Holiness 257 [Pg xii] (b.) Perfect Happiness 258 (c.) Kant’s Views of Religion 259 III.Critick of the Faculty of Judgment 262 1. Critick of the Æsthetic Faculty of Judgment 263 (1.) Analytic 263 (2.) Dialectic 265 2. Critick of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment 266 (1.) Analytic of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment 267 (2.) Dialectic 267 XXXIX.—TRANSITION TO THE POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY 268 XL.—JACOBI 271 XLI.—FICHTE 279 I.The Fichtian Philosophy in its Original Form 282 1. The Theoretical Philosophy of Fichte, his Wissenschaftslehre, or Theory of Science 282 2. Fichte’s Practical Philosophy 295 II.The Later Form of Fichte’s Philosophy 301 XLII.—HERBART 303 1. The Basis and Starting Point of Philosophy 304 2. The First Act of Philosophy 304 3. Remodelling the Conceptions of Experience 305 4. Herbart’s Reals 306 5. Psychology connected with Metaphysics 310 6. The Importance of Herbart’s Philosophy 311 XLIII.—SCHELLING 312 I.First Period: Schelling’s Procession from Fichte 314 II.Second Period: Standpoint of the distinguishing between the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind 318 1. Natural Philosophy 318 (1.) Organic Nature 319 (2.) Inorganic Nature 321 (3.) The Reciprocal Determination of the Organic and Inorganic World 321 2. Transcendental Philosophy 322 (1.) The Theoretical Philosophy 323 (2.) The Practical Philosophy 324 (3.) Philosophy of Art 324 III.Third Period: Period of Spinozism, or the Indifference of the Ideal and the Real 326 IV.Fourth Period: The Direction of Schelling’s Philosophy as Mystical, and Allied to New Platonism 333 V.Fifth Period: Attempt at a Theogony and Cosmogony, after the Manner of Jacob Boehme 335 (1.) The Progressive Development of Nature to Man 337 (2.) The Development of Mind in History 337 VI.Sixth Period 338 XLIV.—TRANSITION TO HEGEL 339 XLV.—HEGEL 343 I.Science OF Logic 346 1. The Doctrine of Being 347 (1.) Quality 347 (2.) Quantity 348 (3.) Measure 348 2. The Doctrine of Essence 349 (1.) The Essence as such 349 (2.) Essence and Phenomenon 350 (3.) Actuality 351 3. The Doctrine of the Conception 352 (1.) The Subjective Conception 352 (2.) Objectivity 353 (3.) The Idea 353 II.The Science of Nature 353 [Pg xiii] 1. Mechanics 354 2. Physics 355 3. Organics 355 (1.) Geological Organism 355 (2.) Vegetable Organism 355 (3.) Animal Organism 356 III.Philosophy of Mind 356 1. The Subjective Mind 356 2. The Objective Mind 358 3. The Absolute Mind 362 (1.) Æsthetics 363 (a.) Architecture 363 (b.) Sculpture 363 (c.) Painting 364 (d.) Music 364 (e.) Poetry 364 (2.) Philosophy of Religion 364 (a.) The Natural Religion of the Oriental World 364 (b.) The Religion of Mental Individuality 364 (c.) Revealed, or the Christian Religion 365 (3.) Absolute Philosophy 365 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. SECTION I. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. To philosophize is to reflect; to examine things, in thought. Yet in this is the conception of philosophy not sufficiently defined. Man, as thinking, also employs those practical activities concerned in the adaptation of means to an end; the whole body of sciences also, even those which do not in strict sense belong to philosophy, still lie in the realm of thought. In what, then, is philosophy distinguished from these sciences, e. g. from the science of astronomy, of medicine, or of rights? Certainly not in that it has a different material to work upon. Its material is precisely the same as that of the different empirical sciences. The construction and disposition of the universe, the arrangement and functions of the human body, the doctrines of property, of rights and of the state— all these materials belong as truly to philosophy as to their appropriate sciences. That which is given in the world of experience, that which is real, is the content likewise of philosophy. It is not, therefore, in its material but in its form, in its method, in its mode of knowledge, that philosophy is to be distinguished from the empirical sciences. These latter derive their material directly from experience; they find it at hand and take it up just as they find it. Philosophy, on the other hand, is never satisfied with receiving that which is given simply as it is given, but rather follows it out to its ultimate grounds; it examines every individual thing in reference to a final principle, and considers it as one link in the whole chain of knowledge. In this way philosophy removes from the individual thing given in experience, its immediate, individual, and accidental character; from the sea of empirical individualities, it brings out that which is common to all; from the infinite and orderless mass of contingencies it finds that which is necessary, and throws over all a universal law. In short, philosophy examines the totality of experience in the form of an organic system in harmony with the laws of thought. From the above it is seen, that philosophy (in the sense we have given it) and the empirical sciences have a reciprocal influence; the latter conditioning the former, while they at the same time are conditioned by it. We shall, therefore, in the history of the world, no more find an absolute and complete philosophy, than a complete empirical science (Empirik). Rather is philosophy found only in the form of the different philosophical systems, which have successively appeared in the course of history, advancing hand in hand with the progress of the empirical sciences and the universal, social, and civil culture, and showing in their advance the different steps in the development and improvement of human science. [Pg xiv] [Pg 11] [Pg 12] The history of philosophy has, for its object, to represent the content, the succession, and the inner connection of these philosophical systems. The relation of these different systems to each other is thus already intimated. The historical and collective life of the race is bound together by the idea of a spiritual and intellectual progress, and manifests a regular order of advancing, though not always continuous, stages of development. In this, the fact harmonizes with what we should expect from antecedent probabilities. Since, therefore, every philosophical system is only the philosophical expression of the collective life of its time, it follows that these different systems which have appeared in history will disclose one organic movement and form together one rational and internally connected (gegliedertes) system. In all their developments, we shall find one constant order, grounded in the striving of the spirit ever to raise itself to a higher point of consciousness and knowledge, and to recognize the whole spiritual and natural universe, more and more, as its outward being, as its reality, as the mirror of itself. Hegel was the first to utter these thoughts and to consider the history of philosophy as a united process, but this view, which is, in its principle, true, he has applied in a way which would destroy the freedom of human actions, and remove the very conception of contingency, i. e. that any thing should be contrary to reason. Hegel’s view is, that the succession of the systems of philosophy which have appeared in history, corresponds to the succession of logical categories in a system of logic. According to him, if, from the fundamental conceptions of these different philosophical systems, we remove that which pertains to their outward form or particular application, &c., so do we find the different steps of the logical conceptions (e. g. being, becoming, existence, being per se (fürsichseyn) quantity, &c.). And on the other hand, if we take up the logical process by itself, we find also in it the actual historical process. This opinion, however, can be sustained neither in its principle nor in its historical application. It is defective in its principle, because in history freedom and necessity interpenetrate, and, therefore, while we find, if we consider it in its general aspects, a rational connection running through the whole, we also see, if we look solely at its individual parts, only a play of numberless contingencies, just as the kingdom of nature, taken as a whole, reveals a rational plan in its successions, but viewed only in its parts, mocks at every attempt to reduce them to a preconceived plan. In history we have to do with free subjectivities, with individuals capable of originating actions, and have, therefore, a factor which does not admit of a previous calculation. For however accurately we may estimate the controlling conditions which may attach to an individual, from the general circumstances in which he may be placed, his age, his associations, his nationality, &c., a free will can never be calculated like a mathematical problem. History is no example for a strict arithmetical calculation. The history of philosophy, therefore, cannot admit of an apriori construction; the actual occurrences should not be joined together as illustrative of a preconceived plan; but the facts, so far as they can be admitted, after a critical sifting, should be received as such, and their rational connection be analytically determined. The speculative idea can only supply the law for the arrangement and scientific connection of that which may be historically furnished. A more comprehensive view, which contradicts the above-given Hegelian notion, is the following. The actual historical development is, very generally, different from the theoretical. Historically e. g. the State arose as a means of protection against robbers, while theoretically it is derived from the idea of rights. So also, even in the actual history of philosophy, while the logical (theoretical) process is an ascent from the abstract to the concrete, yet does the historical development of philosophy, quite generally, descend from the concrete to the abstract, from intuition to thought, and separates the abstract from the concrete in those general forms of culture and those religious and social circumstances, in which the philosophizing subject is placed. A system of philosophy proceeds synthetically, while the history of philosophy, i. e. the history of the thinking process proceeds analytically. We might, therefore, with great propriety, adopt directly the reverse of the Hegelian position, and say that what in reality is the first, is for us, in fact, the last. This is illustrated in the Ionic philosophy. It began not with being as an abstract conception, but with the most concrete, and most apparent, e. g. with the material conception of water, air, &c. Even if we leave the Ionics and advance to the being of the Eleatics or the becoming of the Heraclitics, we find, that these, instead of being pure thought determinations, are only unpurified conceptions, and materially colored intuitions. Still farther, is the attempt impracticable to refer every philosophy that has appeared in history to some logical category as its central principle, because the most of these philosophies have taken, for their object, the idea, not as an abstract conception, but in its realization as nature and mind, and, therefore, for the most part, have to do, not with logical questions, but with those relating to natural philosophy, psychology and ethics. Hegel should not, therefore, limit his comparison of the historical and systematic process of development simply to logic, but should extend it to the whole system of philosophical science. Granted that the Eleatics, the Heraclitics and the Atomists may have made such a category as the centre of their systems, and we may find thus far the Hegelian logic in harmony with the Hegelian history of philosophy. But if we go farther, how is it? How with Anaxagoras, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle? We cannot, certainly, without violence, press one central principle into the systems of these men, but if we should be able to do it, and could reduce e. g. the philosophy of Anaxagoras to the conception of “the end,” that of the Sophists to the conception of “the appearance,” and the Socratic Philosophy to the conception of “the good,”—yet even then we have the new difficulty that the historical does not correspond to the logical succession of these categories. In fact, Hegel himself has not attempted a complete application of his principle, and indeed gave it up at the very threshold of the Grecian philosophy. To the Eleatics, the Heraclitics and the Atomists, the logical categories of “being,” “becoming,” and being per se may be successively ascribed, and so far, as already remarked, the parallelism extends, but no farther. Not only does Anaxagoras follow with the conception of reason working according to an end, but if we go back before the Eleatics, we find in the very beginning of philosophy a total diversity between the logical and historical order. If Hegel had carried out his principle consistently, he should have thrown away entirely the Ionic [Pg 13] [Pg 14] [Pg 15] philosophy, for matter is no logical category; he should have placed the Pythagoreans after the Eleatics and the Atomists, for in logical order the categories of quantity follow those of quality; in short, he would have been obliged to set aside all chronology. Unless this be done, we must be satisfied with a theoretical reproduction of the course which the thinking spirit has taken in its history, only so far as we can see in the grand stages of history a rational progress of thought; only so far as the philosophical historian, surveying a period of development, actually finds in it a philosophical acquisition,—the acquisition of a new idea: but we must guard ourselves against applying to the transition and intermediate steps, as well as to the whole detail of history, the postulate of an immanent conformity to law, or an organism in harmony with our own thoughts. History often winds its way like a serpent in lines which appear retrogressive, and philosophy, especially, has not seldom withdrawn herself from a wide and already fruitful field, in order to settle down upon a narrow strip of land, the limits even of which she has sought still more closely to abridge. At one time we find thousands of years expended in fruitless attempts with only a negative result;—at another, a fulness of philosophical ideas are crowded together in the experience of a lifetime. There is here no sway of an immutable and regularly returning law, but history, as the realm of freedom, will first completely manifest itself at the end of time as the work of reason. SECTION II. CLASSIFICATION. A few words will suffice to define our problem and classify its elements. Where and when does philosophy begin? Manifestly, according to the analysis made in § I., where a final philosophical principle, a final ground of being is first sought in a philosophical way,—and hence with the Grecian philosophy. The Oriental—Chinese and Hindoo—so named philosophies,—but which are rather theologies or mythologies,—and the mythic cosmogonies of Greece, in its earliest periods, are, therefore, excluded from our more definite problem. Like Aristotle, we shall begin the history of philosophy with Thales. For similar reasons we exclude also the philosophy of the Christian middle ages, or Scholasticism. This is not so much a philosophy, as a philosophizing or reflecting within the already prescribed limits of positive religion. It is, therefore, essentially theology, and belongs to the science of the history of Christian doctrines. The material which remains after this exclusion, may be naturally divided into two periods; viz:—ancient—Grecian and Græco-Romanic—and modern philosophy. Since a preliminary comparison of the characteristics of these two epochs could not here be given without a subsequent repetition, we shall first speak of their inner relations, when we come to treat of the transition from the one to the other. The first epoch can be still farther divided into three periods; (1.) The pre-Socratic philosophy, i. e. from Thales to the Sophists inclusive; (2.) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; (3.) The post-Aristotelian philosophy, including New Platonism. SECTION III. GENERAL VIEW OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. 1. The universal tendency of the pre-Socratic philosophy is to find some principle for the explanation of nature. Nature, the most immediate, that which first met the eye and was the most palpable, was that which first aroused the inquiring mind. At the basis of its changing forms,—beneath its manifold appearances, thought they, lies a first principle which abides the same through all change. What then, they asked, is this principle? What is the original ground of things? Or, more accurately, what element of nature is the fundamental element? To solve this inquiry was the problem of the Ionic natural philosophers. One proposes as a solution, water, another, air, and a third, an original chaotic matter. 2. The Pythagoreans attempted a higher solution of this problem. The proportions and dimensions of matter rather than its sensible concretions, seemed to them to furnish the true explanation of being. They, accordingly, adopted as the principle of their philosophy, that which would express a determination of proportions, i. e. numbers. “Number is the essence of all things,” was their position. Number is the mean between the immediate sensuous intuition and the pure thought. Number and measure have, to be sure, nothing to do with matter only in so far as it possesses extension, and is capable of division in space and time, but yet we should have no numbers or measures if there were no matter, or nothing which could meet the intuitions of our sense. This elevation above matter, which is at the same time a cleaving to matter, constitutes the essence and the character of Pythagoreanism. 3. Next come the Eleatics, who step absolutely beyond that which is given in experience, and make a complete [Pg 16] [Pg 17] [Pg 18] abstraction of every thing material. This abstraction, this negation of all division in space and time, they take as their principle, and call it pure being. Instead of the sensuous principle of the Ionics, or the symbolic principle of the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, therefore, adopt an intelligible principle. 4. Herewith closes the analytic, the first course in the development of Grecian philosophy, to make way for the second, or synthetic course. The Eleatics had sacrificed to their principle of pure being, the existence of the world and every finite existence. But the denial of nature and the world could not be maintained. The reality of both forced itself upon the attention, and even the Eleatics had affirmed it, though in guarded and hypothetical terms. But from their abstract being there was no passage back to the sensuous and concrete; their principle ought to have explained the being of events, but it did not. To find a principle for the explanation of these, a principle which would account for the becoming, the event was still the problem. Heraclitus solved it, by asserting that, inasmuch as being has no more reality than not being, therefore the unity of the two, or in other words the becoming, is the absolute principle. He held that it belonged to the very essence of finite being that it be conceived in a continual flow, in an endless stream. “Every thing flows.” We have here the conception of original energy, instead of the Ionic original matter; the first attempt to explain being and its motion from a principle analytically attained. From the time of Heraclitus, this inquiry after the cause of the becoming, remained the chief interest and the moving spring of philosophical development. 5. Becoming is the unity of being and not-being, and into these two elements is the Heraclitic principle consciously analyzed by the Atomists. Heraclitus had uttered the principle of the becoming, but only as a fact of experience. He had simply expressed it as a law, but had not explained it. The necessity for this universal law yet remained to be proved. WHY is every thing in a perpetual flow—in an eternal movement? From the dynamical combination of matter and the moving force, the next step was to a consciously determined distinction, to a mechanical division of the two. Thus Empedocles combining the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, considered matter as the abiding being, while force was the ground of the movement. But the Atomists still considered the moving mythic energies as forces; Empedocles regarded them as love and hate; and Democritus as unconscious necessity. The result was, therefore, that the becoming was rather limited as a means for the mechanical explanation of nature, than itself explained. 6. Despairing of any merely materialistic explanation of the becoming, Anaxagoras next appears, and places a world- forming Intelligence by the side of matter. He recognized mind as the primal causality, to which the existence of the world, together with its determined arrangement and design (zweckmässigkeit) must be referred. In this, philosophy gained a great principle, viz.— an ideal one. But Anaxagoras did not know how to fully carry out his principles. Instead of a theoretical comprehension of the universe—instead of deriving being from the idea, he grasped again after some mechanical explanation. His “world-forming reason” serves him only as a first impulse, only as a moving power. It is to him a Deus ex machina. Notwithstanding, therefore, his glimpse of something higher than matter, yet was Anaxagoras only a physical philosopher, like his predecessors. Mind had not yet appeared to him as a true force above nature, as an organizing soul of the universe. 7. It is, therefore, a farther progress in thought, to comprehend accurately the distinction between mind and nature, and to recognize mind as something higher and contra-distinguished from all natural being. This problem fell to the Sophists. They entangled in contradictions, the thinking which had been confined to the object, to that which was given, and gave to the objective world which had before been exalted above the subject, a subordinate position in the dawning and yet infantile consciousness of the superiority of subjective thinking. The Sophists carried their principle of subjectivity, though at first this was only negative, into the form of the universal religious and political changing condition (Aufklärung).[1] They stood forth as the destroyers of the whole edifice of thought that had been thus far built, until Socrates appeared, and set up against this principle of empirical subjectivity, that of the absolute subjectivity,—that of the spirit in the form of a free moral will, and the thought is positively considered as something higher than existence, as the truth of all reality. With the Sophist closes our first period, for with these the oldest philosophy finds its self- destruction (Selbstauflösung). SECTION IV. THE IONIC PHILOSOPHERS. 1. Thales.—At the head of the Ionic natural philosophers, and therefore at the head of philosophy, the ancients are generally agreed in placing Thales of Miletus, a cotemporary of Crœsus and Solon; although this beginning lies more in the region of tradition than of history. The philosophical principle to which he owes his place in the history of philosophy is, that, “the principle (the primal, the original ground) of all things is water; from water every thing arises and into water every thing returns.” But simply to assume water as the original ground of things was not to advance beyond his myth- making predecessors and their cosmologies. Aristotle, himself, when speaking of Thales, refers to the old “theologians,”—meaning, doubtless, Homer and Hesiod,—who had ascribed to Oceanus and Thetis, the origin of all things. Thales, however, merits his place as the beginner of philosophy, because he made the first attempt to establish his physical principle, without resorting to a mythical representation, and, therefore, brought into philosophy a scientific [Pg 19] [Pg 20] [Pg 21] procedure. He is the first who has placed his foot upon the ground of a logical (verständig) explanation of nature. We cannot now say with certainty, how he came to adopt his principle, though he might have been led to it, by perceiving that dampness belonged to the seed and nourishment of things; that warmth is developed from moisture; and that, generally, moisture might be the plastic, living and life-giving principle. From the condensation and expansion of this first principle, he derives, as it seems, the changes of things, though the way in which this is done, he has not accurately determined. The philosophical significance of Thales does not appear to extend any farther. He was not a speculative philosopher after a later mode. Philosophical book-making was not at all the order of his day, and he does not seem to have given any of his opinions a written form. On account of his ethico-political wisdom, he is numbered among the so-named “seven wise men,” and the characteristics which the ancients furnish concerning him only testify to his practical understanding. He is said e. g. to have first calculated an eclipse of the sun, to have superintended the turning of the course of the Halys under Crœsus, &c. When subsequent narrators relate that he had asserted the unity of the world, had set up the idea of a world-soul, and had taught the immortality of the soul and the personality of God, it is doubtless an unhistorical reference of later ideas to a standpoint, which was, as yet, far from being developed. 2. Anaximander.—Anaximander, sometimes represented by the ancients as a scholar and sometimes as a companion of Thales, but who was, at all events, younger than the latter, sought to carry out still farther his principles. The original essence which he assumed, and which he is said to have been the first to have named principle (ἀρχὴ), he defined as the “unlimited, eternal and unconditioned,” as that which embraced all things and ruled all things, and which, since it lay at the basis of all determinateness of the finite and the changeable, is itself infinite and undeterminate. How we are to regard this original essence of Anaximander is a matter of dispute. Evidently it was not one of the four common elements, though we must not, therefore, think it was something incorporeal and immaterial. Anaximander probably conceived it as the original matter before it had separated into determined elements,—as that which was first in the order of time, or what is in our day called the chemical indifference in the opposition of elements. In this respect his original essence is indeed “unlimited” and “undetermined,” i. e. has no determination of quality nor limit of quantity, yet it is not, therefore, in any way, a pure dynamical principle, as perhaps the “friendship” and “enmity” of Empedocles might have been, but it was only a more philosophical expression for the same thought, which the old cosmogonies have attempted to utter in their representation of chaos. Accordingly, Anaximander suffers the original opposition of cold and warm, of dry and moist (i. e. the basis of the four elements) to be secreted from his original essence, a clear proof that it was only the undeveloped, unanalyzed, potential being of these elemental opposites. 3. Anaximenes.—Anaximenes, who is called by some the scholar, and by others the companion of Anaximander, turned back more closely to the view of Thales, in that he made air as the principle of all things. The perception that air surrounds the whole world, and that breath conditions the activity of life, seems to have led him to his position. 4. Retrospect.—The whole philosophy of the three Ionic sages may be reduced to these three points, viz:—(1.) They sought for the universal essence of concrete being; (2.) They found this essence in a material substance or substratum; (3.) They gave some intimation respecting the derivation of the elements from this original matter. SECTION V. PYTHAGOREANISM. 1. Its Relative Position.—The development of the Ionic philosophy discloses the tendency to abstract matter from all else; though they directed this process solely to the determined quality of matter. It is this abstraction carried to a higher step, when we look away from the sensible concretions of matter, and no more regard its qualitative determinateness as water, air, &c., but only direct our attention to its quantitative determinateness,—to its space-filling property. But the determinateness of quantity is number, and this is the principle and standpoint of Pythagoreanism. 2. Historical and Chronological.—The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers is referred to Pythagoras of Samos, who is said to have flourished between 540 and 500 B. C. He dwelt in the latter part of his life at Crotonia, in Magna Grecia, where he founded a society, or, more properly, an order, for the moral and political regeneration of the lower Italian cities. Through this society, this new direction of philosophy seems to have been introduced,—though more as a mode of life than in the form of a scientific theory. What is related concerning the life of Pythagoras, his journeys, the new order which he founded, his political influence upon the lower Italian cities, &c., is so thoroughly interwoven with traditions, legends, and palpable fabrications, that we can be certain at no point that we stand upon a historical basis. Not only the old Pythagoreans, who have spoken of him, delighted in the mysterious and esoteric, but even his new- Platonistic biographers, Porphyry and Jamblichus, have treated his life as a historico-philosophical romance. We have the same uncertainty in reference to his doctrines, i. e. in reference to his share in the number-theory. Aristotle, e. g. does not ascribe this to Pythagoras himself, but only to the Pythagoreans generally, i. e. to their school. The accounts which are given respecting his school have no certainty till the time of Socrates, a hundred years after Pythagoras. [Pg 22] [Pg 23] [Pg 24] Among the few sources of light which we have upon this subject, are the mention made in Plato’s Phædon of the Pythagorean Philolaus and his doctrines, and the writings of Archytas, a cotemporary of Plato. We possess in fact the Pythagorean doctrine only in the manner in which it was taken up by Philolaus, Eurytas and Archytas, since its earlier adherents left nothing in a written form. 3. The Pythagorean Principle.—The ancients are united in affirming that the principle of the Pythagorean philosophy was number. But in what sense was this their principle—in a material or a formal sense? Did they hold number as the material of things, i. e. did they believe that things had their origin in numbers, or did they regard it as the archetype of things, i. e. did they believe that things were made as the copy or the representation of numbers? From this very point the accounts given by the ancients diverge, and even the expressions of Aristotle seem to contradict each other. At one time he speaks of Pythagoreanism in the former, and at another in the latter sense. From this circumstance modern scholars have concluded that the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers had different forms of development; that some of the Pythagoreans regarded numbers as the substances and others as the archetypes of things. Aristotle, however, gives an intimation how the two statements may be reconciled with each other. Originally, without doubt, the Pythagoreans regarded number as the material, as the inherent essence of things, and therefore Aristotle places them together with the Hylics (the Ionic natural philosophers), and says of them that “they held things for numbers” (Metaph. I., 5, 6). But as the Hylics did not identify their matter, e. g. water, immediately with the sensuous thing, but only gave it out as the fundamental element, as the original form of the individual thing, so, on the other side, numbers also might be regarded as similar fundamental types, and therefore Aristotle might say of the Pythagoreans, that “they held numbers to be the corresponding original forms of being, as water, air, &c.” But if there still remains a degree of uncertainty in the expressions of Aristotle respecting the sense of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, it can only have its ground in the fact that the Pythagoreans did not make any distinction between a formal and material principle, but contented themselves with the undeveloped view, that, “number is the essence of things, every thing is number.” 4. The carrying-out of this Principle.—From the very nature of the “number-principle,” it follows that its complete application to the province of the real, can only lead to a fruitless and empty symbolism. If we take numbers as even and odd, and still farther as finite and infinite, and apply them as such to astronomy, music, psychology, ethics, &c., there arise combinations like the following, viz.: one is the point, two are the line, three are the superficies, four are the extension of a body, five are the condition (beschaffenheit), &c.—still farther, the soul is a musical harmony, as is also virtue, the soul of the world, &c. Not only the philosophical, but even the historical interest here ceases, since the ancients themselves—as was unavoidable from the arbitrary nature of such combinations—have given the most contradictory account, some affirming that the Pythagoreans reduced righteousness to the number three, others, that they reduced it to the number four, others again to five, and still others to nine. Naturally, from such a vague and arbitrary philosophizing, there would early arise, in this, more than in other schools, a great diversity of views, one ascribing this signification to a certain mathematical form, and another that. In this mysticism of numbers, that which alone has truth and value, is the thought, which lies at the ground of it all, that there prevails in the phenomena of nature a rational order, harmony and conformity to law, and that these laws of nature can be represented in measure and number. But this truth has the Pythagorean school hid under extravagant fancies, as vapid as they are unbridled. The physics of the Pythagoreans possesses little scientific value, with the exception of the doctrine taught by Philolaus respecting the circular motion of the earth. Their ethics is also defective. What we have remaining of it relates more to the Pythagorean life, i. e. to the practice and discipline of their order than to their philosophy. The whole tendency of Pythagoreanism was in a practical respect ascetic, and directed to a strict culture of the character. As showing this, we need only to cite their doctrines concerning the transmigration of the soul, or, as it has been called, their “immortality doctrine,” their notion in respect of the lower world, their opposition to suicide, and their view of the body as the prison of the soul—all of which ideas are referred to in Plato’s Phædon, and the last two of which are indicated as belonging to Philolaus. SECTION VI. THE ELEATICS. 1. Relation of the Eleatic Principle to the Pythagorean.—While the Pythagoreans had made matter, in so far as it is quantity and the manifold, the basis of their philosophizing, and while in this they only abstracted from the determined elemental condition of matter, the Eleatics carry the process to its ultimate limit, and make, as the principle of their philosophy, a total abstraction from every finite determinateness, from every change and vicissitude which belongs to concrete being. While the Pythagoreans had held fast to the form of being as having existence in space and time, the Eleatics reject this, and make as their fundamental thought the negation of all exterior and posterior. Only being is, and there is no not-being, nor becoming. This being is the purely undetermined, changeless ground of all things. It is not being in becoming, but it is being as exclusive of all becoming; in other words, it is pure being. Eleaticism is, therefore, Monism, in so far as it strove to carry back the manifoldness of all being to a single ultimate [Pg 25] [Pg 26] [Pg 27] principle; but on the other hand it becomes Dualism, in so far as it could neither carry out its denial of concrete existence, i. e., the phenomenal world, nor yet derive the latter from its presupposed original ground. The phenomenal world, though it might be explained as only an empty appearance, did yet exist; and, since the sensuous perception would not ignore this, there must be allowed it, hypothetically at least, the right of existence. Its origin must be explained, even though with reservations. This contradiction of an unreconciled Dualism between being and existence, is the point where the Eleatic philosophy is at war with itself—though, in the beginning of the school—with Xenophanes, it does not yet appear. The principle itself, with its results, is only fully apparent in the lapse of time. It has three periods of formation, which successively appear in three successive generations. Its foundation belongs to Xenophanes; its systematic formation to Parmenides; its completion and partial dissolution to Zeno and Melissus—the latter of whom we can pass by. 2. Xenophanes.—Xenophanes is considered as the originator of the Eleatic tendency. He was born at Colophon; emigrated to Elea, a Phocian colony in Lucania, and was a younger cotemporary of Pythagoras. He appears to have first uttered the proposition—“every thing is one,” without, however, giving any more explicit determination respecting this unity, whether it be one simply in conception or...