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Title: A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol 2 Modern Philosophy Author: Herbert Ernest Cushman Release Date: July 16, 2020 [EBook #62663] Language: English Character set encoding: UTF-8 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BEGINNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL 2 *** Produced by Richard Hulse and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Transcriber’s Notes The cover image was provided by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain. Punctuation has been standardized. Most abbreviations have been expanded in tool-tips for screen-readers and may be seen by hovering the mouse over the abbreviation. This book was written in a period when many words had not become standardized in their spelling. Words may have multiple spelling variations or inconsistent hyphenation in the text. These have been left unchanged unless indicated with a Transcriber’s Note. Index references have not been checked for accuracy. Footnotes are identified in the text with a superscript number and have been accumulated in a table at the end of the text. Transcriber’s Notes are used when making corrections to the text or to provide additional information for the modern reader. These notes have been accumulated in a table at the end of the book and are identified in the text by a dotted underline and may be seen in a tool-tip by hovering the mouse over the underline. IMMANUEL KANT (The Puttrich’sche Portrait of Kant was printed in the Kant-Studien in 1906 and is said by Professor Vaihinger to be one of the best likenesses of the Königsberg philosopher. The name of the artist was Puttrich, and the original painting goes back before 1798. It is interesting to note that this portrait of Kant was used by the sculptor, Rauch, as his model for the statue of Kant upon the memorial monument of Frederick the Great.) A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN, LL.D., Ph.D. Sometime Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College Lecturer of Philosophy in Harvard College Lecturer of Philosophy in Dartmouth College VOL. II MODERN PHILOSOPHY BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY The Riverside Press Cambridge COPYRIGHT, 1911, BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PREFACE The pedagogical purpose of this history of philosophy is stated in the Preface to the first volume. It may be desirable in this place to restate what that purpose is. This book is intended as a text-book for sketch-courses in the history of philosophy. It is written for the student rather than for the teacher. It is a history of philosophy upon the background of geography and of literary and political history. Since the book is intended for the student, it makes the teacher all the more necessary; for it puts into the hands of the student an outline of the history of philosophy and into the hands of the teacher the class-room time for inspiring the student with his own interpretations. In making use of geographical maps, contemporary literature, and political history, this book is merely employing for pedagogical reasons the stock of information with which the student is furnished, when he begins the history of philosophy. The summaries, tables, and other generalizations are employed, as in text-books in other subjects, as helps to the memory. Therefore the book has the single purpose of arranging and organizing the material of the history of philosophy for the beginner. The student will be impressed with the short time-length of the modern period compared with the tremendously long stretches of the periods of antiquity. The modern period is only four hundred and fifty years in length, if we take the date 1453 as its beginning. Compared to the twenty-two hundred years of ancient and mediæval life, the period of modern life seems very short. Furthermore the student who has followed the philosophy of antiquity must have observed how often philosophy arose out of ethnic situations in which whole civilizations were involved. He will find that modern philosophy in this respect stands in contrast with the philosophy of ancient times. With the decentralizing of modern Europe, philosophy has also become decentralized. This does not mean that philosophical movements have included fewer people in their sweep, but that the movements have had shorter life, the transitions have been quicker, and the epochs have been briefer. Modern civilization is subjective; and its philosophy is thereby more technical, and more difficult to understand and to interpret than the philosophy of antiquity. There are many helpful books in English on the history of modern philosophy, and the student should have them at hand. I call attention especially to Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, for its judicious selection from the original sources; to Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, chapters iii to x; to Eucken, The Problem of Human Life, pp. 303 to 518; and to the Summaries in Windelband, History of Philosophy, Parts IV to VII. Besides these there are valuable histories of modern philosophy by Falckenberg, Höffding (2 vols.), Weber, Ueberweg (vol. ii), Calkins, Dewing, and Rogers. To friends who have read parts of the manuscript, I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness for many wise criticisms and suggestions; especially to Professor W. A. Neilson, Professor R. B. Perry, Dr. B. A. G. Fuller, and Dr. J. H. Woods of Harvard University; to Professor Mary W. Calkins of Wellesley College; to Professor W. P. Montague of Columbia University; and to Professor S. P. Capen of Clark College. Tufts College, December, 1910. CONTENTS VOLUME II. MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1453 to the Present Time) CHAPTER I. The Characteristics and Divisions of the Modern Period 1 The Difficulty in the Study of Modern Philosophy 1 The Periods of Modern Philosophy 2 The Causes of the Decay of the Civilization of the Middle Ages 4 (a) The Internal Causes 4 (1) The Intellectual Methods were Self-Destructive 4 (2) The Standard of Truth became a Double Standard 5 (3) The Development of Mysticism 5 (4) The Doctrine of Nominalism 5 (b) The External Causes 6 CHAPTER II. The Renaissance (1453–1690) 8 The General Character of the Renaissance 8 (a) The New Man of the Renaissance 8 (b) The New Universe of the Renaissance 9 (1) The Transformation of the Physical Universe 9 (2) The Restoration of the World of Antiquity 10 The Significance of the Renaissance in History 11 Map showing the Decentralization of Europe 13 The Two Periods of the Renaissance: The Humanistic (1453–1600); The Natural Science (1600–1690) 15 (a) The Similarities of the Two Periods 16 (b) The Differences of the Two Periods 16 (1) The Countries which participate in the Renaissance differ in the Two Periods 16 (2) The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two Periods 17 (3) The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were Different 18 (4) The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs in the Two Periods 19 A Brief Contrast of the Two Periods—A Summary of the Discussion above 21 CHAPTER III. The Humanistic Period of the Renaissance (1453–1600) 22 The Long List of Representatives of the Humanistic Period 22 Nicolas of Cusa (1401–1464) 24 Paracelsus (1493–1541) 25 Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) 27 Map showing the Birthplaces of the Chief Philosophers of the Renaissance 30 CHAPTER IV. The Natural Science Period of the Renaissance (1600–1690) 31 The Philosophers of the Natural Science Period 31 The Mathematical Astronomers 32 Galileo Galilei (1564–1641) 36 The Life of Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam (1561–1626) 39 The Position of Bacon in Philosophy 39 The Aim of Bacon 42 The Method of Bacon 43 (a) Bacon’s Criticism of the Past 44 (b) Bacon’s Positive Construction 45 The English Natural Science Movement 46 Thomas Hobbes and his Contemporaries 47 The Life and Writings of Hobbes (1588–1679) 49 1. As a Classical Scholar (1588–1628) 49 2. As Mathematician (1628–1638) 49 3. As Philosopher (1638–1651) 50 4. As Controversialist (1651–1668) 50 5. As Classical Scholar (1668–1679) 50 The Influences upon the Thought of Hobbes 50 1. His Premature Birth 50 2. His Father 51 3. The New Mathematical Science 52 The Fundamental Principle in the Teaching of Hobbes 52 The Method of Hobbes 54 The Kinds of Bodies 55 Hobbes’s Application of the Mathematical Theory to Psychology 56 Hobbes’s Application of the Mathematical Theory to Politics 58 The Renaissance in England after Hobbes 61 CHAPTER V. The Rationalism of the Natural Science Period of the Renaissance 62 The Nature of Rationalism 62 The Mental Conflict in Descartes 65 The Life and Philosophical Writings of Descartes (1596–1650) 66 1. As Child and Student (1596–1613) 66 2. As Traveler (1613–1628) 66 3. As Writer (1629–1650) 67 4. In Stockholm (1649–1650) 67 The Two Conflicting Influences upon the Thought of Descartes 67 The Method of Descartes 69 Induction—Provisional Doubt—The Ultimate Certainty of Consciousness 70 Deduction—The Implications of Consciousness 72 The Existence of God 73 The Reality of Matter 75 God and the World 77 The Relation of God to Matter 77 The Relation of God to Minds 78 The Relation of Mind and Body 78 The Influence of Descartes 80 The Relation of the Occasionalists and Spinoza to Descartes 81 Portrait of Spinoza 84 The Historical Place of Spinoza 84 The Influences upon Spinoza 86 1. His Jewish Training 86 2. His Impulse from the New Science—Descartes’ Influence 86 3. His Acquaintance with the Collegiants 87 The Life and Philosophical Writings of Spinoza (1632–1677) 88 1. In Israel (1632–1656) 89 2. In Retirement (1656–1663) 89 3. In the Public Eye (1663–1677) 90 The Method of Spinoza 90 The Fundamental Principle of Spinoza’s Philosophy 91 Three Central Problems in Spinoza’s Teaching 93 The Pantheism of Spinoza—The All-Inclusiveness of God 94 The Mysticism of Spinoza 98 Spinoza’s Doctrine of Salvation 102 Summary of Spinoza’s Teaching 106 Leibnitz as the Finisher of the Renaissance and the Forerunner of the Enlightenment 107 The Life and Writings of Leibnitz (1646–1716) 108 1. Leipsic and University Life (1646–1666) 111 2. Mainz and Diplomacy (1666–1672) 111 3. Paris and Science (1672–1676) 111 4. Hanover and Philosophy (1676–1716) 112 The Three Influences upon the Thought of Leibnitz 112 (1) His Early Classical Studies 112 (2) The New Science and his own Discoveries 113 (3) Political Pressure for Religious Reconciliation 114 The Method of Leibnitz 115 The Immediate Problem for Leibnitz 118 The Result of Leibnitz’s Examination of the Principles of Science—A Plurality of Metaphysical Substances 119 1. Leibnitz first scrutinized the Scientific Conception of Motion 119 2. Leibnitz next examined the Scientific Conception of the Atom 120 3. Leibnitz then identified Force with the Metaphysical Atom 121 The Double Nature of the Monads 122 The Two Forms of Leibnitz’s Conception of the Unity of Substances 125 The Intrinsic Unity of the Monads—The Philosophical Unity 125 The Superimposed Unity of the Monads—The Theological Unity 129 CHAPTER VI. The Enlightenment (1690–1781) 132 The Emergence of the “New Man”—Individualism 132 The Practical Presupposition of the Enlightenment—The Independence of the Individual 134 The Metaphysical Presupposition of the Enlightenment 135 The Problems of the Enlightenment 135 (a) Utilitarian Problems 136 (b) Questions of Criticism 138 A Comparison of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany 140 The Many Groups of Philosophers of the Enlightenment 140 Map showing the Birthplaces of some of the Influential Thinkers of the Enlightenment 144 CHAPTER VII. John Locke 145 The Enlightenment in Great Britain 145 John Locke, Life and Writings (1632–1704) 147 1. Student Life (1632–1666) 147 2. As Politician (1666–1683) 148 3. As Philosophical Author (1683–1691) 149 4. As Controversialist (1691–1704) 149 The Sources of Locke’s Thought 150 1. His Puritan Ancestry 150 2. His Training in Tolerance 150 3. The Scientific Influence 151 4. The Political Influence 152 Summary 153 The Purpose of Locke 153 Two Sides of Locke’s Philosophy 155 (a) The Negative Side—Locke and Scholasticism 156 (b) The Positive Side—The New Psychology and Epistemology 157 Locke’s Psychology 158 Locke’s Theory of Knowledge 160 Locke’s Practical Philosophy 162 The Influence of Locke 163 The English Deists 164 The English Moralists 166 Chronological Table of the English Moralists 168 CHAPTER VIII. Berkeley and Hume 169 The Life and Writings of George Berkeley (1685–1753) 169 1. His Early Training (1685–1707) 169 2. As Author (1707–1721) 170 3. As Priest and Missionary (1721–1753) 171 The Influences upon the Thought of Berkeley 172 The Purpose of Berkeley 173 Berkeley’s General Relation to Locke and Hume 174 Berkeley’s Points of Agreement with Locke 175 The Negative Side of Berkeley’s Philosophy 176 1. As shown in General in his Analysis of Abstract Ideas 177 2. As shown in Particular in his Analysis of Matter 177 The Positive Side of Berkeley’s Philosophy 179 1. Esse est Percipi 179 2. The Existence of Mind is assumed by Berkeley 180 3. Spiritual Substances are Sufficient to explain all Ideas 181 The Life and Writings of David Hume (1711–1776) 183 1. Period of Training (1711–1734) 184 2. Period of Philosopher (1734–1752) 185 3. Period of Politician (1752–1776) 185 Influences upon the Thought of Hume 186 Dogmatism, Phenomenalism, and Skepticism 187 The Origin of Ideas 189 The Association of Ideas 191 The Association of Contiguity 193 The Association of Resemblance 194 1. Mathematics 194 2. The Conception of Substance: Hume’s Attack on Theology 195 The Association of Causation: Hume’s Attack on Science 196 The Extent and Limits of Human Knowledge 199 Hume’s Theory of Religion and Ethics 200 The Scottish School 201 CHAPTER IX. The Enlightenment in France and Germany 203 The Situation in France in the Enlightenment 203 The English Influence in France 206 The Two Periods of the French Enlightenment 207 The Intellectual Enlightenment (1729–1762)—Voltaire, Montesquieu, and the Encyclopædists 208 Voltaire (1694–1778) 209 The Encyclopædists 211 The Social Enlightenment (1762–1789) 213 Rousseau (1712–1778) 213 The German Enlightenment (1740–1781) 216 The Introductory Period (1648–1740). Absolutism 217 1. The Rise of Prussia 218 2. The Early German Literature 219 3. The Pietistic Movement 219 4. The Transformation of Leibnitz’s Rationalism 220 Summary of the Literary Enlightenment of Germany (1740–1781) 223 The Political Enlightenment of Germany—Frederick the Great 224 The Course of the German Enlightenment 226 Lessing 228 CHAPTER X. Kant 230 The Convergence of Philosophical Influences in Germany 230 The Three Characteristics of German Philosophy 231 The Two Periods of German Philosophy 232 The Influences upon Kant 233 1. Pietism 233 2. The Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy 233 3. The Physics of Newton 234 4. The Humanitarianism of Rousseau 234 5. The Skepticism of Hume 235 The Life and Writings of Kant (1724–1804) 235 The Problem of Kant 238 The Method of Kant 239 The Threefold World of Kant—Subjective States, Things-in-Themselves, and Phenomena 240 The World of Knowledge 243 The Place of Synthesis in Knowledge 245 The Judgments Indispensable to Human Knowledge 248 The Proof of the Validity of Human Knowledge 252 1. In what does the Validity of Sense-Perception consist? 253 2. In what does the Validity of the Understanding consist? 255 Has the Reason by itself any Validity? 260 The Idea of the Soul 262 The Idea of the Universe 264 The Idea of God 265 Conclusion 268 The Problem of the Critique of Practical Reason: The Ethics of Kant 269 The Moral Law and the Two Questions concerning it 271 1. The First Question concerning the Moral Law 272 2. The Second Question concerning the Moral Law 273 The Moral Postulates 275 1. The Postulate of Freedom 276 2. The Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul 276 3. The Postulate of the Existence of God 276 CHAPTER XI. The German Idealists 278 Idealism after Kant 278 Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel 279 Map showing the University Towns and other Important Places connected with the German Idealists 280 The Life and Writings of Fichte (1762–1814) 282 1. His Education (1762–1790) 283 2. Discipleship of Kant (1790–1794) 283 3. His Life at Jena (1794–1799) 284 4. His Life at Berlin (1799–1814) 284 The Influences upon Fichte’s Teaching 285 Why we Philosophize 286 The Moral Awakening 287 The Central Principle in Fichte’s Philosophy 288 The Moral World 290 God and Man 292 What a Moral Reality involves 293 1. It involves the Consciousness of Something Else 293 2. It involves a Contradiction 294 Romanticism 295 Goethe as a Romanticist 297 Romanticism in Philosophy 299 The Life and Writings of Schelling (1775–1854) 300 1. Earlier Period (1775–1797) 302 2. The Philosophy of Nature (1797–1800) 302 3. The Transcendental Philosophy (1800–1801) 302 4. The Philosophy of Identity (1801–1804) 303 5. The Philosophy of Freedom and God (1804–1809) 303 6. The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation (1809–1854) 303 A Brief Comparison of Fichte and Schelling as Philosophers 303 Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature 305 Schelling’s Transcendental Philosophy 307 The System of Identity 310 Schelling’s Religious Philosophy 311 Hegel and the Culmination of Idealism 312 Why Hegel remains to-day the Representative of Kant 314 The Life and Writings of Hegel (1770–1831) 315 1. Formative Period (1770–1796) 317 2. Formulation of his Philosophy (1796–1806) 317 3. Development of his Philosophy (1806–1831) 317 Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism 318 The Fundamental Principles of Hegel’s Idealism 321 The Cosmic Unity 322 The Cosmic Law 326 Hegel’s Application of his Theory 328 CHAPTER XII. The Philosophy of the Thing-in-Itself 330 Herbart and Schopenhauer 330 Johann Friedrich Herbart 332 The Life and Writings of Herbart (1776–1841) 333 The Contradictions of Experience 334 The Argument for Realism 334 The Many Reals and Nature Phenomena 337 The Soul and Mental Phenomena 338 Arthur Schopenhauer and his Philosophical Relations 340 The Life and Writings of Schopenhauer (1788–1860) 342 1. Period of Education (1788–1813) 343 2. Period of Literary Production (1813–1831) 343 3. Period of Retirement (1831–1860) 343 The Influences upon Schopenhauer’s Thought 343 The World as Will and the World as Idea 345 The Will as Irrational Reality 347 The Misery of the World as Idea—Pessimism 348 The Way of Deliverance 349 CHAPTER XIII. The Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century 352 The Return to Realism 352 The Character of the Realism of the Nineteenth Century 353 Modern Philosophy and German Idealism 355 The Philosophical Problems of the Nineteenth Century 356 1. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul 357 2. The Problem of the Conception of History 360 INDEX 365 ILLUSTRATIONS Immanuel Kant Frontispiece Map showing the Decentralization of Europe 13 Map showing the Birthplaces of the Chief Philosophers of the Renaissance 30 Baruch de Spinoza 84 Map showing the Birthplaces of some of the Influential Thinkers of the Enlightenment 144 Map showing the University Towns and other Important Places connected with the German Idealists 280 A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1453 TO THE PRESENT TIME) CHAPTER I THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DIVISIONS OF THE MODERN PERIOD The Difficulty in the Study of Modern Philosophy. Beside the great spans of ancient and mediæval civilizations, the 450 years of the modern period seem brief. The road is indeed relatively short from mediæval times to the century in which we live, and yet it proves difficult to the student who travels it for the first time. Even for the modern mind the study of modern philosophy is inherently more difficult than that of the ancient and mediæval. The preceding periods present new points of view, but these, once attained, lead along comparatively easy ways. The chief difficulty of the preceding periods is overcome when their peculiar view of things is gained; but the student of modern philosophy is confronted with difficulties all along the way. In the first place, modern philosophy is very complex because it is a conflict of various aspirations. It has neither the objectivity of ancient thought nor the logical consistency of mediæval thought. It arises from subjective motives, whose shadings are difficult to trace. The task is rendered harder by the fact that intimations of the problems in the history of modern philosophy are on the whole present in the beginner’s mind; and yet at the same time his mind possesses, besides these, many mediæval notions as well. For the student to pass successfully through the entire length of modern thought from Cusanus to Spencer means, therefore, two things for him: (1) he must gain an insight into the depth and significance of his own half-formed ideas; (2) he must transcend or give up entirely his mediæval notions. If therefore philosophy represents the epoch that produces it,—either as the central principle or as the marginal and ulterior development of that epoch,—the modern can come to an understanding of the history of modern philosophy only by coming to an understanding of himself and his own inner reflections. This will explain why the short period of modern thought is traditionally divided into comparatively many periods. These subordinate periods ring out the changes through which the modern man feels that he himself has blindly passed in his inner life. Modern philosophy is no more local and temporary than the ancient; it is no less a part of a social movement; but the modern man is more alive to the differentiations of modern thought than he is to those of antiquity. The Periods of Modern Philosophy. The divisions of the history of modern philosophy are as follows:— 1. The Renaissance (1453–1690)—from the end of the Middle Ages to the publication of Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. 2. The Enlightenment (1690–1781)—to the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 3. German Philosophy (1781–1831)—to the death of Hegel. 4. The Nineteenth Century Philosophy (1820–the present time). The Renaissance, the first period, covers more than half of the length of modern times. It is sometimes called the springtime of modern history, although it is longer than all the other seasons together. It is to be noted that two epoch-making books form the dividing lines between the first three periods. The transition from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment is signalized by Locke’s great Essay on the Human Understanding, which expressed for one hundred years the political and philosophical opinions of western Europe. The transition from the Enlightenment to German Philosophy was in its turn signalized by the appearance of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and this book may be said to have been fundamental to human thinking ever since. There is one point further to be noticed in these divisions, and that is the overlapping of the last two periods. German philosophy ends practically with the death of Hegel in 1831, and the modern Evolution movement began at least ten years before, about 1820. No great philosophical treatise marks the division here, for the Evolution movement had its beginnings in German philosophy and in the discoveries and practical inventions of natural science. Evolution, however, became a reaction upon the last phases of German philosophy, and then formed a distinct movement. The book that formulated the Evolution movement most fully appeared several years after the theory was under way. This was Darwin’s Origin of Species, published in 1859. Locke’s Essay and Kant’s Critique are therefore the most influential philosophical interpretations of the history of modern times since its early beginnings in the Renaissance. The Causes of the Decay of the Civilization of the Middle Ages. The social structure of the mediæval time weakened and broke apart, in the first place because of certain inherent defects in its organism; in the second place because of some remarkable discoveries, inventions, and historical changes. We may call these (1) the internal causes and (2) the external causes of the fall of the civilization of the Middle Ages. (a) The Internal Causes were inherent weaknesses in mediæval intellectual life, and alone would have been sufficient to bring mediæval society to an end. (1) The intellectual methods of the Middle Ages were self-destructive methods. We may take scholasticism as the best expression of the intellectual life of the Middle Ages, and scholasticism even in its ripest period used the method of deductive logic. Scholasticism did not employ induction from observation and experiment, but proceeded on the principle that the more universal logically a conception is, the more real it is. (See vol. i, p. 355.) On this principle scholasticism set as its only task to penetrate and clarify dogma. Its theism was a logical theism. Even Thomas Aquinas, the great classic schoolman, used formal logic (dialectics) as the method of obtaining the truth. After him in the latter part of the Middle Ages, logic instead of being a method became an end. It was studied for its own sake. This naturally degenerated into word-splitting and quibbling, into the commenting upon the texts of this master and that, into arid verbal discussions. The religious orders frittered away their time on verbal questions of trifling importance. The lifetime of such intellectual employment is always a limited one. (2) The standard of the truth of things in the Middle Ages became a double standard, and was therefore self-destructive. Ostensibly there was only one standard,—infallible dogma. Really there were two standards,—reason and dogma. The employment of logical methods implied the human reason as a valid standard. Logic is the method of human reasoning. To use logic to clarify dogma, to employ the philosophy of Aristotle to supplement the Bible, to defend faith by argument, amounted in effect to supporting revelation by reason. It was the same as defending the infallible and revealed by the fallible and secular. It was the erecting of a double standard. It called the infallible into question. It was the offering of excuses for what is supposedly beyond suspicion. The scholastic made faith the object of thought, and thereby encouraged the spirit of free inquiry. (3) The development of Mysticism in the Middle Ages was a powerful factor that led to its dissolution. There is, of course, an element of mysticism in the doctrine of the church from St. Augustine onwards, and in the Early Period of the Middle Ages mysticism had no independence. But mysticism is essentially the direct communion with God on the part of the individual. The intermediary offices of the church are contradictory to the spirit of mysticism. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in the last period of scholasticism numerous independent mystics as representatives of the tendency of individualistic religion, which was to result in the Protestantism of the Renaissance. (4) The doctrine of Nominalism was the fourth important element to be mentioned that led to the dissolution of the civilization of the Middle Ages. This was easily suppressed by the church authorities in the early mediæval centuries, when it was a purely logical doctrine and had no empirical scientific basis. In the later years, however, nominalism gained great strength with the acquisition of knowledge of the nature world. Nominalism turned man’s attention away from the affairs of the spirit. It incited him to modify the realism of dogma. It pointed out the importance of practical experience. It emphasized individual opinion, neglected tradition, and placed its hope in the possibilities of science rather than in the spiritual actualities of religion. (b) The External Causes consisted of certain important events that brought the Middle Ages to a close and introduced the Renaissance. These events caused great social changes by demolishing the geographical and astronomical conceptions of mediæval time which had become a part of church tradition. First to be mentioned are the inventions which belong to the Middle Ages, but which came into common use not before the beginning of the Renaissance. These played an important part in the total change of the society which followed. They were the magnetic needle, gunpowder, which was influential in destroying the feudal system, and printing, which would have failed in its effect had not at the same time the manufacture of paper been improved. Moreover at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century occurred the following events:— 1453. Constantinople fell and its Greek scholars migrated to Italy. 1492. Columbus discovered America, an achievement which was made possible by the use of the magnetic needle. 1498. Vasco da Gama discovered the all-sea route to India and thereby changed the course of the world’s commerce. 1518. The Protestant Reformation was begun by Luther. 1530. Copernicus wrote his De revolutionibus orbium, in which he maintained that the earth moved around the sun. CHAPTER II THE RENAISSANCE 1 (1453–1690) The General Character of the Renaissance. The causes that led to the decline of the society of the Middle Ages were of course the same that ushered in the period of the Renaissance,—the first, the longest, and the most hopeful period of modern times. The general characterization of this period may be expressed in a single phrase,—a New Man in a New Universe. This, however, needs explanation. (a) The New Man of the Renaissance was distinctly a man with a country. The fusion of the German and Roman peoples in the Dark Ages before Charlemagne (800) was now completed. The fusion did not result in a homogeneous whole, but in groups which formed the nations of Europe. The time when this grouping was practically finished is a difficult problem, into which we will not inquire. In a real sense it never was nor will be ended. We know that the nations began to form about the year 1000, and when we examine the history of the Renaissance we find Italians, Germans, French, Dutch, and English with distinctive national characteristics. We find the Renaissance first centralized among the Italians and Germans, and then later among the English, the people of the Low Countries, and the French. The Italian is a new Roman and the German a new Teuton. The undefined nationalities of the Middle Ages now become clear-cut. Philosophy also becomes now more or less of a national concern. (b) A New Universe is now opened to the “New Man” of the Renaissance. Not only in mental equipment, but in scope for his activity, does the European of the Renaissance differ from the mediæval man. The world is actually a new world—new in its geographical outlines and its astronomical relations; new in its intellectual stores from the past. The physical world that supported his body and the intellectual world that refreshed his mind were newly discovered by the man of the Renaissance. We must examine these two new worlds more in detail. 1. The physical universe had undergone a wonderful transformation for man. Our nineteenth century has often been looked upon as a period of extraordinary discoveries; but no discoveries have ever so revolutionized the human mind as those enumerated above as “the external causes of the fall of the society of the Middle Ages.” Think how new that old world must have seemed to the common people who had supposed it to be flat, as well as to the scientists who had hypothetically supposed it to be solid—how new it must have seemed when they found that it had been actually circumnavigated! How the horizon of men’s minds must have widened when new continents were discovered by sailors and new celestial worlds were found by the telescope of the astronomers! Discovery led to experiment, and the whole new physical world was transformed by the new physical science of Galileo into a mechanical order. It was a wonderful new material world that was discovered and scientifically reorganized at the beginning of the Renaissance. Whereas the common man in mediæval time had found little joy in living, the common man now looked upon the world as a magnificent opportunity. Whereas the mediæval man had turned from the disorders of this wicked world to contemplation of the blessedness of heaven, the man of the Renaissance came forth from the cloister and engaged in trade and adventure. The earth and the things therein had suddenly become objects of emotional interest. 2. Not only was a new geographical and physical world discovered at this time, but also the intellectual world of antiquity was restored. For more than a thousand years in western Europe the literature of the Greeks and Romans had been a thing of shreds and patches, and even then read only in Latin translations. Now the European had come into possession of a large part of it and was reading it in the original. He was aroused to the wonderful intellectual life of the Age of Pericles. The interest in ancient literature, which had been started by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, became an absorbing and controlling force at this time. The real interest began with the stimulus received by the coming of the Greek scholars to Italy from the East: first the ecclesiastical embassy in 1438, and afterward in 1453 the large number of refugees from Constantinople at the time of its capture by the Turks. Upon these refugees the patronage of the great Italian nobles—chiefly perhaps in Florence—was lavishly bestowed. The Platonic Academy was founded. Learned expounders of the new learning arose,—Pletho, the two Picos, Fincinus, Reuchlin. Of all the philosophies of antiquity Platonism was favored, and it was interpreted in a mystical manner. Aristotle and Christianity were looked upon as mere interpretations of Plato. Nevertheless the Renaissance scholars were interested in all the new literary material from the East. They studied the Jewish Cabala and its mystic numbers. They revived Skepticism, Eclecticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism. Aristotle was represented by two antagonistic schools; and Taurellus opposed both and appealed to the scholarly world to return to Christianity. The Significance of the Renaissance in History. We have above characterized the Renaissance as a time in which a “new man” found himself living in a “new universe.” But the old world of mediæval science, culture, and conventional manners had by no means been entirely outgrown and discarded. Periods of history do not “leave their low-vaulted past” as easily as a man may throw away his coat. Mediæval science and theology still remained, not only as a background but also as an aggressive social factor everywhere. Mediæval scholasticism was something with which the Renaissance had always to reckon. Scholasticism modified, frequently restricted, and even directed the thought of the Renaissance. Consequently when we form our final estimate of the place of the Renaissance in the modern movement, we must not overlook the conservative force of the mediæval institutions existing during the period. The “new man” lived in a “new universe”; and his problem was how to explain the relation of that “new universe” to himself so that his explanation would not antagonize the time-honored traditions of the church. This was the constructive problem that gave the Renaissance its place in history. The first impression, however, of the Renaissance upon the reader is that it stands for no constructive problem whatever. The changes that usher in the Renaissance seem to speak of an epoch that is entirely negative, destructive, and revolutionary. The period seems from one side to be a declaration against time-honored traditions. The “new man” had risen superior to dogma and to Aristotle. Intellectual fermentation had set in, and never had so many attempts at innovation been so strenuously sought. The love for novelty filled the human mind, and the imagination ran riot. The movement toward modern individualism appeared in the decentralization that at this time was everywhere taking place. Latin, for example, ceased to be the one language for educated men, and the modern languages came into use. Rome ceased to be the only religious centre, and Wittenberg, London, and Geneva became centres. There was no longer one church, but many sects. Scientific centres became numerous. Many of the universities had arisen independently, and now Oxford, Vienna, Heidelberg, Prague, and numerous universities in Italy and Germany afforded opportunities for study equal to those of Paris. To the man who looks upon the Classic Period of Scholasticism in the Middle Ages as the golden age of united faith,—to that man the Renaissance will appear only as the beginning of the disintegration and revolution that he sees in modern times. MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (Note that Rome, Wittenberg, London, and Geneva are the religious centres; that Paris, Oxford, Heidelberg, and Prague are the educational centres; and that Europe is divided into many nations) But a deeper insight into the Renaissance shows that its revolutionary, negative, and spectacular aspect is not its whole significance. No doubt a strong, universal, and well-centralized government and a unity of faith are social ideals. The reverence in which the name of Rome was held long after the empire had been destroyed, and the reluctance with which the first Protestants separated themselves from the Catholic church, show that the loss of such a unity is a real loss. But the church of the Middle Ages was not the carrier of all the treasure of the past, nor could the church with its own inherent limitations stand as representative of modern times. The new problem which the Renaissance faced might be destructive of much of the traditional past, but it contained many new elements. The “new man” found himself in a “new universe.” He was obliged to undertake the solution of a far deeper problem than antiquity had ever attempted. He must orient himself in a larger world than the past had ever imagined. He must do this in the very presence of mediæval institutions, which had not lost their spiritual nor their temporal power. The constructive problem before the man of the Renaissance was therefore an exceedingly complex one. How should he explain his relation to the “new universe” in a way that would not antagonize tradition? It was a new problem, a real problem in which the traditional factor was always persistently present. There were two motifs which give to the problem of the Renaissance its constructive character. These were naturalism and subjectivism. In the first place, the Renaissance is the period when the naturalism of the Greeks was recovered. By naturalism is meant the love for earthly life. Of this the mediæval church and the mediæval time had little or nothing. The church had been born out of the revulsion from the earthly, and it rose on the aspiration for the supernatural. The Renaissance was, on the contrary, born out of a passionate joy in nature, which joy was intensified by the unexpected possession of the literature of the past and by the discovery of new lands beyond the seas. Man felt now the happiness and dignity of earthly living and the worth of the body as well as the soul. In the next place, the Renaissance is marked by the rise of subjectivism. At the beginning of our book we have already given the meaning of subjectivism (see vol. i, p. 2), and we have characterized modern civilization as subjective in distinction from the ancient as objective and the Middle Ages as traditional. We have also found, as we have gone on, the beginnings of subjectivism in the Sophists, Stoics, and Christians. But in the Renaissance for the first time does the individual as a rational self gain the central position. This is subjectivism: the individual is not only the interpreter of the universe, but also its mental creator. Of the subjective motif in modern times the Renaissance marks the inauguration, and German Idealism the culmination. While the world of the ancients was cosmo-centric and the mediæval world was theo-centric, the world of the modern man is ego-centric. The love of life, and the love of life because the individual feels his own capacity for life—this is the situation presented to the man of the Renaissance. Thus in the restoration of naturalism and in the construction of subjectivism did the Renaissance stand for positive upbuilding, in spite of the fact that in all this the period was constrained by the powerful tradition of the church. The Two Periods of the Renaissance: The Humanistic (1453–1600); The Natural Science (1600–1690). The Renaissance is divided into two periods at the year 1600. The reason for taking this date as a division line will soon appear. The period before 1600 we call the Humanistic, or the period of the Humanities; the period after this date the Natural Science Period. (a) The Similarities of the Two Periods. These two periods are alike in having the same motives. Both feel the same urgent need (1) for new knowledge, (2) for a new standard by which to measure their new knowledge, (3) for a new method of gaining knowledge. From the beginning to the end of the Renaissance the “new man” was feeling his way about, was trying to orient and readjust himself in his “new universe.” He was seeking new acquisitions to his rich stores of knowledge, to systematize his knowledge by some correct method, and to set up some standard by which his knowledge might be tested. (b) The Differences of the Two Periods. There are, however, some marked differences in the carrying out of these motives by each period, and to these we must give our attention. (1) The Countries which participate in the Renaissance differ in the Two Periods. In the Humanistic Period Italy and Germany were chiefly concerned. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, these countries had been engaged in commerce with the Orient, had become prosperous and more or less acquainted with the culture of the Orient. In the second place, Italy had been the refuge of the Greek scholars; when the colony of Greek refugees in Florence had died out in 1520, northerners like Erasmus, Agricola, Reuchlin, the Stephani, and Budæus had luckily already made themselves masters of the Greek language and literature, and had carried their learning into Germany. In the Natural Science Period the Renaissance had practically become dead both in Germany and in Italy. The reason for this is not far to seek. In Italy, in 1563, the Council of Trent had fixed the dogma of the church and had made it impossible for the church to assimilate anything more from antiquity. The so-called Counter-Reformation set in, and Italy became dumb under the persecutions of the Inquisition. Furthermore, the discovery of the sea-route to the East had turned commerce away from Italy. When we look to Germany, we find a similar situation. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) had devastated the land and had made intellectual life wholly impossible. On the other hand, England, France, and the Low Countries represent the Natural Science Period in the Renaissance. By the War of Liberation (1568–1648) Holland became the European country where the greatest freedom of thought was granted, and it proved itself an asylum for thinkers and scholars. France, through the influence of the University of Paris, was the centre of mathematical research. In England the brilliant Elizabethan era had already begun. (2) The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two Periods. The Humanistic Period has been well characterized as the time of “the struggle of traditions.” Naturally enough, with the revival of Greek learning the thinkers of the first period of the Renaissance would try to solve the new problems by the standards which they found in antiquity. What did Aristotle, Plato, the Epicureans say in matters of science? What standards did they yield for solving the new problems of the “new universe”? The traditions of antiquity were therefore revived; and the contention was, Which should be taken as a standard? Among all the ancient systems neo-Platonism became the most prominent. It dominated the Humanistic Period because its æsthetic character and its mystical explanations appealed to the susceptible mind of that time. Nevertheless, the sway of neo-Platonism was not absolute. The “struggle of traditions” continued throughout the period, as appears in the schisms of the church and in the literary and philosophical contentions. The Natural Science Period, in its hope of finding a standard to explain the problems of the “new universe,” discovered a new standard within the “new universe” itself. No tradition of antiquity had proved itself adequate to the situation. Nothing could be found in Plato and Aristotle to give a theoretic standard for the new discoveries and inventions. Nature disclosed its own standard within itself. The Natural Science Period said nature facts must be explained by nature facts. But the question will naturally be asked, Why did the thinkers of this period, when the theories of antiquity were found to be inadequate, turn to nature rather than elsewhere for an explanation of nature? The answer to this is found in the great successes of the physical astronomers, who had started their investigations at the beginning of the Humanistic Period, and had reached the zenith of their glory at the beginning of the Natural Science Period. The discoveries of Galileo were especially important. (3) The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were Different. The method usually employed in the Humanistic Period was magic. This first period tried to explain nature facts of the “new universe” by referring them to agencies in the spiritual world. In their neo-Platonic nature-worship the scholars of this period imagined that the control of nature was to be obtained by a fanciful linking of the parts of nature to the spirits supposed to be in nature. The Bible is the product of the spiritual world, so why is not the “new nature-world” inspired from the same source? God is the first cause of all things; He is in all things and each finite thing mirrors Him. All things have souls. To gain control over nature, some all-controlling formula must be found which will reveal the secret of the control of spirits over nature; and to master the spirits that control nature is to control nature herself. Hence arose, as the methods of this first period, magic, trance-mediumship, necromancy, alchemy, conjurations, and astrology. Antiquity could offer (and especially is this true of Platonism) only spiritual causes for nature facts,—hence the search in this time for the philosopher’s stone. There was never a blinder groping after a method. The scientific method used in the Natural Science Period was the mathematical. The world of experience was found to coincide with the number system, and therefore mathematics was used as the symbol to determine the form of nature events. Induction and deduction were used in different combinations. The period has been characterized as the time of “the strife of methods.” Induction and deduction became in fact the new methods of finding the truth about the “new world.” Whatever is clear and distinct, like the axioms, must be taken as true. All other knowledge must be deduced from these axiomatic certainties. In contrast with the magical methods of the Humanistic Period, which point beyond nature for an explanation of nature, here in the Natural Science Period mathematics need not lead the explanation farther than nature herself. (4) The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs in the Two Periods. In the Humanistic Period the attitude of the church toward the new learning was not yet defined. This was because the bearing of the new learning upon dogma was not yet understood. On the one hand, on matters upon which the church had clearly declared itself, it was easily seen what could and what could not be believed. But, on the other...